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Abstract 
This dissertation is dedicated to answer the questions: are we able to achieve accuracy in 
our initial trust perceptions (study 1) and what mechanism may account for this accuracy 
(study 2)?  The first study conducted was field based, using temporary student teams. I 
used the social relations model (SRM) to determine how trust perceptions shift over time 
relative to individual and team perceptions.  I found that individuals’ perceptions remain 
moderately consistent over time and calibrated with their teams’ perception only in terms 
of integrity perceptions. Further, individuals were able to achieve meta-accuracy ("I 
know how much you trust me") at both the generalized and dyadic levels. The second 
study was conducted in an experimental laboratory, examining trust at the dyadic level 
within a negotiation context.  The perceivers’ (trustors) trust perceptions were 
manipulated based on false feedback regarding their partners’ (targets or trustees) 
response to a survey examining their perspective on the use of ethical negotiation tactics.  
I found that individuals’ initial perceptions were correlated with their post-negotiation 
trust perceptions, partially mediated by the perceivers trusting behaviors and the targets’ 
trustworthy behavior. The initial trust manipulation, however, did not have an influence 
on the negotiated outcomes nor the second stage game.  The results of study two support 
the notion that trust is a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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INTRODUCTION TO DISSERTATION STUDIES: 
 
The Accuracy of Initial Trust Judgments 
Trust is necessary for social and organizational relationships to occur (Bachmann 
& Zaheer, 2006) as it allows individuals to become vulnerable and accept the risks 
inherent in these interactions (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995).  Because of its 
importance in interpersonal relationships, trust has been the focus of much empirical and 
theoretical work, demonstrating how it provides benefits by enhancing functions such as 
risk taking behaviors (Colquitt et al, 2007; Mayer et al, 1995), communication (Jarvenpaa 
& Leidner, 1999), perceptions of fairness (Cummings & Bromiley, 1996) cooperation 
(Williams, 2007; McAllister, 1995), and performance (Dirks, 1999; 2000).  These 
benefits are accrued over time as relationships develop and individuals are able to 
confidently discern who they can trust and who they cannot.  However, during the 
relationship development processes and inherent in the decision to trust is the possibility 
that this judgment may change, when individuals no longer have “good reasons” to trust.  
That is, even though trustors may confidently believe that their initial decision to trust 
was appropriate, they may later discover that they were in fact mistaken; that their initial 
trust judgment was inaccurate (i.e., a discrepancy between initial and later trust 
judgments).  Reassessing their initial trust judgments may prevent such benefits from 
occurring in the future. 
Despite the importance of trust in social and organizational interactions the 
decision for a trustor to change their initial trust judgment – or the accuracy of their initial 
judgment - has received little theoretical or empirical attention.  Even in the reviews of 
the trust literature, or meta-analyses supporting models of trust, accuracy of trust 
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judgments is hardly mentioned.  Mayer et al (1995) allude to accuracy by stating the 
perception of accurate trust perceptions affects risk taking behaviors.  Similarly, Dirks 
and Ferrin (2002) propose that perceptions of accuracy influence behaviors by showing 
that the information a leader provides is perceived as being more accurate when the 
leader is trusted.  On the other hand, management researchers have also alluded to the 
potential of inaccuracy in the trust decision making process.  For example, in their initial 
model of trust McKnight et al (1998) propose that individuals develop a trusting stance to 
predict the trustee’s future trustworthy behavior, implying that the trustee can be either 
trustworthy or untrustworthy.  Similarly, Meyerson, Weick and Kramer (1996) suggest 
that individuals initially decide to trust, yet are cautious and skeptical about opportunities 
of being betrayed, both aiding to reduce uncertainty.   Overall, the little work that has 
incorporated the notion or possibility of inaccuracy suggests that individuals are faced 
with a trust dilemma in new relationships, where they decide to trust hoping to engage in 
a beneficial relationship while understanding that there is always the possibility of 
exploitation (Kramer, 2006).  Further, how accurate they believe their initial perception 
to be influences interaction and outcome behaviors.   
Examining this phenomenon – the accuracy of initial trust judgments – is 
important in both advancing theory as well as practical purposes, as the consequences of 
being inaccurate can be great.  If individuals see others as trustworthy and they are not, 
they may be taken advantage of.  On the other hand, if individuals do not trust someone 
who is later found to be trustworthy they may forego the possibility of a meaningful 
relationship.  In either scenario, the trustor may suffer personal or professional costs that 
may affect their current or future relationships.  The individuals who trusted Bernie 
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Madoff are an example of how consequential inaccurate trust judgments can be.   For 
decades, Madoff was accepting money from investors and although they believed he was 
honestly investing their funds he was stealing them.  His “elaborate financial ruse” or 
“wide-ranging financial charade” was shocking to his friends, family and investors who 
all entrusted him with their money.  He defrauded his investors of roughly $50 billion, 
affecting individuals and organizations; some charities closed their doors and some 
individuals lost everything they had.   
In the Madoff scenario, individuals first trusted Madoff later to find they were 
inaccurate, that Madoff was untrustworthy.  Although it is not as commonly presented in 
the media, individuals may also be inaccurate where they initially distrust the trustee later 
to find that he or she is trustworthy.  An example of this could be seen in the context of a 
negotiation.  Trust is essential in negotiations because it increases the value created by 
the negotiators; it allows the information exchanged to appear legitimate and provides 
personal security in believing that the trustee will not act deceitfully.  Lacking trust 
results in more impasses or inefficient negotiated agreements.  A potentially beneficial 
relationship may be dissolved because of the lack of initial trust between parties when 
both parties were good intentioned.    
The inherent possibility of inaccuracy in all relationships begs an answer to the 
question: what is responsible for individuals’ inaccuracy?  Trust can be thought of as 
choice based on a process where we “discriminate among persons and institutions that are 
trustworthy, distrusted, and unknown.  [Where] we cognitively choose who we will trust 
in which respects and under which circumstances” (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 970).  
This quote represents the cognitive reasoning processes that lead individuals to 
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confidently form their initial trust judgment.  Therefore, this initial reasoning process is 
likely to be responsible for individual’s accuracy or inaccuracy.  Brunswik’s lens model 
can be use to describe how this reasoning process can lead to inaccuracy.  In this model, 
the behavioral indicators presented by the trustee may be misinterpreted by the trustor 
leading to inaccurate initial judgments.  Thus, the cues were not valid enough to 
appropriately represent the trustees’ true intentions and motivations.  
Misreading or interpreting the trustee’s encoded cues produces a domino effect in 
that it reinforces misperceptions and misattributions of current and future information.  
For example, the individuals who trusted Madoff may have initially trusted him because 
his client base was composed of close friends and family, or perhaps his dedication to 
charity and his church.  This initial judgment guided all future trust assessments and 
despite the indications of Madoff’s untrustworthiness (i.e., his continued investigations 
by the SEC), individuals continued to invest money showing their trust in him and his 
firm.  This misinterpretation (or the possible lack of available cues to some investors) 
created an anchoring and adjustment affect where individuals’ initial judgment guided all 
future judgment and the salience of Madoff’s present of cues (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
This anchoring heuristic is also similar to cognitive mechanisms such as the self-fulfilling 
prophecy where individuals treat their counterparts consistent with their initial judgment, 
using the trustee’s behavior to reinforce and confirm (or disconfirm) their trust.   
In summary, individuals may be accurate or inaccurate in their initial trust 
perceptions and their cognitive reasoning processes may contribute to their accuracy.  In 
light of this, this dissertation is dedicated to answer the questions: are we able to achieve 
accuracy in our initial trust perceptions (study 1) and what mechanism may account for 
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this accuracy (study 2)?  The first study conducted was field based, using temporary 
student teams where trustworthiness and trust were very relevant to successfully 
executing tasks as well as to their performance.  I used the social relations model (SRM) 
to examine my research questions and to determine how trust perceptions shift over time 
relative to individual and team perceptions.  The second study was conducted in an 
experimental laboratory, examining trust at the dyadic level within a negotiation context.  
The perceivers’ (trustors) trust perceptions were manipulated based on false feedback 
regarding their partners’ (targets or trustees) response to a survey examining their 
perspective on the use of ethical negotiation tactics (SINS scale). 
STUDY 1 
 
The first study of my dissertation examines whether individuals are able to 
achieve accuracy of their initial trust and trustworthiness perceptions.  I longitudinally 
examine whether initial trust perceptions among first year MBA teams remain consistent 
and calibrated after meaningful acquaintance.  In this paper, I define and measure 
accuracy as the (a) the calibration of an individual’s initial perception compared to their 
later trust perception (linear accuracy), (b) the consistency of an individuals’ initial 
perception compared to their team’s consensus after maximum acquaintance (consensus 
accuracy), and (c) whether individuals are able to accurately determine if their teammates 
trust them (meta-accuracy).  I propose that individuals’ accuracy of their initial 
perceptions (trustworthiness being defined by perceptions of ability, benevolence and 
integrity) will vary in strength across the factors of trustworthiness, types of accuracy and 
after meaningful interactions.  I measure perceptions at minimal acquaintance (time 1), 
 6 
 
moderate acquaintance (time 2) and close acquaintance (time 3), with approximately 6 
weeks between data collection points.  Meta-accuracy, however, was measured only at 
times 2 and 3.   
In assessing linear accuracy, I find that individuals’ perceptions remain calibrated 
over time, with the exception of ability.  Individuals were least accurate in achieving 
consensus accuracy; individuals’ perceptions of benevolence, ability and trust intentions 
diverged, but converged with perceptions of integrity.  Overall, these results show that 
individuals were inconsistent in their initial judgments and only moderately calibrated 
over time in their perceptions of trustworthiness.   
The third measure of accuracy – meta-accuracy – is unlike the first two in that 
there is an objective standard in which to measure perceptions.  There are two types of 
meta-accuracy; generalized meta-accuracy refers to whether individuals are accurate in 
perceiving how others view them in general—do I know whether the group as a whole 
trusts me?  By contrast, dyadic meta-accuracy refers, to whether individuals can 
distinguish the extent to which particular people trust them—do I know who trusts me 
more versus less? Contrary to most studies, I find that after meaningful interactions, 
individuals are exceptional at understanding who trusts them both in general and in 
particular.   
 
STUDY 2 
 
While researchers have made important (if relatively few) contributions 
identifying indicators that predict accurate initial trust judgments, such as facial features, 
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there are still many indicators that have not been investigated. These other mechanisms 
address the broader question of how individuals are able to achieve accuracy in their 
initial trust judgment.  In the absence of information, individuals may arrive at accuracy 
by using cognitive mechanisms (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Meyerson, 
1996; Williams, 2001).  Porter and ten Brinke (2009)  suggest that individuals use 
cognitive mechanism such as stereotypes to form an initial trust judgment.  Using these 
mechanisms may distort their evaluation of all information gathered from the interaction 
to be consistent, or positively associated with, their initial trust judgment.  This process 
underscores the idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy (SFP), or erroneous initial 
expectations that are seen as certain through the evaluation of verbal and nonverbal cues, 
and maintained after the interaction has ended (Judice & Neuberg, 1998).  For example, 
initial impressions of high trust would cause perceivers to evaluate information and 
behave as if their interaction partners are trustworthy, possibly by asking questions to 
support his view (Snyder  & Stukas, 1999), and acting more positively towards the target 
during the interaction (Harris, 1989; Neuberg et al., 1993).  This behavior reinforces the 
perceivers’ initial impression, causing them to maintain it regardless of its veracity 
(Beckstead, 2003).   
In my second dissertation study I examine the effects of the SFP on forming and 
evaluating initial trust judgments and the accuracy of these judgments.  Research shows 
that there are two different models through which the SFP can lead to accuracy.  The first 
involves the behavior of the target (i.e., behavioral confirmation)  (Snyder, 1992; Snyder 
et al., 1977).  In this model, the target’s behaviors support the perceiver’s initial trust 
perceptions and expectations of the target’s intentions.  The second model does not take 
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the target’s behavior into account and instead focuses on the perceiver’s perceptual biases 
based on self-perception theory.  According to this model, regardless of the behaviors 
communicated by the target, the perceiver believes his or her initial impression to hold 
true.  The perceiver uses his or her own internal state (i.e., trusting) to assess how he or 
she should perceive the target (i.e., trustworthy) without using the target’s behaviors to 
reinforce or negate his or her initial perspective (i.e., perceptional confirmation) (Bem, 
1972; Jussim, 1989; Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Snyder, 1992).  
In light of the results from study 1, I take a linear accuracy approach and examine 
how the self-fulfilling prophecy affects behaviors, decisions and the accuracy of initial 
trust judgments.  I examined these effects in the context of a negotiation and manipulated 
the perceivers’ initial perception of trust using false feedback regarding the ethicality of 
their partners’ negotiation tactics (only the perceiver received the manipulation).  I used 
two measures of accuracy – a subjective and objective measure.  Subjectively, the 
perceivers’ accuracy is measured by the significance of the relationship between their 
initial judgment and a post-interaction judgment.   Objectively, the perceivers’ accuracy 
is measured by the significance of the relationship between their initial trust judgment 
and whether they were able to achieve behavioral confirmation from the target. 
The results showed support for the perceptual confirmation model in that 
individuals’ initial trust perceptions are significantly correlated with their post-
negotiation perceptions despite the behaviors by both parties during the negotiation 
(supporting the subjective accuracy measure).   Akin the anchoring and adjustment bias, 
the perceivers’ initial trust judgment acted as an anchor, moderately influencing their 
behaviors during the negotiation but did not significantly alter their initial judgment.   
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Although this remains true, the perceivers’ initial trust perception affected their trusting 
behaviors and the targets’ trustworthy behaviors (supporting an objective accuracy 
measure).  While the reciprocity of trust behaviors between the targets and perceivers 
were very strong (r=.85, p<.001), these effects did not fully mediate the relationship 
between initial and post-negotiation trust perceptions together (i.e., double mediation), 
but acted as partial mediators when considered separately.    
 In summary, this study indicates that initial trust perceptions act as a self-
fulfilling prophecy and influence individuals’ achievement of accuracy through two 
possible mechanisms. The first mechanism is behavioral confirmation where the 
perceivers’ initial trust perception and subsequent trusting behavior caused the target to 
reciprocate similar trustworthy behaviors.  This influenced the accuracy of the perceivers’ 
initial judgment, but only partially.  On the other hand, the perceptual confirmation 
mechanism had a strong impact on the perceiver’s accuracy.  Using this model, 
perceivers relied on their internal state (trusting) to make assessments of the targets’ 
behavior (trustworthy), leaving their post-negotiation trust perception highly correlated 
with their initial perception.   
STUDY 1 
Experience is a great teacher; our past experiences with trusting others allow us to 
form predictions in conditions of uncertainly to make situations with a new acquaintance 
seem less risky.  We can do this is by developing swift trust perceptions which aid in 
decreasing the uncertainty to facilitate the interaction.  These past experiences with 
similar individuals give us the confidence to believe that this initial trust judgment is 
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correct (Meyerson, et al 1995).  But what makes experience such a great teacher are the 
mistakes we make in these judgments – when we are inaccurate.  We tend to remember 
instances where we were inaccurate because of the consequences they bared; if we first 
trusted someone only to learn they were untrustworthy we may suffer emotional costs or 
costs in terms of resources and relationships lost.  On the other hand, if we did not trust 
someone who later we found to be trustworthy we may suffer social costs of 
embarrassment perhaps, but also forego the possibility of a meaningful future 
relationship. 
Even with the “50-50 chance a person will take advantage of our trust” 
(Meyerson, et al 1995) and the potential consequences of being inaccurate, we still form 
these initial trust perceptions.   Indeed, the costs can be great in being wrong, but trust 
provides benefits to individuals in approaching and accomplishing assigned work tasks.  
Higher trust decreases uncertainty and allows the trustor (perceiver) to become 
vulnerable and accept potential risks that may be present within the relationship (Mayer, 
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Meyerson et al, 1995).  Further, by forming a positive trust 
judgment, individuals are more likely to share information (Butler, 1999; Ferrin & Dirks, 
2003), cooperate (McAllister, 1995), and exchange resources (Bouty, 2000).   
Yet with the importance of trust and the potential of misplacing it half the time, 
very little work has examined whether our initial trust perceptions are indeed accurate.  
To date,  researchers have found that subjects are accurate to some degree in identifying 
trusting others (Porter et al, 2008), and do so based on nonverbal cues such as eye gaze 
(Bayliss & Tipper, 2009) and facial width (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010).  Research in related 
areas, however, as examined accuracy more closely and has found that individuals are 
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accurate in their perception of strangers (Kenny, 1994; Kenny & DePaulo, 1993), 
examining traits such as personality (Borkenau & Liebler, 1993; Kenny, et al 1994; 
Kenrick & Funder, 1988), sexual orientation (Ambady et al, 1999), and liking (Neuberg 
et al, 1993; Snyder et al, 1977), and that accuracy does not increase with acquaintance but 
remains stable over time (Ambady, Hallahan & Rosenthal, 1995; Kenny, Albright, 
Malloy & Kashy, 1994).   
Much work has been devoted to studying accuracy at zero acquaintance or with 
only thin slices of information, but examining the accuracy of trustworthiness can be 
difficult to assess in real situations.  Traits that are less observable and less visible do not 
provide the diagnostic cues necessary to be well judged (Brunswik, 1956), notably those 
less outwardly expressive in nature, or more self-perceptive or analytical (Albright, 
Forest, & Reiseter, 2000; Costa & McCrae, 1995; Kenny, 1994). These criteria are likely 
the case for trust. Further, highly evaluative traits are difficult to observe because targets 
manage their self-presentation of cues (Funder, 1999).  Taken together, there are reasons 
to believe that individuals can discern which partners will be trustworthy, but also 
reasons they are not able to do so.   
This paper address whether individuals are accurate in their initial trust judgments 
– is their first impression at minimal acquaintance lasting, or does it change as 
acquaintance increases?  This paper makes four contributions to the literature.  First, I 
examine the accuracy of trustworthiness and trusting intentions involving both perceiver 
and target using the Social Relations Model (SRM).  The Social Relations Model (SRM; 
Kenny, 1994) allows us to examine trust perceptions at the dyadic level to see how 
individuals tend to trust others in general initially, and how that may change over time 
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(perceiver effect).  SRM also is beneficial in understanding whether individuals agree on 
who is (un)trustworthy(target effects) and, as well as isolate unique dyadic trusting 
relationships (relationship effect). Second, where most accuracy studies – especially 
those measuring trust – occur in a laboratory, this study is conducted within a field 
context, which allows for the measurement and observation of trustworthiness over time 
to access accuracy using three different benchmarks.  Third, not only does this study 
contributing to the literature by demonstrating whether people are accurate, but it also 
tests whether the factors of trustworthiness develop similarly into accurate perceptions or 
if individuals are accurate with a subset of them.   
Finally, this paper also assesses the meta-accuracy of trust and trustworthiness 
perceptions.  To the extent that trust solves a fundamental interpersonal tension—the 
ability to facilitate group efforts despite the risk they may entail —it is important for 
accuracy to flow in both directions, where individuals understand how others perceive 
them and vice-versa.  Meta-perception involves an understanding of how one is judged 
by other people (Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966).  In the case of trust, meta-accuracy is 
important in that it allows you to know who will support you but who will not, and who 
will be willing to provide valuable resources but who will not. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Consistent with past research, I define trust as “a psychological state comprising 
the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behavior of another” (p. 395).   Mayer et al (1995) propose that judgments of 
trustworthiness precede trust beliefs or intentions.  Thus, evaluations of trustworthiness 
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are central to conceptualization of trust.  Trustworthiness is defined by three factors– 
competence, benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995).  Competence is defined as 
beliefs about the skills and abilities of the trusted party. Benevolence is the belief that the 
trusted party’s actions are with good intention and not for some other underlying motive 
or profit.  Integrity is the belief that the trusted party adheres to accepted rules of conduct, 
such as honesty and credibility.   
Trust is built between individuals by an exchange of information over time, where 
each person communicates their intentions both verbally and nonverbally.  Through this 
repeated exchange individuals can infer the cause of their partner’s behavior based on the 
information acquired during these interactions (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).  Although 
models of trust are based on the assumption of this shared history between the trustor and 
trustee (i.e. Mayer et al, 1995; McAllister et al, 1995), scholars have noted that trust can 
develop between unacquainted individuals (McKnight et al, 1998; Meyerson et al, 1996).  
The attribution models that assume prior acquaintance propose that individuals develop 
expectations of future behavior based on their experiences with the target and the 
interpretation of the observation of their behaviors (Korsgaard et al, 2002; Rusbult & Van 
Lange, 2003).  However, without the assumption of prior acquaintance, attributions of 
trust or trustworthiness cannot be formed using this same logic.  Instead, they are formed 
based on the observable information present, where individuals use proxies as 
mechanisms to infer trust.  In particular, an individuals’ use of biases - based on visual or 
contextual cues - heavily influences their social perceptions, allowing them to draw 
assumptions automatically (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).   
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These social perceptions between strangers are formed from surface level 
information such as group membership or stereotypes (McKnight, Cummings & 
Chervany, 1998; Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996; Williams, 2001), or can be based on 
a sense of similarity, where individuals form higher or lower levels of trust based on 
perceived similarity or familiarity with their interaction partner (Levin et al, 2006; Child 
& Mollering, 2003; etc.).  For example, and interaction partner’s gender may be 
correlated with other features of trustworthiness (competence, integrity, benevolence) 
(Jones & McGillis, 1976).  Because of this, individuals tend to over-attribute these 
characteristics as indicators of trustworthiness and interpret all behavior accordingly.  
This over-attribution of traits is referred to as the fundamental attribution error.   
While the fundamental attribution error is used to infer attributions of an unknown 
individual, perceivers also use other cognitive mechanisms to form initial trust judgments 
when information is ambiguous or unavailable (Kelley, 1972).  Within the context of 
trust perceptions, because strangers do not have a shared history they must pull 
knowledge from past experiences from similar individuals whom they trusted in the past.  
Therefore, they may employ a trust schema informing them how to construe information, 
form attributions of trustworthiness, and respond to behavior.  Other cognitive 
mechanisms may be used to interpret trustworthy behaviors.  Self-based theories (Kenny 
& DePaulo, 1993), for example, involve how perceptions of the self influence person 
perceptions.  These include mechanisms such as the self-fulfilling prophecy (SFP) 
(Swann, 1984), self-perception (Bem, 1972) and self-presentation. These biases influence 
the attention paid and interpretation of the nonverbal cues displayed (Brunswik, 1954). 
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 Because the information we use to make initial and subsequent trust judgments 
may be based on cognitive biases, there are reasons to believe that individuals may not be 
able to achieve accuracy.  Biases distort our social perceptions and create cognitive errors 
in processing information (Kunda, 1990; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Kahneman, Slovic & 
Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Therefore, these biases can knowingly or 
unknowingly be used to influence how others perceive us and how we perceive others.  
Examples of perceptual biases are the self-perception, the self-fulfilling prophecy and 
self-presentation.  Self-perception (Bem, 1972) influences one’s self-view by coming “to 
‘know’ their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially by inferring them 
from observations of their own overt behavior and/or the circumstances in which this 
behavior occurs (Bem, 1972, p. 2).  This means that individuals understand their own 
attitudes from how they behave.  This influences both how they perceive others 
(consistent with their internal state) and how others see them (as they see themselves).  
The self-fulfilling prophecy (SFP) also distorts perceptions.  The SFP is the erroneous 
initial expectations that are seen as certain through the evaluation of verbal and nonverbal 
cues.  For example, initial impressions of low trust would cause perceivers to evaluate 
information and behave as if their interaction partners were untrustworthy, maintaining 
this perception regardless of its veracity (Beckstead, 2003).  Finally, self-presentation 
involves impression management strategies used to appear a particular way to another 
person, either to conceal true traits or intentions from others (i.e., hide emotions or 
deceptive intentions) or to manipulate interpersonal behavior (Albright et al, 2001).  Self-
presentation is a bias because it distorts how others can view you and if the target is 
adopting these strategies, how you view them.   
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 In summary, there are reasons to believe that individuals may be accurate or 
inaccurate in their initial perceptions.  Accuracy may depend on the extent to which the 
attributions individuals make are correct, or based upon cognitive biases leading to the 
application of the fundamental attribution error.  Accuracy may also depend on how it is 
conceptualized and measured, and whether it allows for the inclusion of this biased 
information.   
 
ACCURACY 
If an individual perceives a stranger is trustworthy, how do we assess whether he 
or she is (in)accurate in this initial perception?  The study of accuracy of social 
judgments has been largely debated within the interpersonal perception and social 
psychological literatures.  The core of the debate stems from the measurement of 
accuracy and whether examining accuracy from an objective versus a subjective standard 
is acceptable and accurate in its own right.  Three different schools of thought have 
emerged and each conceptualizes accuracy differently: Realist, pragmatic and 
constructivist.  The realist uses an objective measure to access accuracy, while the 
pragmatic and constructivist views use a subjective measure.  Each are discussed below, 
and outlined in Table 1. 
Objective Measures – The Realist View 
Jussim (2005) argues that an objective standard must exist in order for someone to 
be accurate or inaccurate in their perception.  Several theorists agree with Jussim and 
believe that studying accuracy requires an objective criterion where social judgments are 
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either true or false (Funder, 1987).  This means that advocates of the objective standard 
believe that accuracy does not differ by degree, but by whether an individual is accurate 
or not.  Accuracy is then measured by the extent to which an individual’s judgment 
deviates from this objective standard.  Further, the realism perspective requires that 
objective measures should not be determined by individual’s preconceived notions of 
others or of their behavior.  This approach is appropriate when a criterion variable can be 
clearly and narrowly defined (Funder, Kolar, & Blackman, 1995; Jost & Kruglanski, 
2002) by whether the target engages in a specific behavior in a given context.  For trust, 
the best example is how individuals respond in a ‘trust game’ (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 
2010).   
The strength of the realist view is that the concrete criteria help to eliminate 
measurement errors – the standards are clearly defined and measureable.  Objective 
measures have definitive boundaries.  If, for example, individuals were engaged in a 
debate where the result would be a winner and a loser, the objective perspective would 
delineate who would win and who would lose (Goodwin & Darley, 2008).  While this is a 
strength, it is also a weakness.  According to the realist view, objective measures do not 
allow for individuals perceptions to vary or for gradations of accuracy.  Although this 
may be the case, it should be noted that the methods of studying variables such as trust 
“objectively” result in individuals being more or less accurate depending on the 
coefficient or correlated relationship, rather than being either accurate or not.  Further, 
sometimes the boundaries drawn are too rigid and therefore may not encompass 
everyone’s perceptions.  Finally, the objective perspective is usually tested based on one-
shot games  which are typically void of a relational context.  Therefore, generalizing 
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results beyond these games in a meaningful way is difficult for interpersonal concepts 
such as trust. 
 
Subjective Measures – The Pragmatic and Constructivist Views 
 The subjective approach differs from the objective in the criterion set and the 
latitude given to the conceptualization of the outcome variables.  The subjective standard 
instead allows the individual to determine how they arrive at their perceptions instead of 
the realist view where the experimenter determines this in advance.  Where the objective 
standard is black and white (accurate or inaccurate), the subjective view includes the 
shades of gray (accuracy exists on a continuum), so individuals may vary on accuracy 
based on their unique perceptions.  From the realist view, an individual is either accurate 
or not.  For example, an initial trust perception may be rated as a “5” on a 7-point scale, 
and may decrease to a “3” over the course of six months.  For the realist, this deviation 
from their original perspective indicates inaccuracy.  For the subjectivist, they would see 
this deviation as being “less accurate”. 
There are also deviations in how researchers conceptualize and measure 
subjective criterion.  This can be seen in comparing the pragmatic and constructivist 
perspectives. 
Constructivist view  
The constructivist view conceptualizes accuracy by the degree to which an 
individual’s social perception is related to social reality (Jussim, 1991).  This view 
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advocates that individuals create their social worlds through their different experiences, 
and examines the processes by which people come to describe these social worlds 
(Gergen, 1985).  Central to the constructivists view is the construction of knowledge 
often based on the use of cognitive mechanisms that help the perceiver navigate through 
social interactions.   
In the constructivist view, the standard of what it means to be accurate is 
subjective, therefore set by the individual.  The achievement of an accurate perception is 
judged by the correspondence between the perceiver’s perception and the subjective 
standard they set.  Because of the extent to which social beliefs will vary across 
individuals, this view reflects the idea that individuals have effectively projected an idea 
of who is trustworthy and who is not based on these beliefs, coupled with their 
experience over time (Goffman, 1959).  Thus, the individual’s perception is the focus of 
accuracy, measured by the extent to which their initial perspective of trustworthiness 
coincides with their later judgments. Accuracy would reflect the consistency in 
judgments over time, where inaccuracy would reveal a discrepancy between initial and 
later judgments. 
There are benefits and drawbacks of using the constructivist view to assess 
accuracy. A strength of this approach is that it allows for individuals to establish their 
own criterion to assess the outcome variable (i.e., trust), recognizing that individuals 
portray others and situations differently.  Therefore, accuracy can vary across individuals 
based on their own expectations, experiences or view points.   
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While the strengths boast individuality and subjective evaluation of reality, this 
can also be seen as a weakness.   Constructivists “rules” for determining “what counts” 
are ambiguous and vary across the individuals who use them (Gergen, 1985).  
Consequently, it is difficult to apply the criterion with any consistency because it is 
arbitrary and relative to the individual and context (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002).  Moreover, 
the criterion carries many assumptions that make it conceptually challenging to interpret 
the results (Jussim, 2005). 
Another weakness of the constructivist approach to accuracy is the measurement 
standards.  The constructivist view does not advocate experimental methodology to arrive 
at a conclusion of human behavior and cognition.  As Jost and Kruglanski (2002) state: 
“Constructivists reject the idea of using objective methods to separate fact from fiction 
and to develop accurate theories of the causes and effects of social behavior” since it’s 
impossible to “devise a mirror of nature” (p. 172).  Instead to arrive at the “truth” 
scholars may choose to use the “duck test”: if it looks like a duck and acts like a duck, it 
must be a duck (Jussim, 2005).   
Pragmatic view 
Gill and Swann (2004) propose that understanding the person perception process 
requires having an understanding of goals and motivations of the exchange.  The 
pragmatic view does this.  It conceptualizes accuracy by whether individual’s goals or 
motivations were accomplished as a result of the interaction, not whether “they are 
accurate in an ultimate sense” (Swann, 1984, p. 461).  Accordingly, this view looks at 
individuals’ judgments as fulfilling a practical, social need, as Fiske (1992) states, “social 
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thinking is for social doing” (p. 877).  The central idea of this approach is that people 
construct their understanding of others and social situations in terms of whatever their 
goals are (Fiske, 1992), and use cues and strategies in interactions in order to be able to 
get what they want from them.  Therefore, the pragmatic approach is less concerned with 
the accuracy of these perceptions, but more so how individuals construe their social 
environment in terms of their interaction goals.   
In general, social psychologists have noted that part of an individual’s social 
behavior is to understand how to navigate through their social worlds by setting and 
accomplishing goals (Fiske, 1992).  The concept of goals can be construed differently.  
For example, personality psychology considers traits and goals to be dispositional, and 
serve similar functions.  Both provide individuals with information about person and 
situation.  Traits provide the perceiver with summary information about the target so that 
they are able to predict the target’s future behavior, where goals provide structure for 
particular interactions.  Therefore, individuals can use traits to make attributions of 
behaviors, utilizing them to achieve their goals.  Social attributions are also pragmatic in 
that they inform the perceiver what to do by allowing them to predict individual behavior 
and understand why it may be occurring (Fiske, 1992). 
Like the constructivist view, individuals’ perceptions vary in the criterion the use 
to determine whether they are accurate.  The difference between the views is that the 
constructivist view emphasizes using social perceptions to create social reality, where the 
pragmatic view emphasizes that the goals and motivations of the perceiver cause them to 
view information consistent with that, and evaluate accuracy accordingly.  Along with the 
constructivist view, the pragmatic view posits that individuals may or may not be 
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accurate.  Fiske (1992) argues that individuals are “good-enough” perceivers in that 
accuracy is only important in terms of that person’s outcome goals.   
According to the pragmatic view, individuals use cues and strategies to attain 
accuracy – they use the target’s traits, and perception of these traits can vary across 
contexts.  Swann (1984) devised two types of accuracy that reflect this – global and 
circumscribed. Achieving global accuracy means that individuals are able to predict 
target behaviors across all situations and contexts.  Circumscribed accuracy means 
instead that individuals can predict target behaviors within certain situations.  Interaction 
goals will determine the type of accuracy they will use, whether they want to predict 
target behavior under all conditions, or only those relevant to their goals.  Swann (1984) 
posited that circumscribed accuracy is higher than globalized since it’s easier to predict 
how individuals will behave in a subset of all possible situations, rather than across all 
situations.  Because perceivers typically only need to know limited aspects of the target, 
they only need to achieve circumscribed accuracy by understanding how individuals 
behave in particular contexts.  
The contextual variations are important to pragmatic accuracy and should be 
taken into account when understanding person perception (Swann, 1984).  Individuals 
may trust one person in a particular context (i.e. social settings) but not others (i.e. at 
work).  To this end, Gill and Swann (2004) examined the contextual variations of 
pragmatic accuracy (i.e. circumscribed) using fraternity members and their nuclear family 
members.  In this study, fraternity members were asked to predict the behavior of their 
brothers within the fraternity, and within their nuclear family.  Likewise, their nuclear 
families were asked to predict their behavior within the family setting and within the 
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fraternity setting.  Supporting circumscribed accuracy, they found that fraternity brothers 
were more accurate in predicting their brothers’ behavior within the fraternity but 
inaccurate in the family setting.  Similarly, family members were accurate in predicting 
their relative’s behavior within the family setting, but not within the fraternity.  These 
findings demonstrate that individuals are able to accurately understand others in some 
contexts but not in others.   
 The strength of the pragmatic view is similar to the constructivists in that it 
allows for individuals’ goals and preferences to establish their own criteria for accuracy.  
Here, the standard for accuracy is set by individuals instead of by the experimenter.  This 
view acknowledges that interaction goals vary across individuals and therefore cannot be 
generalized to assume that everyone has these same goals.  The weakness of this 
approach is gathering the information related to goals and preferences within an 
interaction, while allowing for substantial variation in the nature of goals (Gill & Swann, 
2004).  Researchers have attempted to satisfy this weakness by using consensus as an 
indicator of agreement in the behavior of a target within a particular setting. 
 The idea behind consensus is that if everyone can agree on the same trait (i.e., 
trustworthiness) then they all have similar, predictable interaction goals. Kenny’s (1994) 
PERSON model theoretically examines consensus in social perceptions by considering 
the categorical and behavioral information perceivers use to make them.  As acquaintance 
increases, this model assumes that individuals focus less on categorical information (i.e. 
stereotypes) and more on the consistency of behaviors (i.e. norms, opinions, personality, 
error).  Kenny advises the use of consensus to arrive at a judgment of a target when 
meeting certain criteria.  If individuals are exposed to similar information over time, then 
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there is sufficient overlap in what they’ve experienced.  This overlap allows for the use of 
consensus to measure accuracy subjectively. 
 
Accuracy of initial trust: Objective or Subjective? 
The subjective approach to studying accuracy is effective in situations where the 
construct itself is based upon the perception of the individual in that context or when the 
researcher’s intention is to examine these perceptions without a pre-determined set of 
criterion for what may be a “correct” judgment.  The purpose of a subjective evaluation is 
to understand how an individual’s beliefs contribute to or prevent a set of behaviors or 
consequences (Gill & Swann, 2004).  Because individuals engage in behaviors that may 
vary across their interactions with others and contexts (Swann, Bosson & Pelham, 2002), 
attempting to measure one aspect of their behavior by using an objective evaluation (such 
as a one-shot game) and generalizing it to their entire repertoire of behaviors is not 
necessarily representative of the “ground truth”.  Further, as Kenny and Acitelli (2001) 
state, social perceptions are comprised of accuracy plus error, therefore, treating social 
perceptions as either entirely accurate or inaccurate (or, “objectively accurate”) is 
inappropriate. 
The “Trust Game” is an example of a commonly used objective criterion for 
studying trust.  It produces a numerical value for the extent to which individuals in a 
laboratory setting make themselves vulnerable to others with the expectation of a reward 
if the partner reciprocates (Berg,1995).  While the “Trust Game” is useful in measuring 
trusts in some experimental designs, generalizing the results of these one-shot games to 
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ongoing face-to-face interpersonal relationships can be problematic.  Further, such one-
shot games cannot test the three factors of trustworthiness relevant to the current study—
competence, integrity, and benevolence.  Taken together, objective criteria do not fit the 
research question about the extent to which individuals achieve accuracy at forecasting 
the future trustworthiness of peers.   
In the case of trust and trustworthiness perceptions, the subjective approach is 
superior because it fits the criteria noted above – examining individuals’ own perceptions 
of what it means to be trustworthy without experimenter intervention.  By 
conceptualizing trust according to Mayer et al. (1995) who specifically focus on 
perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity, we can examine how the perceiver 
experiences the construct and reacts to it, upholding the conceptualization that 
trustworthiness is partly “in the eye of the beholder”.   In terms of measurement, the 
subjective approach is also most appropriate as this study involves individuals interacting 
within a real group context.  Within these groups, the goal was to determine whether 
individual’s initial trust perceptions remained consistent over time given their own 
diagnostic criterion of specific behaviors – and their relative importance - relevant to 
group behavior.  Following prior research, I examine two forms of subjective benchmarks 
that are based on whether individuals are ultimately perceived to prove themselves to be 
trustworthy. 
While the subjective approach is the most appropriate perspective to use when 
examining trust perceptions, the objective approach serves a purpose as well.  I use an 
objective approach to assess the accuracy of meta-perceptions, or the accuracy of 
knowing how much your teammate trusts you.  This approach is classified as objective 
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because there is a true right answer.  In examining meta-perceptions, individuals rate how 
much they trust their teammates and how much they believe their teammates trust them.  
Accuracy is measured by the degree to which the perceiver’s view (“how much I think 
you trust me”) is positively correlated with their teammate’s responses (“this is how 
much I do trust you”).   
Measurement of subjective accuracy 
This study compares individuals’ early perceptions with their perceptions after 
they have had significant opportunities to interact—that is, using the perceiver herself as 
her own benchmark. This is sometimes called linear accuracy (Fessel, Epstude, & Roese, 
2009). The advantage of this approach is that an index of linear accuracy represents what 
people know at a point in time with experience that they might wish they had known 
sooner.  Buehler and McFarland (2001) also refer to this approach as “calibration” and 
can be thought of as the consistency of individuals’ behaviors over time.  Linear accuracy 
uses the constructivist approach to examine how each individual creates their social 
reality and whether or not it is accurate to them. 
The limitation of linear accuracy is that—in the absence of learning new 
diagnostic information—it can simply allow for personal biases that accrue over time.   
For this reason, I also assess accuracy by combining others’ perspectives for a benchmark 
to measure perceptions of trustworthiness.   Ideally this approach can allow idiosyncratic 
biases to cancel each other, yielding a consensus-based assessment that can be considered 
better than any one person’s judgment.  This approach is commonly used in studies 
assessing the consensus of judgments across individuals (Gill & Swann, 2004; Kenny, 
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2004), or the extent to which an individual’s initial judgment is in agreement with their 
team’s consensus as to who is (un) trustworthy.   Consensus accuracy uses the pragmatic 
approach to examine whether individuals are able to achieve their motivations and goals 
through the interaction.  Referring back to Kenny (1991, 2004) and Fiske (1992) 
consensus is used as an indicator of what is accurate to correct for individual biases but 
more so to validate and measure individual goals.  A high degree of consensus within a 
team alludes to the fact that the individuals have similar goals and are approaching them 
in similar ways.  However, it should be noted that while consensus is used as an indicator 
of accuracy, it does not present an “objective” measure of accuracy. 
Measurement of objective accuracy 
For examining the accuracy of being trusted—that is, meta-accuracy—I use a 
realist perspective.  For this direction, the target’s stated judgment can be considered an 
authoritative perspective on his or her level of trust for the perceiver. 
 
ACCURACY OF INITIAL TRUST JUDGMENTS 
Factors influencing the accuracy of initial trust judgments 
Accuracy can be affected by either the target’s display of the cues or the 
perceiver’s interpretation of them.  The interplay of these factors can be described using 
Brunswick’s Lens Model.  Within Figure 1, each circle represents variables, while the 
lines between each variable represent relationships (adopted from Hammond et al, 1964).  
The criterion variable is the target’s trait, while the prediction is the perceiver’s judgment 
 28 
 
of this criterion.  Accuracy is achieved when there is a high correlation between the cues 
manifested by the target and the appropriate understanding of these cues by the perceiver.  
Being accurate requires that the cues given off by the target are valid (validity of cues) 
and used by the perceiver in order to understand the target’s behavior (cue utilization).  
The cues are valid if they are available and visible, as well as if they are interpreted by 
the perceiver in the way the target intended.  Traits that are easier for the perceiver to 
judge (i.e. more visible) should be more accurate than relatively invisible traits (Funder & 
Colvin, 1988; Funder & Dobroth, 1987; Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980).  Funder and 
Colvin (1988) also found that traits that were more visible were rated more positively. 
For example, those rated more positively were associated with extroversion, meaning that 
these cues are more available to be judged by the perceiver.   
However, the target’s intentional or unintentional distortion of these cues prevents 
the perceiver from accurately interpreting them.   In establishing a good first impression, 
individuals will tend to display themselves in a way to make this more likely by being 
highly socially desirable so that they are trusted.   Social desirability is an unconscious 
tendency to put forth a positive self-concept and the expectation that certain 
characteristics will be positively evaluated (Paulhus, 2003).  This concept is closely 
related to impression management (Paulhus, 1984), an individual’s conscious effort to 
present a false front in order to be seen more positively (Zerbe & Delroy, 1987).  The 
problem with social desirability is that while individuals are trying to present themselves 
in the best possible manner, they are distorting the information presented to others, so the 
validity of the cues given off is low.  Therefore, initial trust perceptions will be less 
accurate since they would be based on biased cues or false positioning. 
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The perceiver’s interpretation of the cues can also prevent them from being 
accurate.  As described above, mechanism such as the self fulfilling prophecy and self-
presentation may distort the information decoded by the perceiver.  These mechanisms 
operate by shaping the perceiver’s attitudes and behaviors and the process they use to 
gather information from the target, as well as the way they express information. 
Thus, in the initial interactions, individuals do not have meaningful behavioral 
information; therefore they would use visible cues and their cognitive mechanisms to 
assess the target.  There is reason to believe that these cues can be accurately interpreted 
with minimal information but also reason to believe that they will not be.  Inaccuracy will 
result from the distortion of cues presented by the target then falsely interpreted by the 
perceiver, or from the perceiver’s biases. 
As the relationship progresses and develops, perceivers are able to use the 
information personally acquired through interaction with the target to make informed 
perceptions.  They will either dismiss their initial impressions as being inaccurate if the 
information they receive through acquaintance conflicts with their initial perception.  
Perceptions may change because the perceiver misinterpreted the non-verbal cues or 
behaviors or perhaps they appropriate cues were not visible to the perceiver at the time of 
the judgment.   Another scenario is that the perceiver may not change their initial 
perception as they become acquainted with the target. Accuracy here could be due to 
being proficient at decoding others or perhaps due to biases such as the self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
Accuracy of trustworthiness perceptions  
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There are reasons to believe that we may be accurate or inaccurate with regard to 
our initial trust impressions.  What complicates the accuracy or inaccuracy are the 
evaluations of trustworthiness – accuracy is likely to vary across the three factors, ability, 
benevolence and integrity.   
A key difference that may influence the accuracy of perceptions involves how 
individuals make judgments about ability and integrity versus benevolence.  Research 
suggests that individuals tend to see ability and integrity as dispositional factors that may 
be discerned by relevant cues. For instance, following the schematic model of 
dispositional attribution (Jones, 1986), Kim and colleagues (2004; 2006) examined how 
individuals draw dispositional attributions of integrity and ability. As they discuss, 
trustors focus on positive information to make judgments about the level of ability or 
competence (e.g., knowledge and skill in accounting) possessed by a trustor. 
Alternatively, they suggest that trustors will draw dispositional judgments about integrity 
based on negative information – e.g., if trustor observes a trustee stealing from another 
person, they will tend assume that the trustee lacks integrity and has the potential to 
engage in the behavior when they interact with them.  
Benevolence – the perception that one genuinely has care and concern for the 
well-being of the trustor – differs from these two in that it is something which may differ 
across relationships. This notion is reflected in earlier discussions of the concept. For 
example, Mayer et al. (1995: 718) observed that “Benevolence suggests that the trustee 
has some specific attachment to the trustor.” Likewise, McAllister (1995: 25) discusses 
the closely-related construct of affect-based trust, as “being grounded in reciprocated 
interpersonal care and concern.” Dirks and Ferrin (2002: 616) observed that affective 
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forms of trust “reflect a special relationship with the referent that may cause the referent 
to demonstrate care and concern about one’s welfare.” These depictions emphasize that 
the fundamental nature of benevolence is largely associated with a given relationship.  
Extending this idea, we might expect that individuals may be seen to be differentially 
benevolent or caring across relationships, even within a work group (i.e., having close 
interpersonal relationships with some individuals but not others). Thus, observing a 
teammate express care and concern in one relationship may be seen as  diagnostic of that 
trustee to some degree, it is not likely to be taken as a sign of how the individual will 
behave in all relationships within the team.  
 
Accuracy across trustworthiness factors over time 
From minimal acquaintance to close acquaintance individuals will use different 
factors or cues to access trustworthiness.  As the above analysis indicates, the use of non-
verbal cues will operate heavily at minimal acquaintance when the perceiver lacks any 
other diagnostic information to base his/her judgments. As time increases, both verbal 
and nonverbal cues will become representative of actual behaviors based on observation 
and experience rather than assumption.  Other factors that will also influence accuracy 
are the cognitive biases held by the perceiver.  For example, theories of initial trust 
formation argue that stereotypes inform the perceiver’s interpretation of cues, possibly 
distorting their judgment (McKnight et al, 1998; Meyerson et al, 1995).  These 
attributions may remain constant over time due to the perceiver’s perceptual biases, 
which heavily influence all future evaluations of the target.   
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Cognitive biases in particular may influence accuracy. One perceptual bias that 
may be operating is anchoring and adjustment, where individuals’ judgments may remain 
consistent over time because they have anchored on their initial judgment.  The self-
fulfilling prophecy may also account of accuracy across time where individuals create 
their own accuracy through eliciting behaviors from the target consistent with their 
expectations (i.e., behavioral confirmation). To capture the consistency of the perceiver’s 
judgments that may take into account these perceptual biases, we measure accuracy of 
individual’s judgment, referring to it as linear accuracy (Fessel, Epstude, & Roese, 2009) 
or calibration (Buehler & McFarland, 2001).  Linear accuracy assesses individual’s 
perceptions across time comparing their first judgment to their later judgment.  This 
measurement of the constructivist view will show how individuals create their own social 
realities, and whether their perceptions are accurate in navigating them through it. 
Because the strength of these biases directly influences individual perception we 
measure accuracy in another way that minimizes the affect of these biases. Kenny (2004) 
proposes that individuals who observe the same targets over time acquire similar 
interpersonal information therefore use the same cues to make judgments.  This is also a 
reflection of the pragmatic approach to accuracy, where consensus is used to determine 
individuals’ motivations within a context; a higher degree of consensus means that 
individuals have agreement on their goals.  Therefore, the consensus of these judgments 
is an appropriate indicator of an individual’s trustworthiness.  This consensus approach is 
common when using social consensus as the definition of accuracy (Gill & Swann, 2004; 
Kenny, 2004)—with the idea that idiosyncratic biases and perspectives cancel each other, 
yielding a consensus-based assessment better than any one person’s judgment.  We 
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would expect this view of accuracy to be appropriate when effects of the target are 
critical, that individuals would need to agree on whether targets possess the 
trustworthiness factor or not. 
Accuracy at Zero-Acquaintance 
Given the arguments above, are individuals able to achieve accuracy at zero 
acquaintance? As discussed earlier, at zero acquaintance, trustworthiness judgments are 
largely grounded in the perceiver’s own views. Because of this, we would not expect it to 
be possible for individuals to achieve accuracy based on consensus, as that requires a 
shared view.  Because individual’s biases may differ, their interpretation and evaluation 
of each target may also vary.  Comparing an individual’s judgment to their team’s mean 
judgment will show a greater disparity than comparing an individual’s own judgment 
across time. 
However, individuals may be able to achieve linear accuracy.  As discussed 
earlier, individuals’ earlier views may calibrate to some degree with their views at the 
end of the relationship. This may be due to various mechanisms previously mentioned, 
such as the self-fulfilling prophecy, the possibility that individuals anchor on their initial 
perceptions and fail to adjust over time, among other mechanisms, such as intuitive 
predictions (Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996).  These 
mechanisms aid in the calibration of judgments over time, where they will not vary 
significantly.  Kahneman and Tversky (1996) state that people form expectation of future 
behavior based on certain features of the target and situation.  These are then weighted 
and applied to how the target’s behaviors and attitudes are construed.  While there are 
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several mechanisms that may explain that individuals are likely to achieve linear 
accuracy, they are related  The common theme among these mechanisms is the perceiver 
focuses on salient information consistent with their preconceived notions that influence 
how they evaluate all incoming and future information. 
Hypothesis 1. At zero acquaintance individuals may achieve linear accuracy. 
 
Accuracy after meaningful interactions 
After individuals have had the chance to engage in meaningful interaction, their 
perception of their team members may remain consistent (linear accuracy) or coincide 
more closely with the average perception of their team (consensus accuracy).  Kenny 
(2000) suggests that individuals become more accurate over time and as acquaintance 
increases.   
For linear accuracy, individuals would have more time to interact with the targets 
and observe their behaviors (Kenny & Acitelli, 2001).  However, accuracy may not be 
achieved for all three factors of trustworthiness, but for benevolence as it is based 
strongly upon interaction and reciprocal behaviors more evident at the dyad level.  For 
benevolence, team members will also be able to observe relevant trustworthy behavior of 
trustees. As discussed earlier, however, we expect this concept to reside largely within 
relationships, as individuals use the information to determine whether the trustee 
possesses care and concern for that specific trustor.  As a consequence, individuals may 
be more likely to achieve linear accuracy, as opposed to consensus accuracy. 
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Kenny (1994) found that acquaintance does not increase the accuracy of 
consensus judgments.  One of the reasons cited for this was the individuals were 
consistently exposed to the same incoming information during further interactions.  
Individuals who observe the same behaviors over time tend to form similar perceptions of 
them because of the “overlap” in what they perceive (Kenny, 2000), increasing accuracy 
after meaningful interactions (Funder & Colvin, 1988). With regards to trustworthiness 
perceptions in teams, individuals do have the benefit of interacting and observing 
behaviors – of having sufficient overlap to form similar impressions.  Therefore, we 
predict that acquaintance will increase accuracy but only for particular factors of 
trustworthiness.  Specifically, for integrity and ability, we predict that individuals will be 
able to achieve consensus accuracy as team members are able to observe relevant 
trustworthy behavior of trustees and process it to make dispositional judgments1.  
Hypothesis 2a. After meaningful interaction, individuals will be able to achieve 
consensus-based accuracy for ability and integrity. 
Hypothesis 2b. After meaningful interaction, individuals will be able to achieve 
linear accuracy for benevolence. 
 
ACCURACY IN META-PERCEPTIONS OF TRUST 
The process of person perception - understanding and predicting the behavior of 
others - also requires that individuals also understand how they are viewed by others.  
                                                            
1
 I assume that not only will meaningful interactions within the group allow relevant trustworthiness to be 
revealed, but also norms will have developed to provide a common interpretation of the behavior.  
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This process of meta-perception (Laing, Phillipson & Lee, 1966) determines how these 
perceivers believe others view them.  Often times, individuals are motivated to behave in 
a particular way for self-presentation purposes (Albright et al, 2001) or impression 
management (Schlenker, 1980), perhaps to deceive others (Zuckerman, DePaulo & 
Rosenthal, 1981) or hide their emotions (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991).  For these 
purposes, it is important to know how others perceive them.  But more so, it’s important 
to know when they’re wrong – when they thought they achieved meta-accuracy but 
instead were mistaken.  Individuals who have an accurate view of how others perceive 
them knows who has their back – who they can trust and who trusts them. 
Think of the consequences of getting this wrong.  When you believe someone 
trusts you and they really don’t, the result could be a wasted investment.  For example, 
you enter into a negotiation where you believe your negotiation partner trusts you.  
Meanwhile, your negotiation partner is dismissing what you say and ultimately plans on 
securing a deal with another person.  This is a wasted investment in terms of the 
preparation and negotiation time, and also potential for a future relationship.  
Alternatively, you can be inaccurate in believing someone doesn’t trust you when they 
really do.   An example of this can be seen between a subordinate and their boss, where 
the subordinate believes their boss doesn’t trust them.  The subordinate, in an effort to 
earn the boss’s trust, may make several attempts to convince the boss that they are 
trustworthy.  This may cause the boss to either become suspicious of the subordinate’s 
attempts or lead to frustration both of which can strain or sever the relationship.  
Meta-accuracy is measured by the strength of the association between the 
subordinate’s perception of the boss’s trust in them, and the boss’s reported trust in them.   
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Because there is an objective measure of accuracy here (i.e., the boss’ actual perception), 
meta-accuracy examines accuracy from the realist view.  There are two different ways 
individuals can achieve meta-accuracy: generalized and dyadic (DePaulo, Kenny, 
Hoover, Webb, & Oliver, 1987; Kenny & DePaulo, 1993).  A generalized view of meta-
accuracy means that others have an accurate understanding of how people view them in 
general.  Kenny found the average correlation to be roughly .51 between how people 
believe others perceive them, and how others actually perceive them (Kenny, 2001).  
Dyadic meta-accuracy then examines how individuals believe particular people view 
them.  Dyadic meta-accuracy is usually non-significant, meaning that while people can 
distinguish how others view them in general, they are not very good at judging who in 
particular may view them favorably or unfavorably (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993).    
Factors influencing the accuracy of meta-perceptions 
How do people determine how others see them?  Sources of inaccuracy or 
accuracy in person perceptions can result from how nonverbal cues are interpreted by the 
meta-perceiver, and the strength of the biases used by both perceiver (to decode) and 
target (to encode) (Brunswik, 1954).  However, research has concluded that the 
observation of behavioral information plays a role in developing meta-perceptions, they 
are based mainly on biases such as self-perception; that individuals typically believe 
others see them as they see themselves (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993; Levesque, 1997; 
Malloy et al, 1997).  Even when given the chance to obtain feedback, self perception still 
explains more variance in meta-perceptions (Shectman & Kenny, 1994). 
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Kenny and DePaulo (1993) outlined four models that focus on the intrapersonal 
and interpersonal dimensions of meta-perceptions: self-theory, self-judgment, and direct 
observation.  The self-theory and self-judgment models are intrapersonal and based on 
self-perception.  The self-theory model proposes that individuals have strong self views 
and therefore believe that their traits are readily apparent to others.  Because of their 
strong self view, they may disregard the target’s behaviors in developing their meta-
perceptions, but may dismiss their own behaviors as well.   The self-judgment model 
argues that individuals take their own behavior into account within a particular situation 
then use their self-perception to derive a meta-perception.  Direct observation is an 
interpersonal model that focuses less on how individuals see themselves, but rather how 
their behavior causes others to react.  Direct observation refers to how the person believes 
their behavior influences others, based on the reactions they receive.  But they may not 
take this to reflect their self view; only that it elicits a certain reaction.  Therefore, in 
developing meta-perceptions, individuals will either disregard the target’s behaviors 
(self-theory), will use the perception they have of themselves to interpret them (self-
judgment), or will use the target’s behavioral cues to assess how they view the meta-
perceiver (direct observation). 
While self-perception is an important mechanism to consider in meta-perceptions, 
the self-presentation bias also influences meta-accuracy (Albright et al, 2001).  Self-
presentation is more consciously applied that the self-perception bias.  These tactics are 
impression management strategies used to portray a certain image to the observer.  
Targets can use this mechanism to bias the way the meta-perceiver believes they view 
them.  For example, the target may distort their verbal and nonverbal behaviors to 
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withhold negative information from the meta-perceiver, leading the meta-perceiver to 
believe the target thinks of them more positively then they actually do (Fletcher & Boyes, 
2004).  
 
Accuracy of Meta-Perceptions of trustworthiness after meaningful interactions 
Goffman (1963) stated that an increase in acquaintance means that “two 
individuals can personally identify the other by knowledge that distinguishes this other 
from everyone else, and when each acknowledges to the other that this state of mutual 
information exists” (p.112, cited in Malloy & Albright, 1990).  As this quote implies, 
acquaintance should allow others to achieve a higher degree of meta-accuracy as 
individuals become more familiar with each other.  However, despite this assumption, the 
results are mixed.  Few studies have documented that meta-accuracy is higher between 
those who are closely acquainted (Levesque, 1997; Vazire & Mehl (2008).  
The majority of the results find the opposite, that meta-accuracy does not increase 
with acquaintance.  In their review of studies on meta-accuracy, Kenny and DePaulo 
(1993) found that individuals’ meta-perceptions do not vary with acquaintance; they 
found evidence of very little partner variance (believing others see them differently) and 
relationship variance (believing particular people have a unique view of them).  Also 
supporting this, Malloy, Albright, Kenny, Agatstein and Winquist (1997) found that 
highly acquainted individuals were only moderately accurate in understanding how their 
partners perceive them, and Carlson et al (2010) found that individuals were able to 
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confidently and accurately identify which traits new acquaintances find characteristic of 
them (i.e., calibration). 
Despite the prior research that shows support for meta-accuracy not increasing 
with acquaintance, we expect that the accuracy of trustworthiness and trust meta-
perceptions will increase as the relationship develops.  Obtaining an accurate perception 
of how you much you believe others trust you without having the benefit of being 
acquainted is difficult to do.  Because trustworthiness is a complex, multifaceted concept 
we would expect that meta-perceptions would take more time to unfold.  Further, the cues 
associated with the meta-perceptions of trust with only minimal acquaintance may not be 
readily available and easily interpreted.  Therefore, it takes a meaningful interaction to 
accurately know assess much you believe others trust you.   
The dyadic and generalized meta-accuracy of trustworthiness perceptions 
The level of meta-perceptions and the nature of the factors measured also 
influence individuals’ met-accuracy.    Most people are able to achieve generalized meta-
accuracy (r=.51 on average) and are either inaccurate or much less accurate with dyadic 
meta-accuracy (r=.13 on average).  The discrepancy in the accuracy ratings is influenced 
by the type of variable being measured.  While meta-accuracy can be achieved for both 
trait (i.e. personality, intelligence) and affect (i.e. liking) variables, individuals are more 
likely to be accurate in general with traits and dyadically with affect (Elfenbein, 
Eisenkraft & Ding, 2009; Kenny & DePaulo, 1993; Levesque, 1997).     
The visibility of the nonverbal cues also contributes to the difference in accuracy 
levels.  Traits such as extroversion are more accurately judged in general because of the 
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expressiveness of the nonverbal cues associated with this trait (Albright & Malloy, 1999; 
Malloy & Janowski, 1992).   That is, Jack’s engagement within a group will increase the 
observability of his personality trait and lead others to see him as being equally 
extroverted.  Further, if Jack considers himself an extrovert, he will assume everyone sees 
him that way as well (self-perception bias).   
Other, less visible factors may not be as accurately judged in general, but are 
more accurate at the dyadic level.  These factors are more relational and therefore unique 
to the meta-perceiver and target.  In these cases, when nonverbal cues are absent, a factor 
that may contribute to dyadic meta-accuracy is motivation (Albright & Malloy, 1999).  
For example, Jack may view himself as being highly likeable but because the indicators 
of liking are not observable he is not able to discern whether everyone truly likes him.  
Further, his teammates may be concealing their dislike of Jack (self-presentation bias) to 
preserve social graces and team cohesion.  In the closer relationships Jack may have with 
a few of his teammates Jack would be better able to judge the extent to which these 
individuals like him.  Individuals who like each other more will interact more often, and 
the meta-perceiver will pay more attention to the cues to confirm this (Ohtsubo et al, 
2009). 
Like with traits and affective factors, similarly, ability, benevolence and integrity 
will be accurate at different levels and increase after meaningful interactions.  As with the 
previous hypotheses, ability and integrity are dispositional qualities and thus considered 
as traits. Therefore, they are not expected to vary considerably across interaction partners 
(Kim et al 2004, 2006).  Alternatively, and also consistent with hypothesis 2, 
benevolence is considered as an affective factor developed within a particular 
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relationship.  Unless operating under a self-theory or self-judgment model, after 
meaningful interactions individuals will come to understand how others perceive these 
factors based on the exchange of behavioral information within the relationship.   For 
example, prior research shows that individuals are able to accurately perceive their status 
within a group based on how much they are valued (Anderson et al, 2009).   Similar to 
status perceptions, individuals may be able to assess how competent others perceive them 
based on the verbal and written feedback within the team and given to the team by the 
supervisor.  They may also assess others’ perception of their competence by how often 
others approach them to ask for feedback or assistance in approaching and completing 
tasks.   Further, the perception that others see the observer as having an expertise may 
increase their actual or perceived status within the group.   
Individuals do have an accurate perception of their social standing within a group 
based in part on how much they are respected (Anderson et al, 2009).  Individuals who 
are honest and credible are respected because they are operating with integrity, therefore 
will be able to determine how respected they are within the group.  These perceptions 
may become clear to the meta-perceiver because of how their team members treat them in 
general.  If the meta-perceiver were caught being dishonest, team members may confront 
them about this violation.  Therefore, both the meta-perceiver and his or her teammates 
will be aware of the integrity offense.  If team members prefer to avoid this meta-
perceiver, the meta-perceiver would use this avoidance as an indication of how others 
may be judging their character.  In addition, because integrity can also mean individuals 
tendency to follow through with actions they commit to (Mayer et al, 1995; Seers, …) 
teammates are likely to keep track of when the meta-perceiver lacks follow-through.   
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Likewise, the meta-perceiver is also aware of their actions and likely to believe this 
perception is salient within the teams’ perceptions.  Meta-perceptions may be based upon 
the extent to which the perceiver believes the team is disturbed or impacted by this 
behavior for example, as evident of additional attempts to monitor his or her actions. 
Where perceptions of integrity and ability are expected to lead the perceiver to 
achieve generalized meta-accuracy, benevolence has a different effect.  McAllister (1995) 
states that affect-based trust “demonstrates interpersonal care and concern”, highlighting 
the conceptualization of benevolence provided by Mayer et al (1995).  Perceptions of 
benevolence therefore are grounded within the relationship between two people are 
interpreted based on the motivation of the parties involved to understand how they are 
perceived (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993; McAllister, 1995).  Further, dyadic meta-accuracy 
may also be achieved because of reciprocity or the notion that “I treat you benevolently 
because you treat me the same way” (Kenny, 1994).  With benevolence, care and concern 
are reciprocated based on the extent to which the target extends these same sentiments.    
Hypothesis 3a. After a meaningful interaction, individuals will be able to achieve 
generalized meta-accuracy for integrity and ability. 
Hypothesis 3b. After a meaningful interaction, individuals will be able to achieve 
dyadic meta-accuracy for benevolence. 
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METHODS 
Participants 
 Participants were 36 teams of four first year MBA students at a private mid-
western university (136 students).   They completed this study as a fulfillment of course 
requirement.  The average age was 26 and 37% were female.  Students – previously 
unacquainted – were grouped together into temporary teams.  These teams worked 
intensively together on several projects throughout the semester in which the data was 
collected.   
Characteristics of Team Formation and Tasks 
The first year MBA teams were developed by the MBA program office.  The 
team creation process began by sorting students into four groups: domestic males, 
domestic females, international males and international females.  Within each broad 
group, these individuals were sorted by their GMAT scores.  The MBA program 
administrator then created each team by first placing all females within each team, 
randomly, where no two domestic females can be on any one team (one domestic and one 
international female student is permitted, however).  The next step was to sort individuals 
by background and work experience, with the goal of creating each team with a mix of 
work experience (those with none paired with those with a lot) and varying backgrounds 
(i.e. engineering and accounting).  Finally, the person creating the teams desired to place 
those with low GMAT scores in teams with others who scored higher on their GMATs.  
These teams were established for first semester only and were disband after this time. 
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Throughout the course of the semester, students had three broad tasks consisting 
of two independent projects (one occurring at the beginning of the semester, and the 
second after midterms) that were completed individually.  The final project is a team-
based case and referred to as “ICE week”. During this time teams work with actual 
business in coming up with solutions to their actual problems, and then presenting their 
solutions to the organization’s executive(s).   
Along with these major projects, each professor requires that teams complete 
other course-specific projects.  The MBA curriculum requires that each person take four 
courses, in addition to two shorter courses offered during their orientation period 
(referred to as “GO! Week”).  The MBA program describes GO! Week a time where the 
“faculty introduces many of the key models and tools needed to frame and analyze the 
fundamental issues of management.”2  During the semester courses, students work within 
their teams to complete several projects.  Figure 2 displays the timeline of the team 
projects assigned in conjunction with the three rounds of data collection.   
The intense workload throughout the semester made it possible to reveal 
trustworthiness on the different factors.  For example, students worked collectively on a 
rigorous team case analysis that had the potential to create perceptions of competence and 
integrity (i.e. team members successfully followed through with their parts).  Team 
interactions throughout the semester as well as during these intensive interactive events 
would have allowed individuals to identify benevolence and integrity (i.e. morals and 
values) among their team members.  Overall, information sharing, cooperation and 
interdependence were critical in completing their tasks.    
                                                            
2
 Available: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/academicprograms/MBA/Curriculum/Pages/default.aspx 
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Thus, trust among team members had the potential of playing a huge role in their 
ability to work together effectively. 
Measures 
 Participants responded to Mayer and Davis’ (1999) 14-item scale measuring 
perceptions of trustworthiness (integrity, benevolence and competence) and trusting 
intentions.  Participants responded to each item on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  In keeping with past research on meta-
perception (i.e. Albright & Malloy, 1999; Boyes & Fletcher, 2007; Kenny & DePaulo, 
1993; Kenny & Acitelli, 2001), this same measure of trustworthiness was also utilized to 
capture meta-perceptions.  Participants rated how they believed they were themselves 
rated by each teammate on each question. 
Procedure 
 Because the predictions addressed the accuracy of initial trust judgments, data 
was collected 3 waves of data starting at the beginning of the first semester (Time 1), 
during the mid-semester point (Time 2), with the last wave being at the end of their first 
semester (Time 3).  During the first wave of data collection, individuals were minimally 
acquainted, that is, they were introduced to their team members 24-hours prior to data 
collection.  Each team was composed of four MBA students who worked together on 
multiple projects and class assignments for the duration of their first semester.  The 
second wave of data was collected mid-semester, when students were acquainted with 
each member of their team.  Finally, the third wave of data – well acquainted – was 
conducted at the end of the semester, roughly 5 months after the first wave.  I collected 
 47 
 
perceptions of trustworthiness and trusting intentions over the three time points, but 
collected perceptions of meta-perceptions during time two and three only.   
Design and Analysis 
In this study, I used a round robin design in which all members of each team rated 
each other.  This design provided data regarding perceptions of trustworthiness of each 
individual on the team, as well as how each individual on the team is perceived.  The 
measures obtained in this research were dyadic scores, which were partitioned into their 
component sources.   According to Kenny’s (1994) Social Relations Model (SRM), the 
scores consisted of three components: the perceiver effect, the target effect, and the 
relationship effect.  The perceiver effect reflects how individuals see others in general, or 
the tendency to see others as either trustworthy or untrustworthy.  A high perceiver 
variance indicates that some perceivers trust some individuals but do not trust others, 
where a lower variance signifies the perceiver trusts (or distrusts) each team member 
equally.  The target effect shows how all team members view each individual, where a 
larger target variance indicates a greater degree of consensus among team members.  In 
other words, high target variance shows that individuals on the team share the same view 
of particular team members in being trustworthy or untrustworthy.  Lastly, the 
relationship effect demonstrates the unique relationship some team members may have 
within the group.  Variance in the relationship effect indicates that a particular dyad 
uniquely trusts each other more or less than others within the team.  This component 
shows whether individuals have unique trust judgments of their team members. 
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 There are three components to the social relations model – actor, partner, and 
relationship effects.  Unlike the target, perceiver and relationship effects above, these 
sources are at the dyadic or individual level and show how each person is perceived by 
their group (partner effect), how they perceive others within their group (actor effect), 
and the unique relationship that may exist between dyads (relationship effect).  Variance 
in the partner effect refers to the behaviors people tend to elicit from others.  Variation of 
this component shows that people are seen similarly by others in their group 
 The analyses were conducted using a version of SOREMO developed for use in 
the R Statistical Software Program (Eisenhardt, 2009).  This program partitions variance 
in the data from the round robin design into the component sources previously described.  
Because I was interested in understanding accuracy of initial trust judgments according to 
the pragmatic and constructivist viewpoints using both linear and consensus accuracy and 
would be able to do this using SRM by obtaining individual actor and partner effects, 
meta-perception effects (i.e., using the realist view) and overall variance of trust 
perceptions over time.  Estimating meta-accuracy is achieved by correlating the perceiver 
effect in meta-perception (how Jack believes Jill views him) with the target effect in trait 
judgments (how Jack is actually judged by Jill).  Meta-accuracy was computed at the 
dyadic level as well as a generalized view (how accurate are people in understanding how 
others view them in general).   
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics for the three waves of trust data appear in Table 2, including 
mean ratings of trustworthiness perceptions, standard deviations of these ratings, and 
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reliability coefficients.  As expected, perceptions of trustworthiness (integrity, 
benevolence and competence) and trust intentions rose monotonically across the three 
time periods for all four factors.  To examine the difference in means across the three 
time periods, we computed ralerting by examining the correlation between the mean ratings 
at each time period and their contrast weights.  The ralerting of .96 for integrity, .99 for 
benevolence, .99 for competence and .93 for trusting intentions indicates that the linear 
trend of these variables consistently increased across time periods.  The contrast 
representing the fit of the variables was computed using the ralerting scores and the analysis 
of variance for each variable.  The rcontrast representing perceptions of integrity over time 
indicates the mean ratings at each time period were significantly different from each 
other F(2, 300) = 25.98, p < .01, rcontrast = .24.  These contrasts also prove true for 
perceptions of benevolence (F(2, 313) = 56.88, p < .01, rcontrast = .35), competence (F(2, 
313) = 33.37, p < .01, rcontrast = .27) and trust intentions (F(2, 305) = 319.37, p < .01, 
rcontrast = .66) (Rosenthal  & Rosnow, 1991).   
As discussed above, I used a round robin design in this study where all members 
of each team rated each other.  This design provided the data regarding perceptions of 
how trustworthy each individual on the team is perceived (perceptions), and individuals’ 
perceptions of how trustworthy others on their team believe them to be (meta-
perceptions).  This design also allowed the use of the Social Relations Model (Kenny, 
1994), a modified version of the ANOVA that accommodates dyadic interdependence, to 
distinguish the source of these dyadic ratings into four exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
components: how trusting the rater is across all judgments (called perceiver effects), how 
trustworthy the target is judged across all judges (called target effects), the unique 
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relationship between the judge and target (called relationship or dyadic effects), and 
measurement error.  The advantage of partialling the variance using the SRM is that it 
shows how individual judgments may differ initially and converge over time.  If 
individual judgments converge over time, it also supports the use of the consensus 
measure as an indicator of subjective accuracy.   
Table 3 summarizes the results of these SRM analyses, using Kenny’s (1994) 
algorithms to calculate SRM coefficients and Lashley and Bond’s (1997) formulas to 
calculate significance levels. The percentages in this table can be interpreted similarly to 
the coefficient of determination (R2) used to summarize the total explanatory power of a 
regression model. That is, similar to the R2, these models reveal the existence of 
individual differences in terms of their predictive power, but do not explain the specific 
effects. 
Examining these variance components indicated that there were substantial 
perceiver effects within the first round of data collection, conducted at minimal 
acquaintance.  Indeed, perceiver effects accounted for 56% of variance in perceptions of 
integrity, 54% in perceptions of benevolence, 52% in perceptions of competence, and 
55% in perceptions of trust intentions.  This suggested that the ratings largely reflected 
individual differences in the degree of trusting with which each rater approached the 
judgment task.  Of the remaining variance, the majority resulted from the relationship 
effect, with no apparent systematic target effects that would signify consensus among 
teammates about who on the team could be trusted.  
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Over the course of the next two months, perceptions of trust appeared to change 
substantially in their composition.  Moving from Time 1 to Time 2, perceiver effects 
decreased to about one-third of their original values, suggesting a decrease in the 
influence on ratings of individual differences in raters’ level of general trust towards 
others.  By contrast, agreement about targets’ level of trustworthiness appeared to solidify 
during this same time, moving from negligible values at minimal acquaintance to 
substantial and significant values at moderate acquaintance.  Just as raters appeared better 
able to distinguish across targets, there was also an increase in dyadic relationship effects, 
which are presented in Table 4.  By the final set of measurements two months after this, 
there were further decreases in the size of perceiver effects, but target effects remained 
approximately stable.  At Time 3, with close acquaintance among teammates, the 
majority of variance in ratings resulted from relationship effects, but still with substantial 
consensus about the trustworthiness of individual targets.   
In addition to recording their perceptions of trust, participants recorded their 
meta-perceptions of how much they believed each teammate trusted them.  Table 4 
displays the relative variance partitioning for these meta-perception judgments.  Large 
perceiver effects suggest that people are relatively consistent in the amount of trust they 
think that each teammate sees in them.  That is, perceivers tend to think that everyone 
else shares the same opinion of them.  However, significant target effects also suggest 
that teammates tend to agree about whom on the team is the most vs. least trusting.  The 
presence of substantial relationship effects suggests that perceivers did see some 
individuation in the degree to which each teammate trusted them, after controlling for 
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perceiver and target effects.  A substantial relationship effect indicates that Jack believes 
one other individual on his team (perhaps Jill) views him as especially trustworthy. 
The Accuracy of Initial Trust Judgments 
The results discussed above focus on the antecedents of trust judgments in terms 
of perceiver, target and relationship variance.  Turning the attention to the question of 
accuracy:  To what extent were these judgments accurate? 
 I took three different approaches in measuring accuracy, with each approach using 
a different measurement to determine “accuracy.” Grounded in the subjective perspective 
on accuracy were analyses using linear accuracy (a comparison of individual’s earlier 
perceptions with their later perceptions after meaningful interactions) and consensus 
accuracy (a comparison of individual’s earlier perceptions with their team’s consensus 
after meaningful interactions). Finally, using a realist perspective, I examine the meta-
accuracy in terms of the correspondence between meta-judgments and the actual 
perceptions reported by teammates. 
Linear accuracy.  Starting with a linear accuracy approach, I used each 
participant’s later beliefs after greater acquaintance in order to assess the accuracy (i.e. 
consistency) of their earlier beliefs.  To measure the accuracy of initial trust judgments, I 
correlated the raw dyadic scores each partner received / gave during each time data was 
collected.  Table 5 reports correlation coefficients indicating how calibrated participants 
were between their earlier judgments and later judgments of the same targets.  
Consensus accuracy. Continuing with a consensus-based accuracy approach, I 
used the collective perception of acquainted observers (i.e., team members) in order to 
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assess the accuracy of individuals’ earlier beliefs – is there agreement between 
individual’s initial beliefs and their group’s consensus.  This answers the question: are 
individual’s initial trust judgments calibrated with the team’s judgments after a 
meaningful interaction?  I measured consensus accuracy by determining the correlation 
between the dyadic scores (how the perceiver believed the target viewed him/her) and 
each individual’s partner score (the variance surrounding the average rating received 
from the target’s team members).  In other words, I examined the relationship between 
how each person views a given team member and how that team member is viewed by 
the other members of their team (partner score).  Table 6 reports correlation coefficients 
indicating the degree of consensus between participants’ earlier judgments and their 
team’s average rating of the same targets at time 3. 
To evaluate hypothesis 1, that individuals would be able to achieve linear 
accuracy but not consensus accuracy, I examined the correlations of time 1 and 3 for both 
linear and consensus accuracy.   Examining the strength of the correlations between 
initial trustworthiness (time 1) and post-acquaintance reveals significant linear accuracy, 
for all factors except ability (r=.08).  That is, individuals’ perceptions of integrity (r=.20, 
p<.01), benevolence (r=.19, p<.01) and trusting intentions (r=.19, p<.01) were calibrated 
over time, or did not vary significantly as acquaintance increased, were as perceptions of 
ability were not calibrated.  Linear accuracy for judgments comparing T2 and T3 were 
quite high, suggesting a crystallization of judgments by the time of moderate 
acquaintance that persisted through close acquaintance.  
Overall, individuals were more accurate for linear accuracy than consensus.  In 
comparing T1 and T3 integrity was the only significant correlation for consensus 
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accuracy, and the strength of this finding was weak (r=.13, p<.05).  Consensus accuracy 
for benevolence (r=.05), ability (r=.04) and trusting intentions (r=.05) were not 
significant. In further analysis, a comparison of T1 and T2 resulted in no significant 
relationships.  That is, peers’ judgments of each others’ ability at T1 were essentially 
uncorrelated with their judgments by T2 and T3.  However, a comparison between T2 
and T3 shows that individuals were not able to achieve consensus accuracy until 
moderate acquaintance.  In comparison, individuals achieved linear accuracy across all 
factors (when comparing T1 and T3), with the exception of ability, and the relationships 
were stronger.  Therefore, these results support hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b predicted that individuals would be able to achieve linear 
accuracy for benevolence (hypothesis 2a), and consensus accuracy for integrity and 
ability (hypothesis 2b).  The results examining hypothesis 2a show that individuals are 
most (albeit moderately) consistent in their integrity perceptions (r=.20, p<.01), and 
equally consistent with trust intentions and benevolence (r=.19, p<.01).   Overall, 
individuals integrity perceptions were highly calibrated overtime (r=.67, p<.01), followed 
by a strong, significant effect for benevolence (r=.57, p<.01) and ability (r=.58, p<.01).   
The results for trusting intentions were also strong (r=.66, p<.01).   Because individuals 
were most linearly accurate with integrity perceptions, hypothesis 2a was partially 
supported.  Benevolence perceptions remained strong and significant but the effect was 
smaller. 
Examining hypothesis 2b shows that individual’s benevolence and ability ratings 
and their team’s consensus at time 3 diverged with all factors, with the exception of 
integrity, indicating that people were able to agree on who had integrity early on.  Initial 
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perceptions of competence were not calibrated, as evident by the non-significant 
relationship of the time 1 and time 3 judgments (r=.08).  Accuracy increased from time 2 
to time three, showing that integrity (r=.48, p<.01) and ability (r=.42, p<.01) perceptions 
were stronger than benevolence (r=.31, p<.01). 
Meta-Accuracy 
The third approach to accuracy applies to the meta-judgments that participants 
recorded about how they believed each teammate perceived them in terms of 
trustworthiness and trusting intentions.  Meta-accuracy is represented by the correlation 
between these meta-judgments and the target’s judgments recorded at the same period in 
time. Table 7 presents the coefficients for both generalized and dyadic meta-accuracy at 
Times 2 and 3.   
To obtain generalized meta-accuracy, we correlated the perceiver scores for meta-
perception (how I think others view me) with the individual-level target scores (how 
others view me).  Meta-accuracy at time 2 revealed that individuals were generally 
accurate in understanding how others viewed them in terms of integrity (r=.44, p<.01), 
benevolence (r=.68, p<.01), ability (r=.25, p<.01) and trusting intentions (r=.34, 
p<.01)By time 3, meta-accuracy was enhanced for integrity (r=.72, p<.01)benevolence 
(r=.78, p<.01), ability (r=.55, p<.01) and trusting intentions (r=.60, p<.01).  The increase 
in accuracy indicates  that individuals are highly accurate at judging who views them as 
trustworthy in general.  To determine dyadic accuracy, I correlated the perceiver effect of 
meta-perceptions (Tom’s view of Tina’s trust towards him) with the target effect 
(whether Tina trusts Tom) at the dyadic level.  These results show a high degree of 
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dyadic meta-accuracy – or having an accurate view of how particular individuals perceive 
their ability, benevolence, integrity and trust intentions.  While generalized meta-
accuracy increased from T2 to T3, as a reflection of the stronger correlations at close 
acquaintance, dyadic meta-accuracy did not vary significantly from T2 to T3. 
To evaluate hypotheses 3a and 3b, I examined the accuracy of meta-perceptions 
by assessing the correspondence between perceivers’ beliefs about the target’s trust for 
them and the judgments reported by the targets.  Hypothesis 3a predicted that individuals 
would be able to achieve meta-accuracy for ability and integrity.  The results show that 
individuals were least accurate in understanding how others perceive their abilities both 
at T2 (r=.25, p<.01) and T3 (r=.55, p<.01) relative to the other factors.  Perceptions of 
benevolence (T2: r=.68, p<.01; T3: r=.78, p<.01) and integrity (T2: r=.44, p<.01; T3: 
r=.72, p<.01) had the highest degree of generalized meta-accuracy at both data collection 
points.  Whereas judgments of how others viewed their abilities and trust intentions were 
also accurate, the correlations were much lower, indicating that it was more difficult for 
them to understand whether their team members viewed them as competent and trusting 
though easier for them to determine who saw them as having integrity or competence.  
Therefore, because hypothesis 3a predicted individuals would achieve generalized meta-
accuracy with ability and integrity perceptions, it is only partially supported.  
In examining dyadic meta-accuracy, the results reveal that individuals are able to 
discern who trusts them in particular in terms of their ability, integrity and trusting 
intentions.  Although there was not much variation between the trustworthiness factors 
and trusting intentions, the data show that individuals were able most able to achieve the 
highest level of dyadic meta-accuracy with integrity (T2: r=.31, p<.01; T3: r=.33, p<.01) 
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and ability (T2: r=.29, p<.01; T3: r=.32, p<.01) perceptions and least accurate with 
benevolence (T2: r=.27, p<.01; T3: r=.28, p<.01).  While individuals were able to 
achieve dyadic accuracy for benevolence, as predicted in hypothesis 3b, they were least 
successful in perceive how others view them with this trait, lending partial support to the 
hypothesis. 
Supplemental Analyses 
 Kenny (1994) specifies that individuals may have an accurate understanding of 
how others view them (meta-accuracy) because they assume there is reciprocity in their 
judgment.  For example, Beth may trust Bob because Beth thinks Bob trusts her.  This is 
not necessarily a reflection of how accurate Beth perceives Bob, but rather accuracy is 
achieved due to reciprocity.  Because of the highly significant dyadic meta-accuracy 
values, I conducted a post-hoc analysis to determine whether reciprocity is a mechanism 
that can explain why people may achieve meta-accuracy.   
To evaluate whether meta-accuracy is a function of assumed reciprocity, I 
conducted a mediation analysis testing whether meta-perceptions (Beth’s perception of 
Bob’s trust for her) mediate the relationship between whether Beth trusts Bob and the 
extent to which Bob does trust Beth.  Because of the unique findings regarding accuracy 
of ability (lower accuracy) and benevolence (higher accuracy) perceptions, I was 
especially interested in understanding what made these relationships distinguishable.  I 
examined these relationships within Time 2 and Time 3.  Below is an example of the 
mediation model: 
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I tested the proposed mediation using the four step sequence recommended by 
Baron and Kenny (1986), examining perceptions of trustworthiness.  Benevolence and 
competence perceptions at Time 3 were unique findings.  In all other cases, the proposed 
mediators (meta-perceptions) only partially mediated the models, as they failed to support 
the final step of the mediation test.  Below we report the findings for these two unique 
models. 
Table 8 and 9 displays the results of the mediation analyses, showing full 
mediation of meta-perceptions of benevolence (Table 8) and ability (Table 9) at Time3.  
First I examined the influence of meta-perceptions of benevolence.  In analyzing the 
merits of this mediator at Time 3, step one of the mediation test established the 
significant relationship between the independent variable, the perceiver’s benevolence 
perception (Time 2) (Beth’s perception of Bob’s benevolence) and the predictor variable 
(Bob’s perception of Beth’s benevolence) (β=.23, p<.001).  In establishing step two, I 
examined whether the initial variable – Beth’s perception of Bob’s benevolence – 
predicted the mediator, the perceiver’s meta-perception of benevolence (Beth’s judgment 
of Bob’s perception of her benevolence).  This relationship was significant (β=.83, 
p<.001).  Step three of the mediation test determined that the perceiver’s meta-
perceptions of benevolence predicted the dependent variable, Bob’s perception of Beth’s 
benevolence (β=.28, p<.001).  The final step of the mediation analysis included both the 
Beth’s trust of Bob 
(Does Beth trust 
Bob?) 
Beth’s meta-perception 
of Bob 
(Does Beth think Bob 
trusts her?) 
Bob’s trust of Beth 
(Does Bob trust 
Beth?) 
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independent variable (Beth’s perception of Bob’s benevolence) and the mediator – Beth’s 
meta-perception – into the analysis to predict the accuracy of Beth’s judgment.  This final 
step was supported, as evident by the non-significant relationship between the 
independent variable (perceiver’s perception of benevolence) and the dependent variable 
(actual perception).  Thus, Beth’s meta-perception of benevolence fully mediates the 
relationship between how she view’s Bob’s benevolence, and how benevolent Bob 
believes Beth to be. 3 
 
DISCUSSION 
Scholars have developed extensive research literatures on trust, and articulated its 
many benefits for group living.  Ultimately trust is a social judgment—which may be 
accurate or inaccurate—the focus of the present paper.  Despite the importance of trust in 
social interactions, the accuracy of trust judgments have been little examined.  Although 
it is common for people to believe they are indeed accurate in their first impressions of 
others, our data suggests otherwise when it comes to trustworthiness, that the strength of 
accuracy varies across measurements of accuracy as well as acquaintance.  Individuals do 
achieve accuracy in their judgments of others’ trustworthiness by all criteria by moderate 
acquaintance.  Indeed, by this time individuals also achieve accuracy in their meta-
judgments both at the individual and dyadic level.   
Linear and Consensus Accuracy 
                                                            
3
 The results of the clustering correction analysis showed that standard errors were not correlated and 
therefore not overstated.   
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In discriminating in the ability to achieve linear and consensus accuracy, the 
results of this study show that individuals are able to be linearly accurate – that is, their 
earlier judgments are moderately calibrated with their later judgments.  This finding 
exceeded consensus accuracy, with the only significant (and accurate) perception in 
regards to integrity.  The success in achieving linear accuracy shows support for the 
influence of individuals’ bias on perception and decision making.   The measurement of 
linear accuracy uses only the individuals’ perception over time to gauge changes in 
evaluations of trust and trustworthiness.  Inherent in these perceptions are biases, which 
are used initially in developing swift trust perceptions of their teammates at minimal 
acquaintance.   Biases such as anchoring and adjustment can account for this calibration; 
individuals may anchor on their initial impression and evaluate all incoming information 
consistent with this initial baseline.  Unless there is an obvious trust violation, 
individuals’ future perceptions will vary only slightly from their initial anchor.  Other 
theories such as the self-fulfilling prophecy and self-perception theory can also explain 
the moderate calibration effects.  The self-fulfilling prophecy operates similarly to the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic in that the perceiver interprets all incoming 
information consistent with their initial impression, but also takes into consideration the 
role of the target’s behaviors in forming future perceptions.  However, the data in this 
study did not allow for the evaluation of the targets’ behaviors in comparison to the 
perceivers’ evaluations, making it difficult to determine the specific cognitive 
mechanisms responsible for linear accuracy. 
The inability to achieve consensus accuracy is consistent with Kenny’s (2004) 
PERSON theory as well as the variance shifts addressed by using the social relation 
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model.  In addressing the shift in variance, the results of this study demonstrate that 
initially individuals tend to rate everyone similarly, as evidence of the higher perceiver 
variance.  Over time, individuals are able to discriminate and agree on who is trustworthy 
and who is not which is seen in the higher degree of target variance within times two and 
three.  Lastly, the high degree of relationship variance especially at time three shows that 
individuals are developing particular relationships within the groups where there are 
higher or lower levels of trust within a particular dyad in the group.  This shows that 
individuals are coming to know each other better as acquaintance increases, and 
individuals tend to agree on these perceptions.  Kenny’s PERSON model predicts that 
individuals may agree on who is trustworthy (i.e., target variance) if they are exposed to 
the same information over time.  This overlap develops a consistent impression across all 
team members.  This theory coincides with the result of consensus accuracy which was 
only significant after time two.  
While the general trend of linear accuracy was significant, there was variation 
with the factors of trustworthiness.  In comparing time 1 and time 3, individuals were 
most calibrated with integrity and benevolence perceptions, as well as trust intentions.  In 
correlating the actor effects (showing how much people trust others in general), 
benevolence and integrity are highly correlated at time 1 (r=.84), with the strength of the 
relationship decreasingly slightly from time 2 (r=.78) to time 3 (r=.76).  These strong 
correlations show that perceivers are unable to distinguish benevolence and integrity 
perceptions initially but do so slightly more as time increases.  Other research has found 
that benevolence and integrity are highly correlated, and Schoorman et al (2007, 2002) 
attribute this to the fact that benevolence is not developed enough early on in the 
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relationship to make a significant, independent contribution.  This corresponds with 
Mayer et al (1995) who proposed that ability and integrity perceptions would form first, 
where benevolence would take longer to develop, and that benevolence would 
significantly influence the relationship as time increases.  Therefore, individuals would 
not be able to differentiae the character perceptions of integrity and benevolence early on 
to make an independent influence on accuracy. 
While integrity and benevolence were significant for linear accuracy, only 
integrity was significant for consensus accuracy.  That is, perceivers’ judgments at time 1 
were consistent with their team’s consensus of who has integrity at time 3.  These results 
suggest that integrity presents particular cues that individuals tend to agree on and remain 
stable throughout the relationship.  Individuals were neither calibrated nor consistent with 
their perceptions of ability.  This may be due to the role of ability versus integrity or 
benevolence in new relationships.  Individuals may be more concerned with threat and 
harm of someone they don’t know at the initial meeting, unwilling to make themselves 
vulnerable.  Trusting ability may seem less risky initially but as time increases; ability 
becomes more important in this context and thus more salient. The salience of ability 
over time creates more variation in the perceivers’ evaluations therefore is not initially 
significant.  Further, feedback received during the semester directly reflects the ability of 
each team member.  This outside feedback from an authority (i.e., the professor) will 
reinforce or change each person’s perception of their teammate’s ability to correspond 
with this feedback.  The inaccuracy of ability perceptions with both linear and consensus 
accuracy may suggest that context plays a role in shaping the accuracy of perceptions.  
Future studies should address the impact of context on perceptions of ability, 
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benevolence and integrity to distinguish which cues aid in achieving accurate 
perceptions. 
Accuracy of Meta-perceptions 
The results of this study also support accuracy from a realist perspective in that 
individuals are able to achieve both dyadic and generalized meta-accuracy at moderate 
and close acquaintance.  That is, individuals are successful in understanding how much 
their team mates trust them in general, and which particular teammates may trust the 
meta-perceiver more than others.  Based upon prior research findings, individuals were 
exceptional at achieving dyadic meta-accuracy, and only modest at attaining generalized 
at time 2, increasing dramatically by time 3. 
In first examining the results of generalized meta-accuracy, the data show that, 
like linear accuracy, individuals are able to better access how others view their character 
based on integrity and benevolence perceptions.  Whereas judgments of how others 
viewed their ability and trust intentions were also accurate, the correlations were much 
lower, indicating that it was more difficult for them to understand whether their team 
members viewed them as competent and trusting though easier for them to determine 
who saw them as having integrity or benevolence.    The ability to achieve accuracy of 
these factors may be due to the use of the direct feedback model, where individuals 
observe how their behaviors influence their team members’ reactions. Perhaps feedback 
from peers regarding integrity and benevolence is more immediate as it is based upon 
how team members treat the meta-perceiver during the interaction.  Meta-perceptions of 
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ability may be more delayed and harder to judge, especially prior to receiving feedback 
regarding the team’s performance. 
 Unlike generalized meta-accuracy individuals were more accurate in 
understanding how particular team members perceive their ability as well as their 
integrity.  This finding supports the Mayer et al (1995) proposition that ability and 
integrity are developed first within the relationship, and benevolence develops later on.  
However, this finding goes against the prediction that individuals would achieve dyadic 
meta-accuracy with benevolence.  The lack of support for this prediction may be due to 
the strength of the biases that are operating when the meta-perceiver is interpreting the 
team member’s cues.  The team member may be acting under the self-presentation bias 
where they are faking their care and concern for the meta-perceiver.  This would imply 
that individuals are not able to accurate discern genuine cues with regards to 
benevolence.  
 The data collected allowed for the examination of one possible mechanisms 
lending to the accuracy of dyadic meta-perceptions.  In testing the reciprocity of 
judgments, or “I trust you because I think you trust me”, the results show evidence of 
substantial reciprocity.  This provides evidence that individuals will not be vulnerable to 
another person and take on risks associated with the relationship unless they know their 
interaction partner will do the same.  The findings here support past research 
demonstrating the role of reciprocity in meta-judgments (i.e., Elfenbein et al, 2009).  
Future research should examine other mechanism that may be responsible for achieving 
meta-accuracy, as well as determine if accuracy is achievable at minimal acquaintance.  
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This study provides support for use of the subjective and objective measures of 
accuracy.  While there has been a tendency to utilize objective criterion in measuring 
trust, the results of this study support the subjective nature of trust, in particular, initial 
trust judgments.  The lack of consensus accuracy implies that individuals tend to view 
their team mates differently leading to divergence in trust and trustworthiness 
perceptions.  The subjective nature of trust suggests that individuals are successful in 
using their initial trust judgments in accomplishing their interaction goals within the team 
and context.  However, individuals are not as adept at using the social information to 
navigate them through their social worlds (i.e., lack of consensus accuracy).  In this case, 
acquaintance matters where individuals are able to gather more information to assist in 
the construction of their social environment to differentiate what is accurate versus 
inaccurate.   
The present study departs from much of the existing research on trust within 
groups and work settings in several ways. Two key research question in this literature 
have been: What benefits accrue from trusting others and how do individuals develop 
trust? (Kramer, 1999). This question poses an important complementary question: Are 
the beliefs that individuals develop accurate or appropriate? This is question is important 
because, as noted earlier, benefits are only likely to accrue if individuals make accurate 
judgments. In other words, if individuals see others as trustworthy when they are not, 
they may be taken advantage of, or if individuals believe the target to be untrustworthy 
when they subsequently prove not to be.  With regard to the development of trust, the 
present study does not look at the factors and processes that shape trust, but seeks to 
evaluate whether the judgment that individuals arrive at are consistent with their prior 
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judgments or that of their team’s. Therefore, the present research might be seen as new 
and important line of inquiry and can lead to a number of different questions.  The second 
study of this dissertation addresses one of these questions by examining a particular 
cognitive mechanism, the self-fulfilling prophecy, which may be a factor that allows for 
the accuracy of initial trust judgments. 
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STUDY 2 
Study 1 utilized a subjective approach to examining the accuracy of 
trustworthiness perceptions between individuals and their team members, demonstrating 
a high degree of linear accuracy.  This subjective approach can be used to approximate 
how trustworthy individuals may be within a particular context.  However, despite our 
best efforts to measure and predict the true trustworthiness of a target, we cannot.  The 
current measurement of trust and contextual variations make it seemingly impossible to 
accurately pinpoint whether an individual has integrity or benevolence across all settings.  
Swann (1984) refers to this as generalized accuracy, meaning that individuals have full 
information to make an informed judgment of a target’s trustworthiness across situations 
and contexts.  Because of this inherent difficulty in determining the generalized accuracy 
of a target’s traits such as trustworthiness, Swann (1984) coined the term “circumscribed” 
accuracy to denote that individuals can subjectively evaluate the target’s trustworthiness 
within some contexts with some degree of accuracy, but not in others.   
Further complicating the ability to achieve generalized accuracy of 
trustworthiness perceptions is the measurement of these factors.  While many of the traits 
and characteristics examined by Swann and other scholars in the interpersonal perception 
domain have a correct, objective measure to quantify “accuracy” trust has no such 
qualities.  Objective measures used are typically void of a relational context that provides 
the foundation for and formation of trust perceptions.  The experiments designed to get at 
the trustworthiness of a target are typically simulated in a game where relational stakes 
are minimal and do not characterize those outside of the laboratory.  Further, the 
contextual elements are important to consider when forming a generalized accurate level 
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of trust of a target which are typically not accounted for within the literature.  Therefore, 
while the objective measures of accuracy are quantifiable way to account for trust within 
a particular context, using them to obtain a generalized accurate, level of trust is unlikely. 
In an attempt to identify another way of getting at the true accuracy of an 
individual, some scholars have attempted to use the consensus perception of a group of 
individuals.  According to Kenny (2004) consensus can reflect an “objective” sense of 
accuracy. Kenny states that individuals who observe the same information over time 
share similar perceptions of the target individual and that their collective perception, or 
consensus, can be used as an indicator of the individual’s “true” behavior within that 
particular context.  These perceptions represent the expectation of an individual to be 
characteristic of a certain trait, for example, trustworthy or untrustworthy.   
However, this consensus approach also does not capture the generalized 
trustworthiness of a target and therefore cannot be used as an objective measure of 
accuracy.  Research in economics and finance agree with this perspective.  For example, 
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1970) states that the market prices reflect 
all available information, including insiders’ knowledge (in the strong form).  Proponents 
of the EMH argue that because of this, the market is efficient and that prices are correct.  
However, skeptics argue that the limitations of this approach lies in the assumption that 
the individuals are always rational and the market always reflects full information.   The 
housing market crash in 2008-9 supports these limitations and is proof that individuals 
are not always rational and that market prices are not based on full information.  If EMH 
were true, and consensus judgments were an indicator or measure of generalized 
accuracy, then investors would be able to predict the bubble crashing and create a fund so 
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that people would profit from this event.  This was not the case; in fact, with the 
exception of Goldman Sachs, everyone lost money.  Like with trust, if consensus 
judgments were indeed a measure of “objective accuracy” then everyone would have 
profited from the housing crisis as they initially predicted when deciding to make their 
investments.  Similarly, the consensus judgment about Madoff was that his competence 
would gain individuals a high return on their investments.  Ultimately, investors were 
misled and Madoff instead cost some of them their life savings. 
The limitations across these domains (finance, economics, psychology) reinforce 
that trust is inherently subjective and accuracy is a “correct” perception unique to the 
perceiver that may or may not be shared by others.  These limitations in the measurement 
of a generalized accurate level of trust can also be explained by the fact that people are 
not always good decision makers.  In the absence of information, individuals may make a 
decision using cognitive mechanisms (McKnight et al, 1998; Meyerson et al, 1995; 
Willams, 2005) which influences the accuracy of their initial perception.  Porter and ten 
Brinke (2009) suggest that individuals use cognitive mechanism such as stereotypes to 
form an initial trust judgment.  Using these mechanisms clouds their evaluation of all 
information gathered during the interaction, leading them to support their initial beliefs 
and creating their own perception of what is accurate.  This process underscores the idea 
of the self-fulfilling prophecy (SFP), or erroneous initial expectations that are seen as 
certain through the evaluation of verbal and nonverbal cues.  For example, initial 
impressions of low trust would cause perceivers to evaluate information and behave as if 
their interaction partners were untrustworthy, maintaining this perception regardless of its 
veracity (Beckstead, 2003).   
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This paper examines the effects of the SFP on forming and evaluating initial trust 
judgments, and the accuracy of these judgments.  Study 1 supported the hypothesis 
proposing that individuals are able to achieve linear accuracy but not consensus accuracy.  
One of the mechanisms proposed to explain this was the self-fulfilling prophecy effect.  
This study also takes a linear accuracy (i.e., subjective) approach and examines how the 
self-fulfilling prophecy affects behaviors, decisions and the accuracy of initial trust 
judgments.  I propose that individuals’ expectations perpetuate theirs and the target’s 
behaviors thereby creating the perceiver’s own unique perception of accuracy.  Given 
such logic, this paper makes a contribution to the literature on initial trust development 
by examining: 1) how initial trust judgments influence perceptions and perpetuate the 
target and perceiver’s trust behaviors; and 2) whether these behaviors reinforce the 
perceiver’s expectations, thereby influencing the accuracy of their initial judgments.   
 
Theoretical Foundations 
Consistent with prior research, I define trust as “a psychological state comprising 
the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behavior of another” (Rousseau et al, 1998, p. 395).   Mayer et al (1995) propose that 
positive judgments of trustworthiness allow trust to form, where the trustor is willing to 
be vulnerable and accept risks within the relationship.  Trustworthiness is therefore 
central to arriving at a judgment of trust and is defined by three factors: competence, 
benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995).  Competence is defined as beliefs about 
the skills and abilities of the trusted party. Benevolence is the belief that the trusted 
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party’s actions are with good intention and not for some other underlying motive or 
profit.  Integrity is the belief that the trusted party adheres to accepted rules of conduct, 
such as honesty and credibility.   
Trust is built between individuals by an exchange of information over time, where 
each person communicates their intentions both verbally and nonverbally.  Through this 
repeated exchange individuals can infer the cause of their partner’s behavior based on the 
information acquired during these interactions (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).  These 
attributions allow for individuals to develop expectations of future behavior based on the 
interpretation of the observed behaviors.  Especially in trust development, causal 
attributions are central to establishing trust (Korsgaard et al, 2002). 
Although models of trust are based on the assumption of a shared history between 
the trustor and trustee (i.e. Mayer et al, 1995; McAllister et al, 1995), scholars have noted 
that trust can develop between unacquainted individuals without a relational history 
(McKnight et al, 1998; Meyerson et al, 1996).  In these cases, individuals use proxies as 
mechanisms to develop trust perceptions, based on visual or contextual cues (Brunswik, 
1954; Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  For example, biased information such as group 
membership or stereotypes can be used to categorize individuals (McKnight, Cummings 
& Chervany, 1998; Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996; Williams, 2001) as trustworthy or 
untrustworthy. Because of this tendency, individuals over-attribute these characteristics 
as indicators of trustworthiness.  This over-attribution of traits is referred to as the 
fundamental attribution error, meaning that individuals are more likely to error in their 
initial perception of trustworthiness because they overly attribute biased cues to be the 
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cause of the trustees’ behavior.  Because of this tendency of biased evaluations of first 
impressions of trust, the perceptions formed of the trustee may not be accurate. 
This paper examines the linear accuracy of the perceiver’s judgment of the 
target’s trustworthiness.  The results of study 1 show that individuals are able to achieve 
linear accuracy, or the calibration of their initial trust judgments and future judgments.  
This study extends these results by providing a mechanism that can explain this effect.   
What does it mean to be accurate? 
The measurement of accuracy has been debated within and between literatures.  
The main critiques of accuracy stem from those within two major perspectives on 
accuracy: the objective and subjective perspective.  These two perspectives differ in 
conceptualizing the mechanisms used to arrive at judgments and as well as the 
measurement of the judgments.  According to the objective perspective, the criterion is 
set by the experimenter, where a “true” right answer exists (Kruglanski, 1989).  
Advocates from this view argue that the objective outcome should not be based on social 
perceptions, but rather a standard in which social perceptions can be compared to 
(Jussim, 2005).  Alternatively, the subjective perspective allows for the perceiver’s 
perceptions to influence the mechanism as well as the outcomes.  In this paper I define 
accuracy using both perspectives, based on the perceiver’s subjective perception of trust 
as well as how their behaviors objectively influence the target’s reactions.   
Both perspectives are appropriate to use in this study.  The subjective perspective 
of accuracy incorporates perceptual biases such as stereotypes to predict behavior present 
in linear accuracy, where the objective view discounts the use of these in determining 
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accuracy and instead focuses on the quantifiable behaviors elicited.  Some advocates of 
the subjective perspective (i.e. Swann, 1984) use the self-fulfilling prophecy effect (SFP) 
as a mechanism to describe the influence of perceptions during the interaction between 
perceiver and target and how these may change or reinforce the perceiver’s initial 
impression. Specifically, advocates of the SFP and subjective measurement of accuracy 
believe that the perceiver’s SFP will influence both the perceiver’s and target’s actions, 
and the perceiver’s future perceptions, therefore should be considered when examining 
how parties arrive at particular outcomes.  The objective approach can also be used to 
measure the extent to which the perceiver’s views influence the target’s behaviors.  The 
target’s behaviors should reflect the content and tone of the perceiver’s and is measurable 
and quantifiable.  Therefore, the target’s behaviors can also be used as an objective 
measure of accuracy.  
Like with study 1, I use linear accuracy as a subjective measurement of accuracy. 
Buehler and McFarland (2001) also refer to this approach as “calibration” and can be 
thought of as the consistency of individuals’ behaviors over time.  Therefore, the 
subjective measurement of accuracy is defined as the strength of the relationship between 
the perceiver’s initial and post-interaction trust perceptions of the target.  Using the 
objective approach accuracy is defined by the changes in the target’s behavior based on 
the perceiver’s trusting behaviors. 
 
Accuracy of Initial Trust Perceptions 
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Indeed, isolating the mechanisms used to form initial trust judgments is important 
in understanding how trust is developed.  Yet, research examining whether they are 
accurate in predicting trust behaviors is relatively absent throughout the trust literature.  
They have, however, been examined in related fields where certain physical features are 
linked to accurate trust perceptions.  For example, Stirrat and Perrett (2010) found that 
people view men with wider faces as less trustworthy, and in a trust game, these men did 
exploit the trust of others. Porter et al (2008) asked subjects to discriminate between 
trustworthy (CEOs) and untrustworthy (criminals from America’s Most Wanted) based 
on cues that indicate kindness.   
While these studies suggest individual’s can discriminate between trustworthy 
and untrustworthy individuals, there is also reason to believe they may not be able to.  
Sabatelli, Buck and Dreyer (1983) suggest that the ability to accurately read nonverbal 
cues is a function of the pre-existing trust established between dyads.  They found that 
individuals with high trust for each other (married couples) were able to accurately 
decode each other’s nonverbal cues, where as strangers (low trust) were unable to do so.  
In summary, the above evidence suggests that behavioral information is used to predict 
trust that may or may not be accurately interpreted by perceivers.   
But what is it about the use and interpretation of these cues that leads to accurate 
initial trust judgments?  Cues are used as a source of information to evaluate how the 
perceiver will behave based on their expectations for the target (Fiske et al, 1995; 2002).  
For example, nonverbal cues such as appearance and demeanor form performance 
expectations (Balkwell, 1995; Fiske et al, 1995), and these cues become salient to the 
perceiver in situations relevant to the task at hand (Fiske et al, 1995; 2002).  Once these 
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expectations are formed they guide behaviors, perpetuating and reinforcing them until 
they become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Balkwell, 1995). At this point, the perceiver’s 
perceptions influence their evaluation of the target’s behavior to determine whether these 
perceptions are accurate. 
Creating accuracy through the SFP 
Self-fulfilling prophecies (SFP) occur when “a false definition of the situation 
evokes a new behavior which makes the original false conception come true” (Merton, 
1957).  This implies that individuals’ beliefs or expectations – regardless of their truth – 
will affect the outcome of a situation by influencing how the perceiver behaves and 
processes information.  For example, in one classic study, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) 
found that teachers who believed their students were poor performers treated their 
students this way, and the students did indeed underperform (see also: Jussim, 1986).  
This pattern of behavior has been found in numerous studies involving different trait 
ascriptions such as gender (Kray et al, 2001), race (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974),  
power differences (Copeland, 1994), leadership (Davidson & Eden, 2000; Eden 1992) 
physical attraction (Jones & Panitch, 1971) and personality (Snyder et al, 1977). 
SFPs create changes in behavior because perceivers who are influenced by the 
SFP may have inflated expectations that seem more certain than they actually are.  These 
perceptions then shape the perceiver’s attitudes and behaviors by distorting the perceptual 
process used in gathering information from the target, as well as the way they (the 
perceiver) express information (Judice & Neuberg, 1998).  It is important to note that the 
perceiver’s impressions may be accurate, but regardless of whether they are they will 
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continue to reinforce and influence current and future perceptions and behaviors.  For 
instance, if the perceiver holds positive trust perceptions of the target, they will be more 
likely to ask questions from the target to support this view (Snyder & Stukas, 1999), and 
act more positively towards the target during the interaction (Harris & Rosenthal, 1985; 
Neuberg et al, 1993).   
Perceiver expectations also are reinforced because they influence the target’s 
behaviors (or perception of the target’s).  Research shows that there are two different 
models through which the SFP operates (see Figure 3): The first (model 1) involves the 
behavior of the target (i.e. behavioral confirmation) (Snyder, 1992; Snyder et al, 1977).  
This model is predominately used to predict and test SFP effects.  The second model, 
which has received less empirical and theoretical attention, does not take into account the 
target’s behavior.  Instead, the SFP influences the perceiver’s perceptual process without 
the influence of the target’s behaviors. This perceptual confirmation means that 
regardless of the behaviors communicated by the target, the perceiver believes their 
initial perceptions to be true (Bem, 1972; Jussim, 1989; Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Snyder 
1992).   
The first model shows that the perceiver’s later judgment is achieved because of 
the target’s behaviors within the interaction.  This is mechanism is behavioral 
confirmation, referring to the behavioral changes within the target that act to support or 
verify the perceiver’s expectations by displaying attitudes or behaviors that support them, 
communicated either verbally or non-verbally.  Behavioral confirmation can be achieved 
because of the goals and motivations of the perceiver, for example, when they are 
instructed to be accurate but are highly distracted, depleting their cognitive resources 
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(Biesanz, Neuberg, Smith, Asher & Judice, 2001). However, being motivated to be 
accurate prevents the perceiver from gathering thorough information about the target 
(Judice & Neuberg, 1998) and in fact makes them less accurate (Biesanz et al, 2001) as 
they are not able to succeed in behavioral confirmation.  The motivation of the target also 
influences their confirmation, for example when they are instructed to “go with the flow” 
and accommodate the perceiver (Snyder & Haugen, 1995).   
The second model describes circumstances when the target may not confirm or 
disconfirm the perceiver’s initial trust perceptions so accuracy would be achieved only by 
way of the distortions in the perceiver’s perceptual process.  One example of this occurs 
when the perceiver pays attention to only information that confirms their expectations 
(Jones, 1986; Olson, Roese & Zanna, 1996) regardless of how minute it may be.  Another 
example is when the perceiver uses their own internal state to inform them how to 
perceive and treat the target.  In these situations the perceiver’s initial perceptions are 
verified regardless of the target’s true behavior due to the perceiver’s self-perception 
(also a perceptual bias) (Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Snyder & Stukas, 1999).   
Self-perception (Bem, 1972) influences one’s self-view by “coming to know” 
their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially by inferring them from 
observations of their own overt behavior and the circumstances in which this behavior 
occurs (Bem, 1972, p. 2).  This means that individuals understand their own attitudes 
from how they behave towards others and less by how the target responds.  For example, 
Strachman and Gable (2006) found that perceivers who had avoidance social goals were 
more likely to remember and interpret information as negative and adopted a more 
pessimistic view of the target.  Further “nonbehaviors” are also informative of opinions 
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or attitudes, for example, finding a cartoon funny based on their reaction to it (i.e., 
laughing resulted in a “funny” response) (Fazio, Shreman & Herr, 1982).  These studies 
show that regardless of the target’s actual behavior, the perceiver’s evaluation of their 
internal states validates their attitude towards the target, confirming their initial 
perception or expectation. 
 
SFPs and the Accuracy of Initial Trustworthiness Perceptions  
The influence individuals have over each other’s attitudes and behavior can have 
important consequences for trust perceptions. Accordingly, SFP theory can also be used 
to explain how individuals arrive at accurate conclusions when attributing trust 
judgments.    
In new relationships, individuals may be concerned with their interaction 
partner’s true intentions and motivations - whether the target is honest or operating under 
false pretenses.  This uncertainty creates expectations of low or ambiguous 
trustworthiness leading the perceiver to question the validity of the information provided 
by the target.  Theoretical (i.e., Mayer et al, 1995; McAllister, 1995) and empirical (i.e., 
Mayer & Davis, 1999; Ferrin & Dirks, 2003; Ferrin et al, 2008) work supports the notion 
that psychological states of trust impact the perceiver’s trusting behavior.  In this paper, 
trusting behavior is defined as perceiver’s willingness to be vulnerable and accept the 
risks that may occur within the new relationship.  Perceivers demonstrate trusting 
behavior in ways that show the targets that they are willing cooperate, and have care and 
concern for the relationship.  Low trust leads to more competitive behaviors and lower 
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trustworthiness perceptions of others (Parks, Henager & Scamahorn, 1996), where higher 
trust leads to more cooperative behaviors (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; McAllister, 1995).  
What stands apart from this paper and the aforementioned research is that prior work has 
examined how trust behaviors are influenced by an interaction.  This work proposes that 
trust behaviors are influenced by expectations that are formed prior to engaging in an 
interaction, before attributions are able to be made based on the target’s behavior.  Here, 
trust behaviors are predicted to occur because of a rational interest in protecting one’s self 
until proven otherwise (Weber, Malhotra & Murnighan, 2005). 
According to the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) individuals who are 
motivated by accuracy are more likely to pay attention to suspicious cues (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986).  The SFP will influence this process in that all cues that are considered 
suspicious will then be processed and evaluated either confirming or disconfirming their 
initial perception.  For example, individuals who believe their interaction partner is 
untrustworthy will engage in avoidance behaviors signaling non-cooperation and self-
concern (Strachman & Gable, 2006).  Neutral cues, or cues that are not suspicious, 
however, will not be actively processed in this way and instead remain in the periphery.  
If the perceiver forms a positive initial trust judgment and uncertainty is not present, 
positive cues may also be processed similar to suspicious cues but when operating under 
the SPF will result in a favorable judgment.  These perceptions influence the perceiver’s 
trusting behaviors, or willingness to engage in an interaction that would be beneficial to 
both parties; low trust prevents the perceiver from wanting to engage in risky behaviors 
where they would be vulnerable to the target’s exploitation or opportunism.   
 80 
 
Hypothesis 1. An initial expectation of high (low) trust will cause the perceiver to 
engage in (low) trusting behaviors. 
 
The perceiver’s expectations of trustworthiness will influence the target’s 
trustworthy behaviors within the interaction, or actions that prove they are trustworthy 
through honest and respectful behavior, cooperation, and intent to create value for both 
parties.  During this interaction, the perceiver decodes the target’s non-verbal and verbal 
behaviors (i.e. identity cues) in an attempt to detect the possibility of exploitation or 
deception (Swann, 1984; 1987). In desiring to be trusted, the target may send signals that 
reflect this aspiration.  This reaction by the target acts as a behavioral confirmation 
mechanism and relays information back to the perceiver that their expectation is correct.  
For example, if a perceiver operates under the expectation of low trust, the perceiver may 
treat the target more contentiously, and the target will in turn match this behavior and act 
contentiously as well.  Ultimately, behavioral confirmation is achieved when the 
perceiver’s expectations are met by the target – when the perceiver’s expectations (“I 
trust you”) are consistent with the target’s actions (i.e., the target is manifesting behaviors 
indicative to the perceiver that the target is trustworthy) (Swann, 1984; 1987).  The 
perceiver will therefore use this information to draw a conclusion regarding the target’s 
trustworthiness.   
Empirical evidence shows support for this – that the perceiver’s trusting behavior 
will cause the target to reciprocate, showing similar trustworthy behavior (Serva et al, 
2005).  Recently, Ferrin et al (2008) found evidence of this reciprocity in their 
examination of trust spirals, or repeated instances of cooperative behavior based on 
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perceptions trustworthiness between individuals.  They found that trust perceptions 
mediate the relationship between interpersonal (and intergroup) cooperation, creating 
reciprocal cooperative behaviors. Beyond this, evolutionary theories argue that 
individuals are innate cheater detectors and can identify when cooperative behaviors are 
not reciprocated (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989).  Although cooperation does not mean the 
target is trustworthy (Mayer et al,1995), cooperative behaviors are a signal of trustworthy 
behavior, and also a result of a trusting relationship (Ferrin et al, 2008).  Therefore, the 
perceiver’s trusting behaviors will lead to greater trustworthy behaviors by the perceiver, 
reflecting model 1 (Figure 3).   
Hypothesis 2: The perceiver’s initial trust and their trusting behavior will 
influence the target’s trustworthy behavior, where expectations high (low) trust 
will yield (un)trustworthy behaviors from the target. 
 
Accuracy can be achieved through two mechanisms: with behavioral confirmation 
or without behavioral confirmation and through the perceiver’s perceptual biases.  
Behavioral confirmation, outlined in hypothesis two, states that the perceiver’s accuracy 
is driven by their SFP (i.e. “I think the target is untrustworthy”) because their trusting 
behavior influences similar trustworthy behavior from the target (i.e. the target exploits 
the perceiver), where accuracy is defined as the positive association between the 
perceiver’s initial trust and later trust perception after becoming acquainted with the 
target.  That is, higher initial trust will result in higher trust once the target and perceiver 
are acquainted because of the behaviors produced and elicited by the perceiver.  
Alternative to this, inaccuracy occurs when the perceiver’s initial perceptions are 
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negatively or not significantly related to their post interaction perceptions.  This may 
happen if the target continually disconfirms the perceiver’s expectations of the target’s 
trustworthy behaviors which change the perceiver’s initial impression.  For example, 
inaccuracy would result if the perceiver expected the target to be trustworthy later 
discovering that they are indeed untrustworthy.   
Alternatively, model 2 shows that a perceiver is able to achieve accuracy without 
relying on the target’s behaviors to confirm their initial trust judgment.  Instead, the 
perceiver’s self-perception drives their post-interaction trust perceptions, creating 
accuracy through perceptual confirmation.   If the perceiver feels trust for the target, they 
will use this internal state to assume that the target is trustworthy regardless of the 
target’s trustworthy behaviors.  Therefore, accuracy is defined similar to the previous 
argument where their initial impressions are maintained over time and does not change, 
however accuracy is arrived at differently; the target’s behaviors may not meditate the 
perceiver’s initial and later trust judgments (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003; Jones, 1990).   
Using the perceptual confirmation mechanism, the target may or may not confirm 
perceiver’s initial trust perceptions, but regardless, the perceiver’s evaluation of the 
target’s behavior is unlikely to deviate from their initial judgment.  Here, the perceiver’s 
interpretation of the target’s behaviors and not necessarily the target’s actual behaviors 
confirm their trust perceptions (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003).  Ferrin and Dirks (2003) found 
evidence of this effect, examining how trust is influenced by individuals presented with 
either cooperative or competitive reward structures.  They found that individuals with 
high initial trust expectations chose more cooperative than competitive behaviors, and 
rated their partner as more trusting regardless of whether they were.  Thus, high initial 
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trust has a strong influence on the effect of rewards on trust because of the perceiver’s 
self-perception; perceivers were able to use their internal state (high trust and cooperative 
behaviors) to infer their opinion of their partner (trustworthy).   
In summary, accuracy can be achieved in two ways.  In line with behavioral 
confirmation predictions, the perceiver’s expectation-consistent behavior will create 
similar behaviors in the target.  Behavioral confirmation will occur when the target’s 
behaviors confirm – rather than disconfirm – the perceiver’s expectations.  This 
confirmation of their expectations reflects accuracy of the perceiver’s initial trust 
judgment.    Therefore, I present two competing hypotheses representing each mechanism 
that accuracy can occur by: 
Hypothesis 3a: The perceiver’s accuracy will be mediated by the perceiver’s 
trusting behavior and the trustee’s trustworthy behavior. 
Hypothesis 3b: The perceiver’s initial trust perception will be mediated only by 
the perceiver’s trusting behavior. 
Behavioral Disconfirmation 
While accuracy can be achieved through the target’s behavioral confirmation, 
inaccuracy can occur as a result of the target’s behavioral disconfirmation, or when the 
target acts in opposition to the perceiver’s expectations.  Inaccuracy occurs when the 
perceiver’s initial trust perception would be unrelated or negatively related with a later 
trust perception.  Behavioral disconfirmation is one reason perceivers may change from 
their initial trust perception and can happen when, for example, the perceiver does not 
feel strongly or is ambivalent about their first trust perception (Swann & Ely, 1984), or 
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when the target is instructed to assert their own self-view (Smith et al, 1997).  Further, 
disconfirmation may occur when targets have a strong self-concept.  This process of self-
verification (Swann, 1987) causing the target to not confirm the expectations that act in 
opposition to their self-view.  Therefore, targets will distort or attempt to change 
perceiver’s expectations if they do not match the target’s self concept (Swann et al, 1989; 
Swann et al, 1992).   
In an interaction, targets may choose to verify their own self concept (self-
verification) in instances where they believe they possess certain traits counter to how the 
perceiver may view them.  In other words, targets who believe they possess a high degree 
of integrity will maintain this stance despite how the perceiver may treat them and will 
interfere with the behavioral confirmation process by disconfirming the perceiver’s 
expectations.  For example, Jill believes that Jack is going to deceive her within their 
negotiation.  Jill is going to treat Jack as if she doesn’t trust him, perhaps by attempting to 
monitor him, being uncooperative or withholding information.  Jack, however, sees 
himself as having a lot of integrity and under very few circumstances would he ever 
consider being dishonest.  Despite Jill’s treatment towards Jack, Jack’s strong perception 
of his own sense of integrity will prevent him from giving into Jill’s expectations – he 
will not confirm them.  Instead, Jack will consistently display cues that he is willing to 
cooperate and will not deceiver her.  Instead of confirming her expectations, Jack 
disconfirms which will have the effect of changing Jill’s perception of him.  Jill will 
eventually come to believe that Jack will not cheat her and therefore can be trusted. 
Behavioral disconfirmation through self-verification is evident throughout SFP 
theoretical and empirical literatures.  In studying instances where targets may disconfirm 
 85 
 
perceiver’s expectancies, Swann and Hill (1982) provided targets with feedback about 
their tendency towards dominance and submissiveness.  Perceivers treated targets as 
either dominant or submissive.  They found that targets who were told that they were 
dominant disconfirmed perceivers’ expectations when treated submissively.  Similarly, 
Swann and Ely (1984) found that targets who were certain about their personality traits 
(extroverted versus introverted) were less likely to confirm perceiver’s expectations when 
treated opposite of their self-confirmed personality profile.  For example, in the case 
where perceivers treated extroverted targets as introverted, targets who were more certain 
they were extroverted disconfirmed perceiver’s expectancies only to verify their own 
self-concept.  In these cases, perceivers ceased their efforts in confirming their 
expectations. 
Similarly, as with the example of Jack above, a person’s propensity to act 
trustworthy, in particular integrity, can be influenced by how closely they hold values 
such as honesty and creditability to their identity.  The target’s integrity and subsequent 
trustworthy behavior can be defined and shaped by their integrity identity.  Integrity 
identity can be described as a self-schema related to how an honest and credible person is 
likely to think, feel and behave (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  Individuals vary in how closely 
they tie integrity into their personal identity, which translates into their self-concept of 
integrity.  If targets believe having integrity is not important in defining their identity, 
then they are less likely to have a self-schema related to this trait which will also 
influence their behaviors (i.e. less likely to act with integrity).  However, those who do 
have a strong integrity identity are able to access this information more readily (Aquino 
& Reed, 2002).   
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When this schema is activated, individuals with a strong integrity identity are able 
to utilize it in order to regulate their actions or behaviors (Aquino et al, 2008), for 
example, when an individual or situation may challenge their integrity.  Thus, the 
strength of targets’ integrity identity can determine whether they confirm or disconfirm 
perceiver expectations; if the target has a weak integrity identity (self-schema) it is less 
likely to be activated and they would be more likely to deviate from honest and credible 
behaviors.  A stronger self-view of integrity will disconfirm the perceiver’s expectations 
of low trust.  Eventually, the perceiver will alter their trust perceptions and the target’s 
self-view will become the new expectation (Swann & Ely, 1984).   
Hypothesis 4: The target’s self-view of trustworthiness will moderate the 
relationship between perceiver’s trust behavior and the target’s trustworthy 
behavior.  Targets who have a greater self-view will disconfirm the low trust 
expectations of the perceiver, influencing their own trustworthy behavior. 
 
SFPs: Expectations of Integrity and Negotiation Behaviors and Outcomes 
In a negotiation context, the SFP can be very influential in achieving accuracy as 
it can influence both the bargaining process and outcomes.  Negotiations are an 
interdependent process where each party desires a particular outcome and attempts to 
utilize tactics in order to reach that goal.  Trust is influential here in terms of the type of 
orientation chosen (i.e., cooperative or competitive), the ability to predict behaviors and 
solve problems (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), as well as how each party reacts to the other’s 
concessions (Van Kleef et al, 2006).  Further, trust and trustworthiness behaviors are 
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shaped by the bargaining process characterized by the degree of reciprocity of 
information sharing and concession making.  In particular, trustworthiness perceptions 
are especially relevant as each party is concerned with the potential of deceptive or 
dishonest behaviors, and the willingness to accept information as sincere (Parks, Henager 
& Scamahorn, 1996). Because of the importance and relevance of trust within a 
negotiation, this experiment examines the perceiver’s SFP of initial trust within a 
negotiation context.   
Accuracy of trust perceptions is also important in negotiations.  According to 
Lewicki, Saunders and Berry (2006), negotiators who believe their counterpart to be 
trustworthy runs the risk of being deceived in the event that he or she behaves 
dishonestly.  The opposite is also true; negotiators who distrust their counterparts are less 
likely to share information and cooperate even if their partner’s intentions are honest.  In 
either situation, the risk of being inaccurate affects not only outcome but future 
relationships and behaviors. 
Research has shown that trustworthiness can produce a SFP effect within a 
negotiation producing accuracy through the behavioral confirmation model.  For 
example, Tenbrunsel (1998) examined the relationship between the expectations and the 
use of unethical behavior, suggesting that factors that influence expectations may also 
influence behavior.  She concluded negotiators who believed their partners would 
misrepresent information led them to do so.  Olekalns and Smith (2007) examined how 
the general impressions of trustworthiness of one’s negotiation partner influenced the 
negotiator’s behavior and use of deception in a negotiation. They found that positive 
expectations of trust with low consequences for punishment triggered the 
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misrepresentation of information (i.e., opportunistic betrayal).  These behaviors can be 
self-fulfilling because of the strategic choices used within the negotiation are based on 
the initial expectation of whether the target intentions are favorable or whether they will 
take advantage of the perceiver. 
The trusting and trustworthy behaviors within a negotiation are chosen based on 
each party’s motivations and desired outcomes (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Pruitt & 
Carnevale, 1993).  For example, if the perceiver is concerned about preserving the 
relationship for future negotiations or business deals, they may have a higher concern for 
their outcomes as well as their partner’s.  In this example, the perceiver would use an 
integrative bargaining style, promoting cooperative behavior to find a mutually beneficial 
agreement (win-win) (Walton & McKersie, 1965).  Because trust promotes cooperation 
and information sharing, integrative tactics and behaviors used are indicative of trust 
between the parties.   
On the other hand, if the perceiver’s concern is only to “win” at the expense of the 
target, they are more likely to use distributive behaviors characterized by competitive 
tactics such as threats and displays of dominance (McClintock & Liebrand, 1998).  
Lewicki, Saunders and Minton (1999) describe this type of bargaining as a conflict where 
the parties try to gain an advantage over the other through misrepresentation (Boles et al, 
2000; Murnighan, 1991).  Because the concern for “winning” is higher in this example, 
trust may be low or perhaps ambiguous.  Relative to integrative styles, distributive 
negotiations provide less opportunities for trust to develop.  In times of lower trust, the 
perceiver would be more likely to believe that the information and offers presented by the 
target are deceptive and not out of concern for the perceiver’s best interest.  The 
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perceiver’s low trust would be communicated by the use of distributive tactics perhaps 
with the intention of claiming as much value as possible for themselves to secure their 
own future. 
Because trusting and trustworthy behaviors – as indicated by the integrative and 
distributed behaviors - are chosen based on motivation and outcome goals within a 
negotiation, they have effect on the value claimed by each party.  In Olekans and Smith’s 
(2007) experiment cooperative individuals are more likely to maximize their own gain as 
well as their partner’s, leading to greater joint gain.  Low trusting behaviors 
demonstrating the concern for self and unwillingness to be vulnerable to the target may 
also create similar trustworthy behaviors from the target.  The contention that is likely to 
arise from the use of distributive tactics will result in less value for each party (lower 
integrative potential), smaller or fewer concessions (van Kleef et al, 2004), more 
claiming value (Allred et al, 1997), and / or a greater potential for impasse. 
Hypothesis 5: The perceiver’s initial trust perceptions will influence the value 
claimed by each party.  This effect will be mediated by the perceiver’s trusting 
behavior and the target’s trustworthy behavior.  
 
The theoretical model is show in Figure 4. 
METHOD 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were 106 (53 dyads) enrolled in a private university in the 
Midwestern United States.  They participated in this experiment in fulfillment of course 
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credit.  The average age of the participants was 19.65 and 49% were female.  The final 
sample consisted of 47 dyads.  6 dyads were excluded because of technical errors in data 
collection.  The average age of the final sample was 19.6, and 49% were female.  
Participants were randomly assigned to the role of perceiver / trustor (Company 
Representative) or target / trustee (Inventor) and then randomly assigned to a partner to 
negotiate over a computer mediated chat terminal.  The initial trustworthiness – 
specifically integrity – perceptions of the trustor were manipulated (high, low).   
Procedure 
 Upon arrival to the experimental laboratory, students were randomly assigned to a 
computer terminal to determine their role, condition and negotiation partner.  After 
general instructions, the role specific instructions were presented to each participant on 
their computer screen.  Participants also viewed a video tutorial to learn how to navigate 
the negotiation interface.  Following the tutorial, all subjects completed the SINS 
measure of the acceptability of negotiation tactics.  A short online quiz was administered 
to ensure comprehension of their role and the negotiation task.  The experimenter 
provided guidance and clarification to any individual who missed a question until they 
could demonstrate proper understanding of the information.  The trustor then received the 
initial trustworthiness manipulation, consisting of false feedback about their negotiation 
partner’s perception of the ethicality of particular negotiation tactics.   
The negotiation case was an adaption of the New Recruit (Neale, 1997) where the 
premise of the cases consisted of a negotiation between an Inventor (trustee / target) who 
created a Hydrogen Fuel Cell and a representative from ABC Corporation (trustor / 
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perceiver) who desired to buy the fuel cell (see Appendix A for the case and payoff 
table).  The Inventor was given a Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) 
of 5000 points (the total possible points to earn were 10,800 for both parties).  The 
Company Representative (Rep) and Inventor were required to negotiate over eight (8) 
issues of an employment contract.  Of the eight issues, two were distributive, two were 
compatible and four had integrative potential.  Participants had 20 minutes to negotiate a 
settlement on all eight issues.  A clock on the screen indicated to the subjects at all times 
how close they were to the time deadline.  If the negotiation was successfully completed 
(i.e., no impasse) subjects then completed a post negotiation task – the Trust Game.  The 
Inventor was the player who passes the initial amount and the Rep returned a portion of 
their tripled amount back to the Inventor.  All subjects were informed in advance that 
they would be paid in cash for their earnings from the Trust Game.  The final portion of 
the experiment measured each participants’ integrity identity with an IAT. 
 Trustworthiness manipulation.  Initial perceptions of integrity were manipulated 
and given to the Rep prior to any interaction with their negotiation partner.   The 
manipulation was based on false feedback reports to the Rep about their partner’s 
negotiation tactics based on the results of the Self-Reported Inappropriate Negotiation 
Strategies (SINS) scale, a measure of negotiator ethicality (Robinson, Lewicki & 
Donahue, 2000).  The SINS scale helps to identify what tactics are appropriate and 
inappropriate in a general negotiation context.   Although all participants were instructed 
to take the SINS measure, actual scores were not reported.  There will be false reports of 
high SINS and low SINS, where high SINS indicates unethical behavior and low SINS 
indicates ethical behavior.  The false feedback reports are located in Appendix B.   
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The class scores in the high integrity condition were created by taking one 
standard deviation below the mean scores reported by Robinson et al (2000) (SD=.77) to 
create a further disparity between class scores and partner scores.  Partner scores were 
also created based on this standard deviation, where the first of five tactics (Bargaining 
competitively) was one standard deviation above the mean, and the other four were two 
standard deviations above the mean.  The class scores in the low integrity condition were 
computed similarly.  The class scores were one standard deviation above the mean, while 
the partner scores were 1-2 standard deviations above the mean.  The class mean and 
median scores reported in both conditions were the same, and obtained from Robinson et 
al’s (2000) paper. 
Measures 
Chat messages were coding using a modified version of Weingart et al’s 
recommended coding scheme for qualitative analyses of negotiation transcripts 
(Appendix C).   
The conceptual map for Hypotheses 1-3 is depicted in Figure 5.  This map shows 
how each variable is measured according to the conceptual definition.  The measurement 
of hypothesis four (point earned) does not require a conceptual definition.  Hypothesis 5 
will be measured using an implicit task. 
 Perceiver’s (Company Rep’s) Initial Trust Perceptions.  Mayer and Davis’ (1999) 
measure of trustworthiness – the integrity and benevolence subscales - were used.  The 
scale reliability (alpha) for integrity was .95 and .98 for benevolence.   The Integrity 
subscale will be the measure used in the present research. 
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Perceiver’s (Company Rep’s) Trusting Behavior.  The perceiver’s trusting 
behavior was conceptualized as the willingness to make themselves vulnerable and take 
on risk by demonstrating their interest in cooperation and relationship building.  (See 
Figure 5 for the conceptual model and measurements.) This use of integrative tactics and 
behaviors is also indicative of trusting behavior (De Dreu, Giebels & Van de Vliet, 
1988).  Integrative behaviors are based upon cooperation and relationship building, 
compromise and value creation (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965).  High 
trust yields the use of integrative tactics, cooperation, information sharing and a goal of 
value creation for both parties (Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999).  Therefore, integrative 
behaviors are reflective of and coded as trusting behaviors – behaviors that elicit 
cooperation and relationship building.  
Rhoades and Carenvale argue that a problem solving approach- or a higher regard 
for one’s own and the other’s outcomes – is defined by less contention, and greater 
cooperation with the goal of value creation for both parties.  Weingart et al (2004) also 
note that code schemes used can be reflective substantive tactics (i.e., value claiming and 
creation) but also relational elements such as showing concern for the other party’s 
outcomes, and the use of particular tactics (i.e., integrative or distributive).  They 
recommend that while these “behaviors are not mutually exclusive” coding schemes 
should emphasize the information and behaviors that are theoretically relevant.  Trust 
expectations and behaviors both have implications for the relational dynamics between 
parties, as well as the substantive tactics used to claim or create value. Along these lines, 
the perceiver’s trusting behavior was created similarly by taking into account the 
behaviors that were used to create or claim value – substantive (i.e., offers that help 
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create value for both parties, asking about preferences, compromising behavior, etc) and 
relational dynamics (i.e., contention) used by the perceiver, and labeled together as 
“integrative behaviors”.  The relational dynamic was conceptualized as the degree of 
contention and was rated on a -2 (very contentious) to 2 (very positive) scale.  All 
substantive oriented variables were coded as 0,1.  (See Appendix C for the coding 
scheme used in this experiment.)   
Weingart et al (2004) also suggests developing a coding scheme that reflects 
either a theory driven approach, a reflection of the negotiation process, or a hybrid of the 
two.  I used a hybrid approach by examining what has already been done and how 
negotiation scholars conceptualize “integrative behaviors” that also reflected the 
conceptualization of “trusting behavior”.  The codes chosen were refined based on the 
type of integrative tactics that would be used to reflect such behaviors.  For example, 
willingness to make one’s self vulnerable and assume risk would be reflected by the 
contention within the negotiation, signaling a power stance and unwillingness to 
negotiate from their position.  Cooperation and relationship building are also 
conceptualized as trusting behaviors were created to reflect the integrative tactics of 
“compromising” “asking about preferences” and “offers to create value for both parties”.   
After coding for the behaviors, I then used an empirical approach to determine 
which were most appropriate to use.  First, I correlated the variables to see which were 
highly related.  Those highly related variables would be combined.  I also mapped out the 
variables using a MDS approach.  Both the correlation table and the MDS graph showed 
the perceiver’s contention to stand alone as its own dimension, and compromising, offers 
to help create value for both parties, and asking about their partner’s preferences were all 
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highly correlated and clustered together through the MDS approach.  (See Table 15 for 
correlation table and Figure 8a for cluster diagram).  Weingart et al (2004) recommend 
this approach and it has also been used within other empirical studies (i.e., Adair et al 
2005; Carnevale, De Dreu & Carsten, 2005; Putnam, 2005; ). 
The end result was the creation of the variable, trusting behavior.  This was done 
by first summing together the variables coded as “0,1”.  The second step was to combine 
the variable “tone” (defined as the degree of contention) with the composite variable.  
Combining variables measured on different scales into a single factor is best done by 
creating factor scores.  Factor scores are the standardized score on each variable, 
multiplied by the corresponding factor loading of the variable for the given factor and 
sums these products.  This new factor created – in this case, a measure of the Rep’s 
trusting behavior – represents the linear relationship between the variables.   
Target’s (Inventor’s) Trustworthy Behavior.  The target’s trustworthy behavior 
was created similar to the perceiver’s trusting behaviors.  These variables were chosen 
again using the correlation / MDS approach to see how well they “hang together”.  
Variables chosen were highly correlated with each other – no others were – and were 
clustered together within the MDS diagram. (See Table 16 for correlation table and 
Figure 8b for cluster diagram). 
The resulting variable, trustworthy behavior, was a composite of “offers to help” 
and “cooperation” as substantive behaviors (coded as 0,1) and “contention” as the 
relational dynamic (coded as -2 (very contentious) to 2 (very positive).  As with the 
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Trusting Behavior variable, the substantive and relational codes were combined using 
factor scores because of the differences in coding scales. 
 Negotiated Outcomes.  Negotiated outcomes were measured as number of points 
earned by each party – Company Representative (trustor) and Inventor (trustee) – in the 
negotiation. 
 Post Negotiation Trustworthiness Perceptions. Post-trustworthiness perceptions 
were measured after the negotiation took place and prior to the post-negotiation task.  I 
used Mayer and Davis (1999) items to measure integrity and benevolence.  Both trustor 
and trustee completed this measure (integrity: α=.94; benevolence: α=.94). 
Post-Negotiation Task. To examine the impact of the trustworthiness 
manipulation on the Reps’ and Inventor’s behavior away from the bargaining table 
subjects were provided with a second task, the Trust Game. This game was played with 
the same partners from the first negotiation task.  Only Inventors were endowed with $5, 
and were instructed to forward any portion of their endowment in $.50 increments to the 
Rep (or they did not have to send anything at all).  Whatever sum they passed to the Rep 
would triple in value. The Rep would then be given a decision about how much, if any of 
this tripled sum to return to the Inventor.  
 
RESULTS 
Manipulation check and Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics and interclass correlations are located in Table 10.  
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The manipulation check demonstrated that the integrity manipulation was 
successful.  As a manipulation check, all trustors completed the Mayer and Davis (1999) 
measure of trustworthiness (benevolence and integrity) and trusting intentions.  For 
purposes of the manipulation check and measurement model, only the initial integrity 
perception measure was used.  Subjects in the low integrity condition reported 
significantly lower integrity ratings (M=2.02, SD=.80) than those in the high integrity 
condition (M=5.67, SD=.85, p<.001). 
Hypothesis Tests 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that the Rep’s initial integrity perceptions would create a 
change in their behavior.  I used linear regression to test whether the initial perceptions of 
integrity influenced the Rep’s trusting behavior.   The results show that initial integrity 
does impact Rep’s behaviors (β=.37, p = .01), supporting hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the Company Representative’s behavior would 
change the behavior of the Inventor so the Inventor’s behavior would mirror that of the 
Representative’s. This hypothesized relationship is also an objective measure used to 
access the affect of the SFP and t accuracy.  I tested for mediation using the four step 
sequence recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986).  Step 1 examines the initial 
predictor’s effect (the Rep’s initial trust perception) on the dependent variable (the 
Inventor’s trustworthy behavior).  Table 11 shows that the Rep’s initial integrity 
perceptions predicted the Inventor’s trustworthy behavior – that high integrity 
perceptions will cause the Inventor to use a more integrative tactics (β=.36, p<.05).  Step 
2 presents the influence of the predictor on the mediator (Company Rep’s trusting 
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behavior). As shown in Table 11, initial integrity perceptions significantly predicted the 
Rep’s behavior (β=.37, p=.01).  .  As evident by step 3, when the mediator is entered into 
the equation with the independent variable, the influence of the independent variable 
(initial integrity perceptions) on the dependent variable (trustee’s behavior) becomes non-
significant (β=-.09, p=.38).   Therefore, the Rep’s behavior fully mediates the relationship 
between the integrity manipulation and the Inventor’s behavior, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3a predicted a double mediation effect – that the Rep and Inventor’s 
behavior would mediate the relationship between the integrity manipulation and the 
Rep’s post-negotiation perceptions of integrity – while hypothesis 3b predicted that only 
the Rep’s behavior would be a significant mediator.  To evaluate which hypothesis 
predicts the accuracy of the Rep’s behavior, I used the multiple mediation macro 
(“indirect”) provided by Preacher and Hayes (2008).   
The indirect tests also use a bootstrapping method, producing a distribution of the 
values of ab.  Three sets of confidence intervals are produced: percentile, bias corrected 
(BC) and bias corrected and accelerated (BCa). The percentile confidence intervals are 
produced using 2.5% and 97.5% endpoints.  These CIs are only accurate if the bootstrap 
distribution is symmetric, otherwise the results will be strongly biased (Efron & 
Tibshirani, 1983).  The BC and BCa methods are used to correct the skewness, and are 
more accurate than the percentile when the sampling distribution is asymmetrical.  BCa is 
different from BC in the use of an acceleration statistic.  Efron and Tibshirani (1983) 
suggest that the BCa is the best CI to use. 
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Using a causal step approach outlined by Preacher and Hayes (2008), the 
proposed mediators are significant when either of the hypothesized indirect effects 
through the mediators is significantly different from zero.    Table 12 shows the results of 
the multiple mediation analysis, the indirect effects of the initial integrity perceptions on 
post integrity perceptions through Rep and Inventor behaviors.  The statistic Z is the 
asymptotic critical ratio for the total indirect effect of X on Y (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).4  
The total indirect of the mediators on the dependent variable is significant.  However, 
Preacher and Hayes (2008) state that if one of the paths is non-significant then that 
mediator does not have an effect of the independent variable (X) on the dependent 
variable (Y).  As table 12 shows, both mediators are not significant predictors of the 
Rep’s trust perception after the negotiation, and this finding is significant across all three 
variations of confidence intervals.  Therefore, according to Preacher and Hayes criteria, 
the mediators do not predict the Rep’s post integrity perceptions, therefore cannot be 
considered mediators within this model lending no support to hypothesis 3a.  However, 
because of the high correlation between the mediators (r=.85, p<.001), a significant 
degree of collinearity may account for this insignificant effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  
Further, these mediators are highly correlated because they both rely on a common cause 
therefore may not demonstrate large enough unique effects on the outcome variables.    
To evaluate hypothesis 3b as well as an additional step to explore the individual 
effects of each mediator, I ran a simple regression model with each mediator separately, 
                                                            
4
 Z is computed by (1) taking the sum of the specific indirect effects (f); (2) computing the asymptotic 
variance of f; (3) Z= f / √var(f) (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) 
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followed by a Sobel test.5  I also ran a simple regression model because of the conflicting 
results of hypothesis 3a – that the total indirect effect was significant, yet each mediator 
was not.  Examining them individually will at show how significant they are in predicting 
the Rep’s post-negotiation integrity perception without the influence of the collinearity 
when both are present in the model. 
According to Barron and Kenny’s (1986) criterion for mediation, each mediator 
partially mediated the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable; 
adding the mediator into the regression equation only slightly decreases the significance 
of the independent variable.  See Tables 13a and 13b for the simple mediation tests using 
the Inventor and Rep’s behaviors as separate mediators.  Looking at the Rep’s behavior 
as the mediator, the addition of this factor into the model caused a slight decrease in 
effect size from the independent variable, but the independent variable remained 
significant.  Rep’s behavior is therefore a partial mediator of their initial integrity 
perceptions and post integrity perceptions.  The Sobel test statistic was significant 
indicating that the Rep’s behavior is a significant mediator (2.24, p < .05).  Inventor’s 
behavior also resulted in a partial mediation model, slightly decreasing the significance of 
the independent variable on the dependent variable.  The Sobel test statistic was 
significant (2.15, p < .05); this along with the results of the simple mediation test 
demonstrate that Inventor’s behavior partially mediates the relationship between the 
Rep’s initial integrity and post integrity perceptions, supporting hypothesis 3b.   
                                                            
5
 The Sobel test is based on the assumption that the variables being used are normally distributed.  
Therefore, if the variables are skewed the Sobel test statistic may not be meaningful.  Both of the mediators 
are skewed – the skewness statistic for the Reps’s behavior is -.36 and -.76 for the Inventor’s behavior.  
The bootstrap method is more appropriate as it does not make any assumptions about the distribution of the 
data (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). 
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The Inventor’s integrity identity was predicted to moderate the relationship 
between the Rep’s trusting behavior and the Inventor’s trustworthy behavior (Hypothesis 
4).  Given the Rep’s behavior, the interaction effect showed that the Inventor’s integrity 
identity did not influence their corresponding behavior (β=.14, p=.59), finding no support 
for Hypothesis 5.  See figure 6 for a graph of the interaction. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the integrity manipulation would influence the value 
claimed (i.e., number of points awarded in the negotiation) by each party by way of the 
Rep’s and Inventor’s trusting and trustworthy behaviors; that higher trust would create 
more integrative behaviors resulting in more value for each party. To analyze the full 
effect of the manipulation on the dependent variables through the mediators, I performed 
a multiple mediation analysis using the same method as outlined in Hypothesis 3 putting 
the points earned by each party into separate models.  In examining the Rep’s points 
earned first, the results (see Table 14) show that indeed, both mediators are not 
significant.  However, the total indirect effect is marginally significant (Z=1.74, p=.08).  
In examining the specific relationship of the mediators to the dependent variables, 
the results demonstrate that the Rep’s initial trust judgment did not have a significant 
total effect on the value claimed by either Inventor (B=-7.96, p=.95) or Rep (B=-64.46, 
p=.64).  Because this effect is not significant, the multiple mediation model is not 
significant, nor in the predicted direction, finding no support for hypothesis 5.  Further, 
because of this non-significant finding, the simple regression models also show that the 
mediators are not significant individually, as they are in the results of hypothesis 3a and 
3b.   
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Finally, because the point values earned are interdependent, I also examined the 
mediators influence using a MANOVA.  The results are consistent with those above; the 
Rep’s initial trust judgment had no impact on the negotiated outcomes, but their trusting 
behaviors significantly predicted the points they earned in the negotiation (F(1, 41)=4.54, 
p<.05) although not the Inventor’s (F(1, 41)=1.30, p=.26).  Similar to the simple 
regression above, the Inventor’s trustworthy behavior had a marginal impact on the Rep’s 
points earned (F(1, 41)=3.68, p=.06) but not their own point values (F(1, 41)=.36, p=.55). 
 
Non-Contracted Behavior – The Trust Game: An Exploratory Analysis 
 Accuracy can further be examined by the behavior that occurs after the contract 
has been agreed upon.  The SFP effect predicts that the perceiver will engage in trusting 
behaviors consistent with their initial perception, eliciting similar trustworthy behaviors 
from the target.  Together, these were predicted to influence the outcomes of the 
negotiation and the perceiver’s post trust perception.  The results of this study show that 
when the perceiver engages in trusting behaviors that they are reciprocated by the target, 
yet do not jointly predict post-trust judgments nor the negotiated outcomes.  However, 
the post-negotiation game can be used to determine if individuals’ future behaviors 
reflect their negotiation behaviors and post-trust perceptions.  Do these behaviors and 
perceptions spill over into future behaviors? 
Examining these spill over affects is important in understanding how the 
behaviors and perceptions created by the negotiation process shape future exchange.  
Battacharya et al (1998) created a model of trust based on outcomes, where they consider 
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the consequences of the outcomes for both parties as the downstream affect of trust.  
Similar to other models of trust, their model shows that the actions carried out by each 
party are evaluated based on how sincere or believable they are perceived to be.  The 
actions (behaviors) and attitudes (beliefs) of the parties then interact to influence 
outcomes, which create social and / or economic consequences for each party.  Similar to 
the negotiation, the trust and trustworthy behaviors communicated and evaluated within 
the negotiation are the actions and thus the sincerity of them influences the negotiated 
outcomes.  While empirical and theoretical work have made a distinction between the 
relational and economic outcomes, Misin et al (2010) demonstrate that they are both 
important and influence future non-contracted exchange behaviors.  The consequences 
then are the post-trust judgments and behaviors that have the potential of influencing the 
future relationship and implementation of the contacted deal.  To consider this effect, I 
measured the influence of both relational (post-trust judgments) and economic (point 
earned in the negotiation) outcomes and their consequences by using a non-contracted 
exchange, the Trust Game (Berg et al, 1995). 
 Unlike the negotiation where the parties played for points, the Trust Game was 
played for real money where individuals would be paid in cash for their earnings.   In this 
game, the Representative and Inventor switch roles – the Representative becomes the 
trustee and the Inventor assumes the role of the trustor.  The amount of money the 
Inventor passes to the Representative signifies the trust they have in the Representative to 
return a portion of the money back with the expectation of at least an amount equal in 
proportion to what was sent.  The amount of money passed back by the Representative 
represents their trustworthy behavior.   The Trust Game is a unique aspect of this 
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experiment because it incorporates risk; the Inventor does not know how much money 
the Rep will send in return, if they will reciprocate the same percentage of their pie or 
leave them walking away without any money. 
In addition to examining how the negotiated outcomes spill over to influence 
post-negotiation behaviors, this non-contracted exchange also shows the extent to which 
the SFP produces a contagion effect.  During the negotiation both parties are forming 
trust beliefs of each other, influencing how they communicate and interact.  Because the 
partners’ behaviors “match” each other’s within the negotiation, it is possible that the 
perception of trust or trustworthiness is also matched, influencing the non-contracted 
behavior after the negotiation has concluded.  The money sent represents the influence of 
the Reps’s SFP on the Inventor’s corresponding trusting behavior; it is literally the 
amount of risk the Inventor is willing to take based on their perception of the Rep’s 
trustworthiness, or likelihood of returning a “fair” proportion of the money.   
 In analyzing the effects of the integrity manipulation on the money sent, the 
results show that the integrity manipulation did not influence the amount of money sent 
by Player 1 (Figure 7) – those in the low integrity condition did not send a significantly 
different amount (M=2.72, SD=1.92) than those in the high integrity condition (M= 3.22, 
SD=1.60).  The amount of money sent back by Player 2 also did not differ across 
conditions; the subjects in the low integrity condition (M=2.64, SD=3.79) did not pass 
back an amount significantly different than those in the high integrity condition (M=4.17, 
SD=2.84). These results replicate Mislin et al (2010) – the initial manipulation does not 
directly influence the non-contracted post-negotiation behavior.   
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Mislin et al (2010) attribute this contracted behavior to the relationship between 
the parties that is built during the negotiation – the trust each party has for the other - that 
has an effect on the values passed by each Player.  A MANOVA analysis does not reveal 
any significant relationships with the manipulation, trust and trustworthy behaviors and 
money exchanged in the Trust Game.  Because of the high correlation between the 
mediators (trust and trustworthy behaviors) that prevent each from having an independent 
impact on the dependent variables, I performed a simple regression analysis.  This 
analysis revealed that the Representative’s trusting behaviors predicted the proportion of 
money they sent back to Player 1 during the Trust Game (β=.54, p=.01) but not their 
initial integrity perception (β=-.23, p=.27), post integrity perception (β=.10, p=.66) or the 
points they earned in the negotiation (β=-.07, p=.69).  While the correlation between 
post-negotiation benevolence perceptions and the proportion of money sent back by the 
Rep is significant (r=.43, p<.01), this effect is not significant in a regression analysis 
(β=.23, p=.22). 
Examining the Inventor’s trustworthy behavior, points earned and post-
negotiation trust perceptions on the money sent reveals null results.  These factors do not 
significantly influence the money they chose to send their partner in the Trust Game.  For 
a game based on perceptions of trust, the Inventor’s rating of the Rep’s integrity and 
benevolence had no bearing on the amount of money they were willing to exchange.  
These results show that the Inventor’s behavior had no direct influence over their 
outcomes; it was the Representative’s trusting behaviors and choice of negotiation tactics 
that caused them to send more money back to the Inventor rather than walk away with it. 
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DISCUSSION 
Trust plays a critical role in interpersonal relationships, yet the accuracy of these 
perceptions bears the most importance; inaccuracy has negative consequences such as 
personal, emotional or monetary costs that can sever current and future relationship.  
Individuals may arrive at inaccurate judgments because of the way the perceiver decoded 
or misread the target’s nonverbal cues.  One factor that can also contribute to inaccuracy 
is the cognitive mechanisms perceivers use to decode and interpret behavioral 
information from the target.  That is, regardless of how trustworthy the target may be, the 
perceiver’s subjective evaluation causes them to behave and evaluate information 
consistent with their own perceptions.  For example, initial trust perceptions may be 
made based on how sincere, honest and credible the perceiver believes the targets 
intentions to be.  Low initial trust creates a SFP effect where the perceiver interprets 
incoming information consistent with this perception, and also engages in low trusting 
behaviors.  Accuracy is achieved when the SFP causes the perceiver’s initial trust 
perception to be calibrated with their post-interaction trust perception.   
The results of this study show that SFPs can have a powerful impact on the 
attitudes and behaviors of both the perceiver (who holds the SFP) and the target (who is 
the recipient of the perceiver’s behaviors and reciprocates with similar trustworthy 
behaviors).  Along with prior research, this experiment also supports the SFP’s effect and 
shows that the initial perceptions of low or high trust remains consistent so that post-
interaction perceptions of trust are highly correlated with initial perceptions (r=.57, 
p<.01).  This significant, positive correlation demonstrates that strength of the SFP effect 
on the perceiver’s behaviors and future evaluations. 
 107 
 
However, further analyses show that individuals achieve accuracy differently 
depending on their level of initial trust.  The models presented in figure 3 show the two 
different mechanisms responsible for the perceiver’s accuracy.  The first model shows the 
influence of the target’s behavior.  If the perceiver’s trusting behavior is able to influence 
the target’s trustworthy behavior, then the perceiver will use this as feedback to keep 
their post-interaction perception consistent with their initial perception.  However, 
accuracy can also be achieved without the influence of the target’s behavior.  In this case, 
the perceiver uses their self-perception to form their trustworthiness judgments based 
upon their own internal states.  For instance, a perceiver in the high trust condition uses 
their behaviors and perceptions during the interaction to infer or assume that the target 
has the same level of trustworthiness.   
Model 1: Behavioral Confirmation.  In examining the effect of the perceiver’s 
SFP in achieving behavioral confirmation, the results show that higher trust judgments 
caused the perceiver to use trusting behaviors, measured by the tone and content of the 
interaction.  These behaviors, indicative of integrative negotiation tactics, consisted of 
behaviors such as compromising and the types of offers made.  As well as the overall 
level of contention expressed by each party.  The target reciprocated these using 
trustworthy behaviors, measured by cooperation and the types of offers made.  The SFP 
effect had a very strong reaction on this reciprocation resulting in a highly significant 
relationship (r=.85).   As predicted by SFP theories, the perceiver’s initial trust judgment 
caused the perceiver to show their trust for the target (trusting behaviors) and a reaction 
from the target showing they are indeed trustworthy (trustworthy behaviors). 
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Model 2: Perceptual Confirmation.  This model was measured using a simple 
mediation test, including only the perceiver’s trusting behavior as the mediator.  While 
the strength of the independent variable (initial trust perception) only decreased slightly 
when adding the mediator into the model, the Sobel test revealed a significant statistic 
showing support for full mediation. 
Which model determines accuracy? 
After testing both models, the results were difficult to interpret in order to draw a 
clear distinction of which created the perceiver’s accuracy.  On the one hand, the double 
mediation model considering both target and perceiver behaviors shows that the indirect 
effect of each mediator is not significant, yet the total indirect effects are.  On the other 
hand, when performing a simple mediation test using the mediators in separate models, 
the Sobel test statistic and boot strap confidence intervals indicate a full mediation effect.    
In deciding which model contributes to the perceiver’s accuracy, consideration 
must be given to the relationship between the mediators.  Because the mediators are so 
highly correlated (r=.85) – and in addition to the small sample size – it is hard to interpret 
the results of the multiple mediation model.  The multicollinearity may be preventing 
either mediator from being exerting a significant effect on the dependent variable.  
Credence must also be given to the reason for the multicollinearity, as it demonstrates the 
perceiver’s ability to receive behavioral confirmation from the target as a result of their 
SFP.  So while the multicollinearity may be preventing statistical significance, it succeeds 
in demonstrating the affect of the perceiver’s SFP on the behaviors exchanged in the 
negotiation.  Given this, and the importance of statistical significance, the simple 
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mediation models examining each mediator’s independent influence on the perceiver’s 
accuracy may be the best way to interpret the results and identify the appropriate 
mechanism.  Therefore, perceivers are able to achieve behavioral confirmation as a result 
of their SFP (achieving objective accuracy) but it does not fully contribute to their ability 
to achieve accuracy.  The perceptional confirmation model bears more influence on the 
perceiver’s accuracy and therefore should be considered to explain their consistency in 
perceptions (achieving subjective accuracy).    
Negotiated outcomes and Non-Contracted Behaviors 
While initial trust influences the perceiver’s post-negotiation trust perception, it 
does not influence the outcomes – or points earned from the negotiation – for each party.  
The multiple mediation model predicting the point values earned by each party was not 
significant.  However, examining the indirect effect of each mediator independently 
shows that the perceiver’s trusting behaviors, and partially the target’s behaviors assisted 
the perceiver in gaining more points for themselves.  The behaviors of each party had no 
bearing on the Inventor’s points.  This shows that the when the perceiver demonstrated a 
willingness to trust the target - to compromise and create value for both parties - they 
were able to create more value for themselves; showing that demonstrating trust for the 
target earned them more points.  The target’s trustworthy behavior, however, had a very 
small influence on the perceiver’s negotiation outcomes.  This implies that the perceiver 
was able to use their trusting stance to their advantage by gaining more concessions from 
the target.    
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Surprised that the SFP did not exert more influence on the negotiated outcomes, I 
examined each condition separately to gather alternate explanations for the lack of 
significant results.   In the high trust condition none of the variables measured predicted 
the point earned by the perceiver or target.  In the low integrity condition the perceiver’s 
trusting behaviors (β=.37, p = .07) and post-interaction integrity perceptions (β=.50, p < 
.01) contributed to the value they were able to claim.  By demonstrating their trust for the 
target, under conditions of low trust the perceiver was able to marginally gain more 
value.   The cognition of the perceiver may differ in the low versus high integrity 
condition, explaining this discrepancy.  The low initial trust condition may cause 
perceivers to be more conscious of behaviors and engage in more explicit processing 
when the outcome affects the value they are able to claim.  Perceivers in the high 
integrity condition may use different information processing when negotiating with the 
target.  High trust perceptions are more likely to result in implicit processing and not 
influence the value of the negotiated agreement.  They may hold their trust judgments 
separate from their negotiation behaviors. 
The target’s integrity identity may also play an interesting part in the value of 
each party’s outcomes across conditions. The target’s points earned were correlated only 
with their IAT score in the high integrity condition (r=-.46), and their post-interaction 
benevolence perception of the perceiver (r=.44) in the high integrity condition.  The 
negative correlation between points earned and IAT score in the low condition means that 
the greater the target’s integrity identity (i.e., the more he or she associates with honest 
behaviors) the fewer points they were able to earn.  Their tendency for honesty prevented 
cheating and deception but at the expense of the value they were able to claim.  This can 
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also be supported by the association between the target’s IAT score and the perceiver’s 
points earned in the high trust condition (r=.49).  Honesty appeared to cost the target 
value.  DeRue et al (2009) recently described the paradox of honesty within a 
negotiation: being honest makes you feel good yet it has the influence of decreasing your 
payout in a negotiation.  These authors found that being honest and straightforward led to 
greater concessions within a negotiation and lower payouts.   
Examining the non-contracted behaviors using the Trust Game further revealed 
further influence of the SFP as well as the perceiver’s use of self-perception theory.   The 
amount of money the target was willing to pass in the trust game is an indication of their 
level of trust for the perceiver.  However, the amount passed was not related at all to their 
post-interaction trust perceptions nor any other factor measured.  Prior Trust Game 
results show a significant relationship between the amount of money passed by Player 1 
(the target) and the proportion of the amount passed back by Player 2 (the perceiver).  
However, the results of this study do not support this relationship.  Assuming the target 
was trustworthy, the perceiver reciprocated this level of trustworthiness by sending back 
a proportion of their earnings to the target.  The amount of money they chose to send 
back was related to their joint gain (r=.31, p<.05), their trusting behaviors (r=.47, p<.01), 
the target’s trustworthy behaviors (r=.37, p<.05) and their post-interaction benevolence 
perception (r=.43, p<.01).   
To provide an explanation for the non-significant relationship predicting the 
money exchanged in the Trust Game, I again analyzed each condition separately to gain 
alternate perspective.  This exchange behavior was the portion of the experiment that was 
most impacted by the manipulation.   Interestingly, the manipulation had an influence on 
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the money passed by the target (Player 1) in the high integrity condition (r=.46).  The 
money sent by the target was also related to the perceiver’s trusting behaviors in the high 
trust condition only (r=.50) as well as the perceiver’s post integrity perception (r=.54).  
The proportion of money passed back by the perceiver was related to their post 
benevolence perceptions (r=.56).  These significant findings suggest that the perceiver’s 
initial trust had a direct effect on their behaviors as well as the target’s level of trust, 
demonstrated by the value they chose to pass in this exchange.  However, these 
relationships disappeared in the low trust condition.   In fact, in the low trust condition 
the decision to pass a particular dollar amount was not related to any measured variable.   
The point values for each player and the perceiver’s post trustworthiness 
perceptions also had an impact on the money exchanged in the trust game between the 
conditions.  In the low integrity condition the value captured by the perceiver predicted 
the proportion of money sent back to the target (β=.75, p<.05), where the target’s points 
(β=.55, p<.10) were marginally predictive.  The number of points earned in the high 
integrity condition did not significantly predict the non-contracted exchange behaviors.  
This shows that individuals’ post-negotiation trust / trustworthy behaviors were more 
influenced by the points they were able to earn, particularly in the low trust conditions. 
 
Conclusion 
These results of this study show how significantly an initial trust perception can 
influence behaviors, perceptions and outcomes, and accuracy.  The SFP exerts influence 
by causing the perceiver to evaluate new information consistent with their perception of 
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the target’s intentions, influencing not only their behaviors but the target’s as well.  The 
SFP maintains its influence throughout the interaction, affecting post-negotiation trust 
perceptions as well as negotiated outcomes and downstream behaviors.  While the 
perceiver does have some influence on the target’s behaviors, their expectation of how 
the target may behave – not how the target does behave – is the cause for their accuracy 
and outcomes.   
This shows that trust does affect attitudes and behaviors (Jones & George, 1998), 
but that attitudes and behaviors have varying effects on outcomes; attitudes – or mindset 
toward the target’s trustworthiness - do not shift much and directly influence relational 
outcomes, where behaviors influence the value negotiators are able to walk away with.  
But they are interrelated - the attitude of one party also has a strong effect in shaping 
behaviors of both parties.  This is less of an “attitudes are contagious” effect because of 
the uncorrelated trust perception of the perceiver and target, rather, a “behavioral 
contagion” which can be used strategically to extract value for one’s self.  This follows 
Rhoades and Carnevale’s findings that behaviors tend to “match” within a negotiation 
motivations are similar.  Perceivers and targets reciprocated each other’s behaviors but 
the perceiver did not fully take into account what the target’s behaviors meant – only that 
they were using their own trusting behaviors to gain points, with a bit of assistance from 
the target. 
Overall, the results support the use of the perceptual confirmation model to 
achieve accuracy. The perceptual confirmation model indicates that the perceiver did not 
rely on all behavioral information communicated by the target to achieve accuracy. The 
perceiver used only their perceptions to assume the target’s level of trustworthiness.  This 
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shows the strength of initial perceptions on subsequent behaviors and judgments.  
Regardless of the target’s true level of trustworthiness, the perceivers’ initial impression 
caused them to evaluate information consistent with it, discounting other information that 
may object to it (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).   
Perceptional confirmation also differs across conditions and influences how the 
perceiver achieves accuracy.  In the high integrity condition perceivers use both their 
initial perceptions to guide their behavior, influencing their ability to achieve accuracy.  
This, however, is not the case in the low integrity condition.  Individuals’ initial 
perceptions still influence their post-negotiation perceptions however they do not rely on 
their trusting behavior to arrive at this judgment.  According to the ELM (Petty & 
Caciopicco, 1986), the perceiver’s motivation to process new incoming information will 
engage them in thoughtful processing (i.e. explicit) that will either change or support 
their initial perception.  If they are not motivated to process this information, then cues 
will be unnoticed (i.e. implicit).  Perceivers in the high trust condition seemed to rely 
more on implicit processing that guided their behaviors.  Low initial trust had the 
opposite effect.  The perceiver was motivated to discover new information that indicated 
the target’s trustworthiness, but refrained from engaging in trusting behaviors.  Therefore, 
their accuracy was achieved because they did not discover information significant enough 
to alter their behaviors or counter their initial impression.   
This is also similar to how individuals use their affective state to process 
information and arrive at particular conclusions (Schwartz & Clore, 1983).  High trust 
indicates to the perceiver that it is safe to take a risk, therefore should engage in trusting 
behaviors.  Low trust, however, informs the perceiver of potential threats that may stand 
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in the attainment of their goals.  Therefore, with low initial trust perceptions perceivers 
are not likely to engage in trusting behaviors in fear of exploitation by their partner.  This 
also serves to explain the reason the outcome variables were uncorrelated with the 
perceiver’s initial and post-interaction integrity perceptions.  The high trust condition, 
however, influenced both perceiver behaviors, relational outcomes and non-contracted 
behaviors.  Specifically, the high trust condition had a direct effect on the money passed 
by the target and the proportion returned by the perceiver.  This implies that the perceiver 
was able to gain the target’s trust, and by way of self-perception theory, the perceiver’s 
trustworthiness for the target increased their level trustworthiness as indicated by the 
money they sent back.   
Although examining accuracy and outcomes across conditions produces 
interesting showing that the level of initial trust may alter how accuracy is achieved, 
these results are only exploratory.  Due to the small sample size of each condition many 
of the results bordered on significance and should be cautiously interpreted.   
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GENERAL DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
Trust serves an essential function in interpersonal relationships; without it, social 
and organizational interactions would not be possible.  Trust gives us the permission to 
be vulnerable to others and take on in risky behaviors that may be present within the 
relationship; it allows us to engage in activities without making rational calculations of 
potential destructive outcomes (Lewis & Weigart, 1985).  Trustworthiness also springs 
from the definition of trust itself. Trustworthiness is said to be a perception or "belief 
about another's ability, benevolence and integrity which leads to a willingness to risk, 
which leads to risk taking in the relationship, as manifested in a variety of behaviors" 
(Dirks & Ferrin, 2001: p. 452). These perceptions of an individual's trustworthiness fuel 
the attribution process that leads to either trust or distrust (Simons & Peterson, 2000).  
However, with the potential of developing trust also brings the potential of 
changing the amount the trust perceived.  This change can come as a result of a particular 
attitude or event, or discovery of new information requiring the reassessment of the 
original state of trust.  This shift in judgment from trust to distrust, or from distrust to 
trust, is a reflection of the inaccuracy of the perceiver’s (trustor’s) initial judgment.  
Despite the severity of the consequences that may occur as a result of inaccurate 
perceptions, researchers have not directly addressed this problem it is necessary to do so.  
While the development, violation and repair of trust are essential research questions, what 
is more important is whether individuals are accurate and how this influences the 
development process, potential for violation and possibility of reparations.   
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This dissertation provided an initial examination of individuals’ ability to achieve 
accuracy and proposed a mechanism that contributes to the accuracy of judgments.  The 
first part of this research statement addressing whether individuals can be accurate in 
their initial trust was addressed in study 1.  Using temporary teams and measuring trust 
over time, I demonstrated that individuals are both accurate and inaccurate depending on 
the conceptualization and measurement of accuracy, either using subjective or objective 
criterion.  Subjective approaches to accuracy use individuals’ perceptions as a criterion 
and reference point, where comparing them over time produces measures of linear and 
consensus accuracy.  Using a linear accuracy model, I found that individuals’ perceptions 
remain consistent over time, from minimal acquaintance to well-acquainted.  This is true 
for all factors of trustworthiness with the exception of ability, where individuals were 
inaccurate. 
 The second measure of subjective accuracy, consensus accuracy, demonstrated a 
convergence in perceptions over time.  Consensus accuracy was achieved if individuals’ 
initial judgments at minimal acquaintance corresponded with their teams’ consensus 
judgment of the target (i.e., team member) after meaningful interactions.  The results of 
this consensus based approach demonstrated that individuals only converge with integrity 
perceptions, and benevolence, ability and trusting intentions are not initially accurately 
perceived.   
Finally, as an objective measure of accuracy, meta-perceptions were measured 
assessing the accuracy of the tustors’ perception of how much their team members trust 
them (generalized meta-accuracy), as well as whether particular team members trust them 
(dyadic meta-accuracy).  Meta-accuracy, a measure of whether trustors know who “has 
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their back”, was exceptionally high particularly at the dyadic level where these 
relationships are typically non-significant. 
The second part of the research statement, addressing possible mechanisms 
responsible for this accuracy, was explored in study 2 and also used an objective and 
subjective measurement of accuracy.  This experimental laboratory study manipulated 
initial trust of the trustor and measured trust after the trustee and trustor engaged in a 20 
minute negotiation.  Testing the theory that trustors create their own accuracy through use 
of the self-fulfilling prophecy, this study found that individuals’ initial perceptions were 
consistent with their later perceptions proving that individuals create their own accuracy.  
Trustors used the initial trust manipulation to form a judgment of their interaction 
partner’s intentions and motivations, which was reinforced and maintained throughout 
the negotiation as well as in their post-negotiation evaluation.  Subjectively, perceivers’ 
initial level of trust was correlated with their post-interaction level (accuracy); objectively 
perceivers’ SFP had a direct relationship on how they treated the target and how the 
target reciprocated through engaging in similar behaviors. 
Taken together the results of these two studies suggest that individuals can be 
accurate in their initial trust judgment but their achievement of accuracy may be due to 
their self-fulfilling prophecies.  The use of SFPs in achieving accuracy, as well as the 
high degree of linear accuracy, supports the notion that (and measurement of) trust is 
subjective – that it is truly in the eye of the beholder.  While individuals may agree on 
who is trustworthy after significant acquaintance, initial perceptions may vary due to the 
difference in how perceptions are cognitively represented and processed. 
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The results of this dissertation present opportunities for future work.  The SRM 
analysis in study 1 presented the shift of variance over time, from initially high perceiver 
variance (“I see everyone similarly”) to high levels of target (“we agree on who is 
trustworthy”) and relationship (“I trust one individual in particular to a greater or lesser 
degree than others within the team”) variance after meaningful interaction.  This variance 
suggests two avenues for future research.  First, the initially high levels of perceiver 
variance indicate that individuals are generally trusting of their teammates despite lack of 
personal knowledge and information about their trustworthiness.  Yet, individuals do not 
agree on who seems to be trustworthy as evident of the initially low target and 
relationship variance.  Future work can address these shifts in variance.  One way this can 
be done is by taking context into account, for example, by examining how individuals 
disposition based on their initial trust levels interact with perceptions of the institution 
interact to produce the initial trust perception and how this continually influence 
perceptions over time.  Initial trust models suggest the relationship between institution 
based trust and dispositional trust interact to influence trustworthiness and trust 
perceptions but little empirical work has addressed this proposition.  The institution based 
trust factor could be responsible for consensus accuracy of integrity perceptions in study 
1.   
Second, the high level of relationship variance suggests that trust networks are 
forming within the groups.  Future work can explore how the trust networks or factions 
may develop within teams and how this affects ongoing team functioning and behaviors. 
Further, addressing how influential these factions can be on team perceptions can explain 
how the convergence of perceptions occurs and whether it’s a function of information 
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overlap as Kenny (2004) suggests or whether it’s due to an influential trust network or 
few key individuals.  
Future work can also address why some individuals are more or less accurate than 
others. Existing research emphasizes some perceivers are more or less generally trusting 
of others (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010), which is a perceptual lens and form of bias. 
Target characteristics also receive research attention, notably the attributes of targets that 
are diagnostic versus ‘red herrings’.  Intriguingly, recent research suggests a target’s 
facial width may reliably predict behavior in a trust game (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010). At the 
relationship level, research can examine why some dyads are more accurate than others, 
and whether this relates to dyadic factors such as rapport or similarity.   
Further, just as individuals are concerned with accurately assessing the true 
motivations and intentions of their counterparts, they are also equally concerned with 
being trusted by them.  Especially in instances where developing and maintaining a 
successful relationship is important, the trustor places a large emphasis on gaining the 
initial trust of their partner.  For example, a financial advisor will need to be trusted in 
order to continue the relationship with his or her client.  How do individuals manipulate 
their behavioral cues to portray themselves as trustworthy in order to be trusted? 
The high levels of meta-accuracy at moderate acquaintance propose the question 
of whether individuals are able to achieve this level of accuracy at zero or minimal 
acquaintance.  This can be important in some settings, for example, in an interview when 
the perceiver’s accuracy in understanding how they are viewed by the employer can 
result in obtaining a job. Meta-accuracy helps the perceiver know how to respond to the 
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employer based on his/her reaction to the perceiver.  Research has examined meta-
accuracy at zero acquaintance with traits such as physical attraction (Marcus & Miller, 
2003) and personality (Jung, 2006) and found agreement between self and other ratings.  
But trust perceptions are different in that it is a relationally based construct.  Are 
individuals just as accurate in achieving accuracy at zero-acquaintance?  Further, research 
has also not yet explored predictors of trust meta-accuracy.  Does, for example, the self-
fulfilling prophecy also play a role in achieving meta-accuracy?   
The results of study 2 show that the SFP is responsible for the accuracy of initial 
trust perceptions.  Two research questions can expand this finding.  First, the results show 
that the target’s behavior did not fully influence the perceiver’s post-interaction trust 
perception.  There are experimental designs that may be able to increase the influence of 
the targets’ behavior to directly influence the perceiver’s judgments.  This could involve 
increasing opportunities for deception within the negotiation or incentives to encourage 
the target to engage in potentially riskier actions.  Perhaps acting on these strategies will 
make the targets’ behaviors much more salient and noticeable to the perceiver.  Closely 
related, another option would be to create an experimental design that would remove the 
SFP effect.  Other design factors such as time pressure or increasing cognitive load may 
impair the perceiver’s use of the SFP, creating inaccuracy in their initial trust perceptions.   
Theoretically, the results from this dissertation in conjunction with other work in 
person perception can form a theory of implicit trust judgments, describing how initial 
trust perceptions can be made “automatically” without thoughtful effort.  Skowronski and 
Ambady (2008) state that forming first impressions is “fundamental to the processes of 
person perception and social cognition” (p. 2).  The cues used to form these initial 
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impressions – particularly trust perceptions – can be interpreted inaccurately resulting in 
a misperception of the target.  Using the fundamental attribution error, for example, can 
decrease accuracy, or perhaps processing information implicitly prevents the perceiver 
from recognizing other salient, potentially diagnostic information.  The use and 
interpretation of the targets’ visible cues aids in the formation of these implicit trust 
perceptions and therefore can increase or decrease the likelihood of achieving accuracy. 
With the strengths of this research also come limitations.  First, a subjective 
measure of accuracy was used to understand whether individuals’ perceptions converge 
or remain consistent over time.  Researchers use other objective measures to assess trust 
perceptions and while they are appropriate for their context, they were not as appropriate 
here.  Second, both studies use self-report data to assess perceptions of trustworthiness.  
Third, trust perceptions were gathered in study 1 at minimal acquaintance and not zero-
acquaintance.  Although this minimal time difference should not interfere with accuracy 
(Kenny, 1991) it should be taken into account when generalizing the results. 
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Table 1 
Summary of the Perspectives on Accuracy 
 
 Realist Pragmatic Constructivist 
Defines accuracy as: 
Standard criterion set by 
experimenter; “correct” 
response. 
Individual criterion 
based on 
accomplishment of 
goals. 
Whether social 
perceptions correspond 
with social reality. 
Emphasizes:  
Observable and 
measurable behaviors. 
Accomplishing goals / 
motivations through the 
interaction. 
Interprets social reality 
based on experiences. 
Goals: 
Focuses on eliciting a 
desired response from 
the individual (outcome 
focused). 
Focuses on learning 
and using the 
appropriate strategies 
to accomplish goals 
(process and outcome 
focused). 
Focuses on constructing 
knowledge rather than 
acquiring it (process 
focused). 
Mechanisms: 
Cues lead to purpose-
drive behaviors; “if 
then”. 
Influenced by the 
perceiver; degree to 
which they use cues to 
achieve outcome goals. 
Context specific; 
individuals understand 
the situation based on 
what they know. 
Measured in this 
study by: 
Meta-Accuracy Consensus Accuracy Linear Accuracy 
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Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, Reliability Coefficients, and ralerting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
  
 
  
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 ralerting 
Variable M SD α M SD α M SD α  
Integrity 5.48 .95 .91 5.89 1.13 .93 6.12 1.17 .95 .93 
Benevolence 5.24 .97 .88 5.66 1.17 .88 6.03 1.14 .92 .99 
Competence 5.37 1.15 .83 5.73 1.15 .89 5.97 1.21 .93 .99 
Trust Intentions 4.05 .87 .81 5.64 1.18 .88 5.92 1.25 .93 .93 
MP: Integrity -- -- -- 5.71 .93 .90 6.04 .93 .95  
MP: Benevolence -- -- -- 5.65 .90 .88 5.99 .96 .92  
MP: Competence -- -- -- 5.55 .96 .88 5.95 .94 .90  
MP: Trust Intentions -- -- -- 5.72 .93 .85 6.02 1.01 .91  
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Table 3.  
Relative Variance Partitioning for Trust Intentions and Trustworthiness Ratings  
 
 
Sources of Variance: Perceptions 
 Perceiver Effects Target Effects Relationship Effects 
Variable Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Integrity 56% 18% 8% 2% 29% 26% 18% 32% 51% 
Benevolence 54% 23% 12% 2% 11% 6% 19% 46% 66% 
Ability 52% 14% 8% 0% 28% 20% 19% 39% 58% 
Trust Intentions 55% 19% 18% 2% 30% 26% 14% 33% 42% 
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Table 4.  
Relative Variance Partitioning for Meta-Perceptions of Trust Intentions and Trustworthiness Ratings  
                  
                  
                  
                  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Sources of Variance: Meta-Perceptions 
  Perceiver Effects Target Effects Relationship 
Effects 
Variable Time 2 Time 3 Time 2 Time 3 Time 2 Time 3 
Integrity 0% 2% 32% 35% 45% 45% 
Benevolence 0% 2% 24% 24% 55% 58% 
Ability 0% 2% 44% 31% 38% 48% 
Trust Intentions 0% 5% 25% 29% 53% 48% 
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Table 5. 
Degree of calibration between initial individual judgments of trust and later perceptions (Linear Accuracy) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Linear Accuracy 
  T1,2 T1,3 T2,3 
Integrity .24** .20** .67** 
Benevolence .39** .19** .57** 
Ability 0.09 0.08 .58** 
Trust Intentions 
.25** .19** .66** 
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Table 6. 
Degree of convergence between initial individual judgments of trust and team’s consensus (Consensus Accuracy) 
 
                  
         
         
         
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consensus Accuracy 
  T1,2 T1,3 T2,3 
Integrity 0.08 .13* .48** 
Benevolence 0.03 0.05 .31** 
Ability 
-0.04 0.04 .42** 
Trust Intentions 0.01 0.05 .48** 
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Table 7. 
Dyadic and Generalized Meta-Accuracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meta-Accuracy 
     Generalized  Meta-Accuracy     Dyadic Meta-Accuracy 
Variable  Time 2 Time 3 Time 2 Time 3 
Integrity  .44** .72** .31** .33** 
Benevolence  .68** .78** .27** .28** 
Ability  .25** .55** .29** .32** 
Trust Intentions  .34** .60** .31** .34** 
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Table 8.   
Testing the Mediation of Meta-Perceptions of Benevolence (Time 3)  
 
  
Benevolence Perceptions, T3 
(Does Bob perceive Beth to be benevolent?) 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
 
 
(Predicting 
MP) 
 
 
 
  β SE   β SE   
 
β SE 
 Main Effect 
      
 
  
  
Benevolence (Perceiver) 
(Does Beth think Bob’s 
benevolent?) 0.23 0.05 *** 0.83 0.03 *** 
 
0.004 0.03 
 
   
 
   
 
 
  Mediators 
  
 
   
 
 
  
Meta-Perception of 
Benevolence (Perceiver) 
(Does Beth know how 
benevolent Bob 
perceivers her to be?) 
  
 
    
0.82 0.03 *** 
      
  
    
 
 
 
    
  
R2 0.05 
 
 
0.69 
 
  
0.67 
 
 F(x) 22.8     918.31     
 
416.1     
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Table 9.   
Testing the Mediation of Meta-Perceptions of Competence (Time 3)  
 
  
Competence Perceptions, T3 
(Does Bob perceive Beth to be competent?) 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
 
(Predicting MP) 
 
 
  β SE   β SE   β SE 
 Main Effect 
        
  
Competence (Perceiver) 
(Does Beth think Bob’s 
competent?) 0.24 0.05 *** 0.32 0.04 *** 0.07 0.04 
 
   
 
    
  Mediators 
  
 
    
  
Meta-Perception of 
Competence (Perceiver) 
(Does Beth know how 
competent Bob 
perceivers her to be?) 
  
 
   
0.52 0.06 *** 
      
  
    
 
     
  
R2 0.06 
 
 
0.10 
 
 
0.30 
 
 F(x) 23.92     45.56     87.24     
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Table 10.  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
  
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Rep's Initial Integrity Perception 3.73 2.01 1 
         
2 Rep's Post Negotiation Integrity Perception 4.20 1.62 .57** 1         
3 Rep's Points 6187.23 1656.95 -0.14 .30* 1 
       
4 Inventor's Points 6781.91 1508.54 0.04 -0.11 -.72** 1 
      
5 Joint Gain 12969.15 1192.07 -0.15 0.28 .48** 0.26 1 
     
6 Rep's Trusting Behavior 0.00 1.00 .37* .58** 0.28 -0.17 0.17 1 
    
7 Inventor's Trustworthy Behavior 0.00 1.00 .36* .53** 0.25 -0.09 0.22 .85** 1 
   
8 Inventor's IAT Score (Integrity Identity) 0.61 0.33 -0.21 -.40** 0.04 -0.09 -0.06 -.41** -0.28 1 
  
9 Money Sent by Inventor 2.87 1.78 0.11 0.18 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.26 0.09 -0.05 1 
 
10 Proportion of Money Sent Back by Rep 0.34 0.29 0.05 0.27 0.21 0.01 .31* .47** .37* -0.18 0.13 1 
* p < .05     ** p < .01     
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Table 11.  
Mediation analysis (Initial trust  Trustor behavior  Trustee behavior) 
 
 
 
  
Variable   
Trustor's  
Behavior   
Trustee's  
Behavior   
Equation 1 
     
          Initial Integrity 
   
.39* 
 
          R2 (adjusted) 
   
.15 (.13) 
 
          F 
   
6.84 
 
      Equation 2 
     
          Initial Integrity 
 
.38* 
   
          R2 (adjusted) 
 
.14 (.12) 
   
          F 
 
6.39 
   
      Equation 3 
     
          Initial Integrity 
   
0.21 
 
          Trustor's Behavior 
   
.50*** 
 
          R2 (adjusted) 
   
.37 (.33) 
 
          F       10.72   
 * p < .05     ** p < .01     *** p < .001 
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Table 12.   
Double Mediation Analysis, Indirect effects of IV on DV through mediators (ab paths) 
 
   
Product of 
 
Bootstrapping (5000) 
   
Coefficients 
 
Percentile 95% CI 
 
BC 95% CI 
 
BCa 95% CI 
  
Effect SE Z 
 
Lower Upper 
 
Lower Upper 
 
Lower Upper 
Rep's Behavior 
 
0.15 0.10 1.48 
 
-.03 .32 
 
-.02 .34 
 
-.01 .35 
Inventor's Behavior 
 
0.02 0.06 0.37 
 
-.08 .13 
 
-.07 .14 
 
-.07 .15 
TOTAL 
 
0.17 0.07 2.37 
 
.04 .31 
 
.05 .33 
 
.05 .32 
              Note: Values represent indirect effects; BC: bias corrected, BCa: bias corrected and accelerated; 5000 bootstrap samples
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Table 13a.  
Simple mediation analysis, Company Representative’s (Rep’s) Trusting Behavior as mediator 
 
     
Variable   
Trustor's 
  
Post 
Behavior Integrity 
Mediator:  
Trustor's Behavior 
    Equation 1 
    
          Initial Integrity 
   
.57*** 
          R2 (adjusted) 
   
.32 (.31) 
          F 
   
21.23 
 
    Equation 2 
    
          Initial Integrity 
 
.38* 
  
          R2 (adjusted) 
 
.14 (.12) 
  
          F 
 
6.39 
  
     Equation 3 
    
          Initial Integrity 
   
.41*** 
          Trustor's Behavior 
   
.43*** 
          R2 (adjusted) 
   
.48 (.46) 
          F 
   
19.59 
     
 * p < .05     ** p < .01     *** p < .001 
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Table 13b.  
Simple mediation analysis, Inventor’s Trustworthy Behavior as mediator 
 
Variable   
Trustee's 
  
Post 
Behavior Integrity 
 
    Mediator:  
Trustee's Behavior         
Equation 1 
    
          Initial Integrity 
   
.57*** 
          R2 (adjusted) 
   
.32 (.31) 
          F 
   
21.23 
     Equation 2 
    
          Initial Integrity 
 
.36* 
  
          R2 (adjusted) 
 
0.13 (.11) 
  
          F 
 
5.75 
  
     Equation 3 
    
          Initial Integrity 
   
.49*** 
          Trustee's Behavior 
   
.36** 
          R2  (adjusted) 
   
.50 (.47) 
          F 
   
18.77 
          
* p < .05     ** p < .01     *** p < .001 
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Table 14.   
Double Mediation Analysis, Indirect effects of IV on DV through mediators (ab paths) for the points earned for Inventor and Company 
Representative (Rep) 
 
 
      
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
DV: Inventor’s points earned 
   
Bootstrapping (1000) 
      
Percentile 95% CI 
 
BC 95% CI 
 
BCa 95% CI 
  
Effect SE Z 
 
Lower Upper 
 
Lower Upper 
 
Lower Upper 
Rep's Behavior -140.55 126.01 -1.12 
 
-387.67  38.40 
 
-390.42  34.37 
 
-388.31    39.75 
Inventor’s Behavior 49.80 82.65 .60 
 
-92.71   243.59 
 
-85.20   247.86 
 
-86.56   238.55 
TOTAL 
 
-90.76 73.99 -1.23 
 
-238.67   45.56 
 
-244.18  35.58 
 
-251.43 35.56 
              
DV: Rep’s point earned 
   
Bootstrapping (1000) 
      
Percentile 95% CI 
 
BC 95% CI 
 
BCa 95% CI 
  
Effect SE Z 
 
Lower Upper 
 
Lower Upper 
 
Lower Upper 
Rep's Behavior 120.88 130.08 .92 
 
-93.12 379.88 
 
-85.18   378.00 
 
-80.35   408.67 
Inventor’s Behavior 26.60 84.67 .31 
 
-144.69   195.35 
 
-115.12   226.17 
 
-131.42   224.92 
TOTAL 
 
147.48 84.77 1.74 
 
3.00   334.34 
 
25.35   365.71 
 
24.83   385.73 
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Table 15. 
Correlations between variables coded for Perceiver’s (Company Representative’s) Trusting Behaviors 
                  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
* p < .05     ** p < .01    
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Offers to help 1 
2 Compromises .41** 1 
3 Tone (Contention) .36* .65** 1 
4 Asks Preferences .55** 0.30 0.16 1 
5 Shares Private Information -0.27 -0.03 0.05 -0.18 1 
6 Shows appreciation 0.14 0.18 .33* 0.09 -0.14 1 
7 Uses Humor 0.01 0.27 0.29 -0.12 .41** -0.03 1 
8 Uses "we" v . "I" .34* 0.06 0.02 0.26 -0.22 -0.09 -0.16 1 
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Table 16. 
Correlations between variables coded for Target’s (Inventor’s) Trustworthy Behaviors 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Offer to help 1 
2 Tone .46** 1 
3 Cooperates .56** .60** 1 
4 Shares Private Information -0.07 -0.26 -0.04 1 
5 Uses "we" v. "I" 0.02 0.06 -0.18 0.06 1 
6 Power (asserts BATNA) -.48** -.60** -.45** 0.1 -0.22 1 
 
* p < .05     ** p < .01     
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Table 17. 
Correlations, Means and SDs in the Low Integrity Condition  
 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Rep's Initial Benevolence Perception 1.64 1.08 1 
2 Rep's Initial Integrity Perception 2.19 1.11 .87** 1 
3 
Rep's Post Negotiation Benevolence 
Perception 3.05 1.45 .43* .38* 1 
4 
Rep's Post Negotiation Integrity 
Perception 3.58 1.52 .44* .40* .87** 1 
5 
Inventor's Post Negotiation 
Benevolence Perception 3.66 1.55 0.07 0.18 -0.17 -0.09 1 
6 
Inventor's Post Negotiation Integrity 
Perception 4.55 1.27 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.05 .70** 1 
7 Rep's Points 6496.43 1757.63 0.02 -0.08 .61** .49** -0.23 -0.11 1 
8 Inventor's Points 6753.57 1620.92 -0.12 -0.01 -0.26 -0.21 .437* 0.34 -.67** 1 
9 Joint Gain 13250.00 1384.77 -0.12 -0.12 .48** .377* 0.22 0.26 .49** 0.32 1 
10 Money Sent by Inventor 2.89 1.89 0.02 -0.10 0.20 0.00 0.31 0.28 0.09 0.15 0.29 1 
11 
Proportion of Money Sent Back by 
Rep 0.30 0.20 -0.19 -0.35 0.21 0.11 -0.01 -0.04 0.37 0.03 .48* 0.24 1 
12 Inventor's Trustworthy Behavior -0.25 1.05 0.24 0.13 .54** .49* -0.26 0.05 0.30 -0.07 0.36 -0.02 0.42 1 
13 Rep's Trusting Behavior -0.24 0.96 0.20 0.17 .50* .56** -0.08 0.17 0.37 -0.13 0.37 0.08 0.30 .83** 1 
14 
Inventor's IAT Score (Integrity 
Identity) 0.68 0.31 -0.14 -0.06 -0.20 -0.35 0.31 .40* -0.30 0.22 -0.12 0.01 -0.14 -0.27 -.42* 1 
15 Rep's IAT Score (Integrity Identity) 0.67 0.45 0.16 0.12 0.26 0.20 -0.09 -0.09 0.35 -.42* -0.05 0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.13 -0.10 1 
 
* p < .05     ** p < .01     
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Table 18. 
Correlations, Means and SDs in the High Integrity Condition  
 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Rep's Initial Benevolence Perception 4.91 0.71 1 
2 Rep's Initial Integrity Perception 5.61 0.78 .60** 1 
3 
Rep's Post Negotiation Benevolence 
Perception 
4.02 1.32 
0.08 0.19 1 
4 
Rep's Post Negotiation Integrity 
Perception 
4.83 1.51 
0.10 .49* .80** 1 
5 
Inventor's Post Negotiation 
Benevolence Perception 
3.54 1.13 
0.21 -0.21 -0.10 -0.31 1 
6 
Inventor's Post Negotiation Integrity 
Perception 
4.54 1.04 
0.31 0.03 0.20 -0.08 .59** 1 
7 Rep's Points 5946.00 1379.83 -0.07 0.18 0.27 0.22 -0.25 -0.06 1 
8 Inventor's Points 7116.00 1378.84 0.01 -0.28 -0.21 -0.28 0.10 0.08 -.53** 1 
9 Joint Gain 13062.00 1341.20 -0.08 -0.09 0.06 -0.07 -0.15 0.02 .49* .49* 1 
10 Money Sent by Inventor 3.02 1.70 0.24 .40* 0.39 .52** 0.07 0.09 -0.15 -0.14 -0.30 1 
11 
Proportion of Money Sent Back by 
Rep 
0.38 0.34 
-0.21 -0.14 .56** 0.34 0.00 0.35 0.17 -0.02 0.18 0.07 1 
12 Inventor's Trustworthy Behavior 0.35 0.84 0.10 0.40 .50* 0.41 0.15 0.31 0.26 -0.21 0.05 0.23 0.29 1 
13 Rep's Trusting Behavior 0.30 0.99 0.09 .49* .61** .50* -0.15 0.16 0.27 -0.28 0.00 .50* .59** .84** 1 
14 
Inventor's IAT Score (Integrity 
Identity) 
0.55 0.31 
0.13 0.01 -0.14 -0.13 0.16 0.23 .49* -.46* 0.05 0.06 -0.15 -0.11 -0.33 1 
15 Rep's IAT Score (Integrity Identity) 0.60 0.37 0.08 -0.15 0.13 0.07 0.32 .67** -0.07 -0.16 -0.25 -0.13 0.26 -0.22 -0.36 0.30 1 
 
* p < .05     ** p < .01      
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Figure 1. 
Brunswick’s lens model 
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4 
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Figure 2 
Time line of courses and data collection 
 
August 
  5-Aug DATA COLLECTION, TIME 1 
 
Required 1st Year Courses (FA08): 
10-Aug Group presentation - Critical Thinking 
 
Statistics (Gordinier)- all individual work 
13-Aug Group presentation - Critical Thinking 
 
Financial Accounting (Fields)- Three Group Assignments  
28-Aug Case write-up for Crown Cork & Seal - Management & Strategy 
 
Critical Thinking (Nickerson) - 2 group presentations; class meets 5 
times 
   
Intro to Management and Strategy (Elfenbein) - 4 group projects 
September 
 
Marketing (Lewis)- 3 group cases  
7-Sep Walgreens Assignment (Group Project I)  - Financial Accounting; also 
do peer evaluations 
 
Missing: Ray's class 
9-Sep Activity Map for Edward Jones -  Management & Strategy 
  16-Sep Case write-up for Ryanair - Management & Strategy 
  28-Sep Lexmark Assignment (Group Project II) - Fin Acct; also do peer 
evaluations 
  
    October 
  3-Oct DATA COLLECTION, TIME 2 
  8-Oct Concept Map of Strategic Management - Management & Strategy 
  9-Oct Sample Final Exam Write-up (Group Project III) - Financial Accounting 
  29-Oct Case Assignment - Marketing 
  
    November 
  12-Nov Case Assignment - Marketing 
  
    December 
  1-Dec Case Assignment - Marketing 
  15-Dec ICE presentations 
  16-Dec ICE presentations 
  17-Dec ICE presentations 
  19-Dec DATA COLLECTION, TIME 3 
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Figure 3.  
Models of Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 
 
Model 1. Using the target’s behaviors (i.e., through behavioral confirmation) to achieve accuracy 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 2. Perceiver’s achieve accuracy without full reliance of the target’s behaviors (i.e., through perceptual biases) 
 
 
      
  
Perceiver’s 
Expectation 
Perceiver’s 
Behavior  
Perceiver’s 
Judgment   
Perceiver’s 
Expectation 
Perceiver’s 
Behavior  
Target’s 
Behavior 
Perceiver’s 
Judgment    
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Figure 4.  
Proposed theoretical model and hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
Post 
Negotiation 
Trust 
Negotiation 
Outcomes 
Target’s 
Integrity 
Identity 
H3 
H4 
H5 
Perceiver’s 
Initial Trust of 
Target 
Perceiver’s 
Trusting 
Behavior 
Target’s 
Trustworthy 
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H2 H1 
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Figure 5.   
Proposed conceptual map, H1-H3
                                                            
6
 Integrity: Adhering to accepted rules of conduct such as honesty and credibility; consistency of actions and deeds; fairness and sense of justice (Mayer, Davis 
& Schoorman, 1995) 
7
 Benevolence: Evidence of wanting to do good to the Perceiver aside from egocentric profit motives; holds attitudes / values / preferences similar to the 
Perceiver (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995) 
IV/Med Initial Integrity  Perceiver’s Trusting Behavior 
 
Target’s Trustworthy 
Behavior 
 
Post Integrity 
(Accuracy) 
Definition 
Perceiver’s 
perception of 
Target’s Integrity, 
post manipulation, 
pre-interaction 
 1. Willingness to 
make self 
vulnerable and 
take on risk 
2. Demonstrating a 
willingness to 
cooperate and 
relationship 
building 
 
 1. Displays of 
integrity6  or 
benevolence7 that 
proves Target can 
be trusted; 
2. Showing honest, 
respectful behavior 
that promotes 
cooperation, 
reciprocity and 
positive outcome 
for both parties. 
 
 Perceiver’s 
perception of 
Target’s integrity, 
post-negotiation / 
trust game 
 
Measure 
Mayer & Davis 
(1999) measure of 
initial perception of 
integrity.  
 Perceiver’s tone – 
degree of contention 
present within the 
negotiation;  
Integrative  
tactics – 
demonstrating a 
willingness to 
provide information 
(vulnerability) and 
help create value 
with partner; 
interested in value 
creation for both 
parties. 
 
Target’s tone 
(contention); Integrative 
tactics- Whether the 
Target presents their 
alternatives to an 
agreement during the 
negotiation; this shows 
the Perceiver that the 
Target is solely 
concerned with own 
outcome, driven by 
profit; not concerned 
with fairness of outcome 
for both sides, mainly 
Target’s outcome. 
 Mayer & Davis 
(1999) measure of 
post perception of 
integrity. 
 
Accuracy is 
achieved if the 
correlation 
between initial 
integrity and post 
integrity is positive 
and significant. 
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Figure 6.   
Interaction of IAT and the Inventor’s trusting behavior by integrity condition 
 
 
 
 
 
Integrity Conditions 
Inventor’s Trusting Behavior 
Inventor’s IAT Score 
 151 
 
Figure 7.  
Money exchanged in the Trust Game 
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Figure 8a.  
MDS Results used to create the Perceiver’s (Company Representative) Trusting Behavior Variable 
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Figure 8b.  
MDS Results used to create the Target’s (Inventors) Trustworthy Behavior Variable 
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Appendix A.  
Negotiation Case and Payoff Table 
 
TEXT FOR INVENTOR 
Instructions 
During this experiment you will be asked to conduct a negotiation with another person over a 
hydrogen fuel cell contract.  You have been assigned the role of the Inventor of the Hydrogen 
Fuel Cell.  Your negotiation partner is a representative from ABC Motor Corp who has been 
asked to negotiate this agreement with you on behalf of his company.   
An Inventor’s Dilemma 
You are assigned the role of the inventor.  You have produced a new product that will aid in 
producing a hydrogen fuel cell to power automobiles.   Several car manufactures have been 
interested in developing such an alternative fuel source but have not been able to successfully 
complete any models.  After hearing of this new invention, ABC Motor Company is interested in 
acquiring your new invention/product.  You are also eager to sell your product to an organization 
that is able to reproduce it and build it into vehicles internationally, with ABC Motor Company 
being among your top choices.  A representative has been sent from the company to meet with 
you, where you will be negotiating the terms of the contract to manufacture this fuel cell within 
the ABC Motor Company. 
 
You will be negotiating over eight (8) issues: 
1. Ownership rights 
2. Royalties to inventor 
3. Duration of patent 
4. Location of manufacturing plant 
5. Salary to inventor 
6. Allocation of staff 
7. Control over trademark and advertising 
8. Upfront costs 
You are very confident in the successful development of your fuel cell.  Without a doubt, you 
know it will turn huge profits for you and ABC Motor Company.  The only detail you have not 
worked out is the environmental impact of this fuel cell.  In several preliminary tests of your 
product, you have discovered that the environmental impact of the carbon dioxide released from 
burning fossil fuels can have a dangerous impact on the environment. Not only that, but releasing 
hydrogen into the environment causes a break down in the ozone layer and could lead to 
increased global warming. 
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You should strive for an agreement that provides the best possible terms on these issues.  On the 
payment schedule below, you should place the most emphasis on the options with the greatest 
point value.  Thus, the greater the point value, the more valuable this option is to you.  You 
should study the chart carefully in order to earn the maximum payoff from your participation in 
the experiment.  
You will have a total of 20 minutes to reach agreement on all issues.  In order to conclude the 
deal, the two of you must reach an agreement on eight issues of potential concern.  Reaching 
agreement on only some of these issues is not sufficient.  You must negotiate a successful 
resolution of all 8 issues.  If you and your partner do not reach an agreement at the end of your 
20 minute negotiation time, the ABC Company Representative will have five (5) minutes to 
finalize the terms of the contract, and send it to you for your approval.  You may accept or reject 
this final contract.  If you accept it, you will move on to the final portion of this experiment.  If 
you reject it, you will not earn any points and this part of the experiment is over.   
For purposes of the experiment, all communication will take place via messaging over the 
computer.  There will be no face to face discussions with your negotiation partner in this 
experiment.    
While you are negotiating, you are not permitted to disclose any information that might reveal 
your actual identity to the other party within the messages you send.  You are also not permitted 
to divulge the number of points you would be getting from deals proposed.  The information 
about points and payoffs is strictly for your personal use in evaluating different options.   
 
[PAGE 2] 
You, the Inventor, have the opportunity to back out of the contract and manufacture your fuel 
cell elsewhere.  Here are your options if you choose not to strike an agreement with ABC Motor 
Corp. 
1. Back out completely, leaving the company with no compensation or production rights to 
the fuel cell, where the company rep will earn no money from this experiment.  This will 
earn the inventor an additional 5000 points. 
2. Back out completely, but agreeing to provide financial compensation to ABC, ranging 
from 0-5000 points, to cover some of the potential losses.  (This would be deducted from 
your total points earned) 
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TEXT FOR COMPANY REP 
Instructions 
During this experiment you will be asked to conduct a negotiation with another person over a 
hydrogen fuel cell contract.  You have been assigned the role of the corporate representative of 
ABC Motors to negotiate a contract for your partner – the fuel cell Inventor – to begin 
production of his fuel cell at your company.   
An Inventor’s Dilemma 
An Inventor produced a new product that will aid in producing a hydrogen fuel cell to power 
automobiles.   Several car manufactures have been interested in developing such an alternative 
fuel source but have not been able to successfully complete any models.  After hearing of this 
new invention, your organization, ABC Motor Company, is interested in acquiring this new 
product.  The Inventor is also eager to sell his/her product to an organization that is able to 
reproduce it and build it into vehicles internationally, with ABC Motor Company being among 
his top choices.  ABC Motor Company has sent you as its representative to meet with the 
Inventor, where you will be negotiating the terms of the contract to manufacture this fuel cell 
within the ABC Motor Company. 
 
You will be negotiating over eight (8) issues: 
1. Ownership rights 
2. Royalties to inventor 
3. Duration of patent 
4. Location of manufacturing plant 
5. Salary to inventor 
6. Allocation of staff 
7. Control over trademark and advertising 
8. Upfront costs 
ABC Motor Corporation prides itself on its dedication to the environment, which is part of their 
interest in taking on the hydrogen fuel cell project.  ABC has noted the positive benefits that 
yield cleaner and more efficient results.  The current CEO informed you directly that she would 
be extremely unsatisfied if this fuel cell proved to in anyway damage the environmental 
commitment and values of ABC.  In so many words, ABC’s CEO has made it our job to ensure 
very minimal damage in its production and use.  You know that if you screw this up, your job 
would be on the line. 
You should strive for an agreement that provides the best possible terms on these issues.  On the 
payment schedule below, your company has placed the most emphasis on the options with the 
greatest point value.  Thus, the greater the point value, the more valuable this option is to you.  
You should study the chart carefully in order to earn the maximum payoff from your 
participation in the experiment.  
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You will have a total of 20 minutes to reach agreement on all issues.  In order to conclude the 
deal, the two of you must reach an agreement on eight issues of potential concern.  Reaching 
agreement on only some of these issues is not sufficient.  You must negotiate a successful 
resolution of all 8 issues.  If you and your partner do not reach an agreement at the end of your 
20 minute negotiation time, you, the ABC Company Representative will have five (5) minutes to 
finalize the terms of the contract, and send it to the Inventor for his/her approval, where s/he may 
accept or reject this final contract.  If the Inventor accepts it, you will both move on to the final 
portion of this experiment, and if rejected neither of you will earn any points and this part of the 
experiment is over.   
For purposes of the experiment, all communication will take place via messaging over the 
computer.  There will be no face to face discussions with your negotiation partner in this 
experiment.    
While you are negotiating, you are not permitted to disclose any information that might reveal 
your actual identity to the other party within the messages you send.  You are also not permitted 
to divulge the number of points you would be getting from deals proposed.  The information 
about points and payoffs is strictly for your personal use in evaluating different options.   
 
[PAGE 2] 
You, the ABC Motor Company representative have just learned that the Inventor has received 
multiple offers from various, more prestigious firms, and has granted contract negotiation 
sessions to at least two other companies.  If the inventor backs out of the contract negotiated with 
this company, ABC Motor Company will lose millions of dollars that have already been invested 
in production facilities and materials.  Given this, you will have to insure the Inventor will follow 
through with his/her commitment to produce the fuel cell with ABC.   
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ISSUE OPTIONS ABC Motor's Points Inventor's Points 
        
  10 years 0 0 
  9 years 300 300 
Time To Delivery 8 years 600 600 
  7 years 900 900 
  6 years 1200 1200 
        
  25M 1200 -600 
  20M 1100 -500 
Environmental protection 
insurance coverage 15M 1000 -400 
  10M 500 -300 
  5M 250 -200 
        
  10 Years 1200 1200 
  8 Years 900 900 
Duration of Patent 7 Years 600 600 
 
6 Years 300 300 
  5 Years 0 0 
        
  100% 0 1600 
  90% 100 1200 
Allocation of Staff 80% 200 800 
  70% 300 400 
  60% 400 0 
        
  $250K 0 400 
  $200K 400 300 
Salary To Inventor $150K 800 200 
  $100K 1200 100 
  $50K 1600 0 
        
  Phoenix 0 600 
  Pittsburgh 150 450 
Location of Manufacturing Plant Minneapolis 300 300 
  Dallas 450 150 
  Charlotte 600 0 
        
  (A)Inventor - Sole Control 0 3000 
  
(B) Inventor 80% / ABC 
20% 750 2250 
Control over Trademark and (C) Inventor 50% / ABC 1500 1500 
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Advertising 50% 
  
(D) ABC 80% / Inventor 
20% 2250 750 
  (E) ABC - Sole Control 3000 0 
        
  50% 0 2000 
  40% 200 1500 
Royalties to Inventor 30% 400 1000 
  20% 600 500 
  10% 800 0 
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Appendix B. 
False Feedback Reports given to the Perceiver (ABC Company Representative) 
 
Integrity (SINS) Manipulation 
 
Prior to this negotiation, you and your negotiation partner were asked to complete the SINS scale 
as a measure of negotiator ethicality.  Some participants in this experiment were selected to see 
the result of their partner’s results, and some were not.  You were selected to receive the results, 
but your partner was not selected to see yours.  Your partner’s results are reported below.  
 
Below you will find the average scores of 150 random Washington University in St. Louis, Olin 
Business School students selected to complete this survey, followed by your partner’s average 
scores.  Reported is the overall score, as well as the score on each individual “SIN” as predicted 
by the survey. 
 
 
 
Class Statistics  Partner’s 
Scores 
OVERALL 2.2 5.19 
SD 0.77 0.77 
Median 1.12 4.84 
Specific SINS:     
1.         Bargaining Competitively 4.27 6.73 
2.        Attacking opponent’s 
network 1.84 5.41 
3.        Making False Promises 1 4.18 
4.        Misrepresentation 1.05 4.79 
5.         Inappropriate information 
gathering (i.e. use of bribes, hiring 
opponent’s teammates, etc.) 
1.12 4.84 
All scores are calculated from a 7 point scale where 1 = not at all 
appropriate and 7 = very appropriate 
 
 
Interpreting your Partner’s Score: 
 
These SINS scores reflect that your partner is very likely to use unethical tactics to come to a 
negotiated agreement.  Examples of such tactics are withholding information, lying about their 
position, providing misleading information, and making false promises.  These negotiators seek 
agreements that benefit them more than you, negotiate unfairly and dishonestly, and are less 
trustworthy. 
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 #8 B– SINS FEEDBACK – P’s ONLY – CONDITION 2, HIGH INTEGRITY 
 
Integrity (SINS) Manipulation 
 
Prior to this negotiation, you and your negotiation partner were asked to complete the SINS scale 
as a measure of negotiator ethicality.  Some participants in this experiment were selected to see 
the result of their partner’s results, and some were not.  You were selected to receive the results, 
but your partner was not selected to see yours.  Your partner’s results are reported below.  
 
Below you will find the average scores of 150 random Washington University in St. Louis, Olin 
Business School students selected to complete this survey, followed by your partner’s average 
scores.  Reported is the overall score, as well as the score on each individual “SIN” as predicted 
by the survey. 
 
 
Class Statistics 
– HIGH 
Integrity 
Partner – 
HIGH 
Integrity 
OVERALL 3.74 1.84 
SD 0.77 0.77 
Median 3.6 1.12 
Specific SINS:     
1.         Bargaining Competitively 6.73 4.27 
2.        Attacking opponent’s 
network 4.22 1.84 
3.        Making False Promises 3.12 1 
4.        Misrepresentation 2.87 1.05 
5.         Inappropriate information 
gathering (i.e. use of bribes, hiring 
opponent’s teammates, etc.) 
3.6 1.12 
All scores are calculated from a 7 point scale where 1 = not at all 
appropriate and 7 = very appropriate 
 
 
Interpreting your Partner’s Score: 
 
These SINS scores reflect partner is very likely to use ethical tactics to come to a negotiated 
agreement.  This means they will not typically withhold information, lie about their position, 
provide misleading information, and make false promises.  These negotiators seek agreements 
that have been negotiated fairly and honestly, and are more trustworthy. 
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Appendix C. 
Negotiation Coding Scheme 
 
PRINCIPAL’S BEHAVIORS  
Shares private information Sharing point values or how much they will be 
gaining / losing 
Use of humor Does the principal try to use humor? 
Use of We v. I Does the principal use more “we” or “I” 
statements 
Use of denials Does the principal deny anything that s/he is 
“accused” of 
Asks about preferences / interests Does the principal ask specifically about the 
Agent’s preferences / interests in the 
negotiation 
Willingness to make tradeoffs / compromise Does the principal indicate his/her willingness 
to compromise or make tradeoffs?  Or does the 
principal shoot the agent down (so to speak) 
Offers something that will help the joint 
outcome 
Makes reference to the offer helping both 
principal AND agent’s outcomes 
Offers something that will only help their own 
outcome 
Offer references only helping OWN outcome, 
regardless of principal’s 
Use of apologizes Does the principal apologize for his/her 
behaviors 
Use of appreciation Does the principal express gratitude / thanks 
towards the agent  
 
AGENT’S BEHAVIORS  
Shares private information Sharing point values or how much they will be 
gaining / losing 
Offers something that will help the joint 
outcome 
Makes reference to the offer helping both 
principal AND agent’s outcomes 
Offers something that will only help their own 
outcome 
Offer references only helping OWN outcome, 
regardless of principal’s 
Use of We v. I Does the agent use more “we” or “I” 
statements 
Willingness to cooperate Does the agent make counteroffers / 
proposals?  Or shoot down the principal’s 
offers / unwilling to negotiate further? 
 
PRINCIPAL’S & AGENT’S BEHAVIORS   
Who talks more Does the Principal or agent speaks a majority 
of the time in the negotiation 
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